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PART 1) Social problem addressed 
1.1 Problem area 
In Hungary (and several other CEE countries), the Roma are disadvantaged in almost all as-
pects of life: education, employment, income, housing, land ownership, or health condition. 
Moreover, they face discrimination mainly in the fields of education and employment. Open 
or covert prejudices against the Roma are visible in everyday life and in the media.  
These fields are closely connected to each other. Here, these connections will be just outlined 
and the individual topics and the supporting references elaborated on in chapter 1.3.  
Lack of education has an effect on employment. This is a general phenomenon but the em-
ployment rate of undereducated people in Hungary is especially low, even if compared to 
other countries in transition. Due to high unemployment rates and inactivity, the achievable 
income is low. This effect is further increased by the recent years’ changes in the state wel-
fare and family support systems. Because of low income and vanishing social housing after 
the regime change, more and more Roma move to the most underdeveloped areas of the 
country; thus, their spatial segregation grows, further reducing their chance to find employ-
ment. On account of historical reasons, the land ownership of the Roma is so very insignifi-
cant that the option of agricultural production is often missing or is very limited. Due to per-
manently low income, the health conditions of the Roma are also worsening, which is another 
factor of reduced employability.  
Poor education is the most important determinant in the long run. The Hungarian education 
system increases school segregation more and more – mostly as a result of middle class pres-
sure. In segregated Roma schools, the quality of education is deteriorating, which supports 
the intergenerational transmission of disadvantages. Due to segregation in education, there 
are less and less connections between the Roma and the non-Roma, which further reduces 
future employment chances. During the past years among the active labour market pro-
grammes public works programmes received preferential treatment from the state; this also 
adds to the segmented nature of the labour market. 
As a consequence of interconnected counter-effects, overcoming the disadvantaged position 
requires extraordinary efforts of the Roma and only few can achieve it. This may result in 
learned helplessness further limiting their mobility. 
The focus of the programme (namely, the Kiútprogram) discussed in this case study is the 
labour market because the biggest positive effect can be expected from the improvement of 
the labour market situation in the short run. Due to the complexity of the problem, however, 
the programme also has educational, network-building, anti-segregation, and empowerment 
aspects. 
1.2 Targeted beneficiary group(s) 
The target group of the programme are in the first place, but not exclusively, people of Roma 
origin and in productive age who live in deep poverty. The programme is active in areas that 
are densely populated by the Roma but still have an ethnically mixed population.  
Since an important objective of the programme is to facilitate social integration, there is no 
ethnic selection of the participants in the programme, even in the form of positive discrimina-
tion. Although the programme primarily includes districts of settlements where many Roma 
people live, anyone living in poverty can become a programme client. According to a survey 
based on self-declaration, 80% of the programme clients are Roma. 
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Since the objective of the programme is to facilitate self-employment (including agricultural 
primary production), applicants inclined to such activities are given preference within the 
above defined target group.  
1.3 Problem background 
1.3.1 The situation of the Roma 
Demographics and regional characteristics 
The number of the Roma in Hungary is estimated at 190,000 to 650,000, which is about 2% – 
6% of the whole population. It is well-known that the number of minorities, including the 
Roma, is usually underestimated, not only in Hungary but also in other European countries. 
According to estimates based on non-census data, there are about 520,000 – 650,000 Roma 
people in Hungary1 (Bernát, 2014). 
Based on the latest census data, the Roma population is significantly younger than the total 
population in Hungary (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Distribution of the total and the Roma population by age groups, in % 
Age group Total population Roma population 
0 – 14 years 15 32 
15 – 39 years 34 43 
40 – 59 years 28 20 
60 years old and older 23 5 
Total 100 100 
Average age 42 years 26 years 
Source: Own calculation based on the 2011 census. http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/ 
 
The smaller a settlement, the higher the relative ratio of the Roma (Table 2). 
  
                                                 
1
 When discussing these numbers, elaborating on discrepancies is beyond the scope of this study; therefore, just 
the causes of the differences are highlighted here. People are usually reluctant to admit their association with a 
stigmatised minority in front of an official state organisation. There are also differences in research as to the 
question who is classified as Roma (self-declaration, the judgement of the environment, or both); in case of self-
declaration, allowing single or multiple ethnic identity; the basis of self-declaration (language, identity, etc.), the 
purpose of the research, the questions asked in the framework of the research, and the consequent differences in 
sampling. 
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Table 2: Distribution of the total and the Roma population by settlement types, in % 
Settlement type Total population Roma population 
Village 31 53 
Town 32 31 
Cities with county rights 20 9 
Capital 17 6 
Total 100 100 
Source: Own calculation based on the 2011 census. http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/ 
 
In addition to the above presented settlement-related differences in population distribution, 
there is another regional concentration: a much higher proportion of the Roma population 
rather lives in the peripheral north-eastern and south-western counties than in the other re-
gions of the country. (In Figure 1 the two counties are named where the programme covered 
in this case study is currently active.) 
 
Figure 1: Roma population rate in comparison to the total population in Hungary’s counties, 
based on the census of 2011 
 
Education 
The most important reason of falling behind is poor education. Without a secondary school 
certificate it is difficult to find long-term, legal employment on the Hungarian labour market; 
the income of people without secondary school education is much lower – and the disparities 
keep growing (Bernát, 2014; Hajdu et al., 2014).  
According to the data of the 2011 census, more than 90% of the Roma over 15 years of age 
do not have a secondary school certificate. As to the total population over 15 years of age, 
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this proportion is slightly higher than 50% (see Table 3). In the total population, there are less 
people with a secondary school certificate among the older generations; this means that when 
considering the age distribution, an even bigger gap between the Roma and the non-Roma 
can be observed. 
The education expansion of the last decades has also affected the Roma. However, this only 
means that the differences have shifted and that new differences emerge between the Roma 
and the non-Roma. After the regime change ‘there was a significant catching up in complet-
ing elementary school and continuing education in secondary education; however, falling 
behind has grown in obtaining a secondary school certificate and attending college-level edu-
cation’ (Hajdu et al., 2014, p. 271, author’s translation). Falling behind means that many drop 
out of secondary school or attend vocational schools, where they receive a vocational educa-
tion but will not achieve a secondary school certificate. So the educational gap between the 
Roma and the non-Roma shifted to the point where – regarding employment and income pos-
sibilities – the labour market gap is: getting a secondary school certificate. 
It is important to mention a positive development, i.e. the fact that during the past decades 
dropping out of elementary school has significantly decreased among the young Roma and 
starting secondary (or vocational) school has become almost universal; moreover, significant-
ly more young people complete a vocational school education than before (Hajdu et al., 
2014). 
 
Table 3: Distribution of the Roma and non-Roma population of 15 years of age and older, by 
highest finished education 
 Total population Roma population 
Unfinished elementary school 
(ISCED1, 2) 
5 23 
Elementary school (ISCED1, 2) 27 58 
Vocational school (without secondary 
school certificate) (ISCED3)  21 13 
Secondary school certificate (ISCED4)  30 5 
Diploma (ISCED5+)  17 1 
Total 100 100 
Source: Own calculation based on the 2011 census. http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/ 
 
The fact that Roma children finish their schooling with a less marketable outcome than non-
Roma children has nothing to do with ethnic differences. Non-Roma children living in fami-
lies similar to Roma families or having similar living conditions have rather similar outcomes 
– although not the same (this will not be discussed in detail here; the point is that whether a 
child is successful in school is mostly related to poverty and living conditions and not to the 
ethnic background). Most disadvantages appear already before children enter elementary 
school or as soon as they are in elementary school; a smaller portion of disadvantages be-
comes apparent in secondary school (Hajdu et al., 2014).  
’Roma youngsters growing up in uneducated and poor families living in poor housing condi-
tions must face many obstacles during learning: their health is worse than average, they do 
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not have access to important resources to develop their skills at home, and they get squeezed 
out of good quality schools.’ (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2012, p. 46, author’s translation.) 
Educational disadvantages in Roma families are mostly due to cognitive disadvantages and 
are not of a psychological nature. They also result from the families’ living conditions and are 
not characteristic ethnic traits. These disadvantages ’are due to the fact that the parents are 
uneducated and the families are poor living in an underdeveloped region. (…) In comparison 
to middle class parents, parents living in poverty are a lot less capable of providing an envi-
ronment that enhances their children’s development (providing objects, tools, activities).’ 
(Kertesi and Kézdi, 2012, p. 47; author’s translation) 
The other important factor is that ’the Roma youngsters get squeezed out of good quality 
schools due to the selection mechanisms of the school system and because they live in disad-
vantaged areas. Most of the Roma youngsters are taught in classrooms where it is impossible 
to provide good quality education because of the high volume of unsolved educational prob-
lems. Roma children have 40% higher chance to end up in extremely segregated, difficult-to-
teach classes with an unfavourable pupil group composition; under these circumstances it is 
almost impossible to offer good quality education because the teachers are overburdened. In 
view of the fact that there is no compensation for the additional workload, good teachers 
avoid these classes. Students with a low social status – regardless of their ethnic group – have 
a significantly higher risk to be placed in a class segregated by learning capabilities. As to 
Roma students ethnic segregation is an additional disadvantage’ (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2012, 
pp. 47–48; author’s translation). 
 
Employment, poverty 
Location, age, and the level of education have a combined effect; therefore a large portion of 
the Roma is either not present on the labour market or only in a very poor position with very 
poor chances (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Distribution of the Roma and non-Roma population of 15 – 59 years of age, by ac-
tivity 
 Total population Roma population 
Employed 61 26 
Unemployed 9 21 
Student 12 12 
Other inactive 17 41 
Total 100 100 
Source: Own calculation based on the 2011 census. http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/ 
 
As a result, a rather large segment of the Roma population lives in poverty. No matter which 
indicator is examined, much more Roma live in poverty than non-Roma. According to a re-
search in 2012, 76% of the Roma, but only 12% of the non-Roma, live under the poverty 
threshold2. In addition, the situation is becoming worse, both for the Roma and non-Roma 
                                                 
2
 Poverty threshold: 60 % of the median of the equalised household income. 
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population, however, much faster for the Roma. More Roma have to face poverty and they 
are affected by it to a greater extent: the median income of people living in poverty is falling 
more and more under the poverty line. Again, this tendency is faster in the case of the Roma 
population (Bernát, 2014). 
 
Transmission of decades-old disadvantages 
As mentioned above in the section on education, before the regime change completing the 
elementary school was less common amongst the Roma than the non-Roma. As a result of the 
full-employment policy during the era of state socialism, it was possible for people with only 
very little education to find employment. Unskilled or minimally educated Roma (and non-
Roma) usually worked in underpaid, low-prestige jobs, often in industries that later turned 
out to be non-viable in the market economy. (The abovementioned regional concentration of 
Roma population is no coincidence. One area of such population concentration is the former 
industrial centre of the socialist era, the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County in the north-eastern 
part of Hungary.) Due to these circumstances, the Roma were the first to become unemployed 
after the regime change. Since then, several generations have grown up. The parents of to-
day’s children entered the labour market after the regime change – this means that many of 
them have never worked in the legal labour market. This enlarges the already huge gap be-
tween school and home and makes it almost impossible for the school to really facilitate and 
enhance social mobility, which is very often an escape from the deepest and most desperate 
poverty and the ultimate exclusion; this is not likely to change unless social policy finds a 
more focused and professional approach to address the problem. 
 
1.3.2 The representation of the Roma in the public opinion and the press 
Prejudices against the Roma contribute to their disadvantaged position and exclusion – and in 
turn, this disadvantaged position and unemployment strengthen the prejudices which become 
visible through judgements such as ‘they don’t want to work’, ‘they don’t want to learn’, 
‘stealing is in their blood’, etc. Table 5 illustrates the existence and the extent of these preju-
dices. 
 
Table 5: Attitudes towards the Roma in Hungary, 2011. Agreement with the statements, in % 
Positive items  
More social benefits should be given to the gypsies than to the non-gypsies. 11 
All gypsy children have the right to attend the same classes as non-gypsies. 82 
Respect for traditional values is stronger among gypsies than among non-
gypsies. 
63 
Negative items  
The problems of the gypsies would be solved if they finally started working. 82 
The inclination to criminality is in the blood of gypsies. 60 
It is only right that there are still pubs, clubs and discos where gypsies are 
not let in. 
42 
Source: Bernát et al. (2013, p.2). 
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According to another survey, 76% of the Roma think that they are frequently discriminated 
against when looking for employment and only 3% said that they never had to face discrimi-
nation in that respect. As to dealing with official authorities, the corresponding values were 
42% and 12% (Neményi et al., 2011, p. 78).  
There is a very particular system of prejudices with reference to the alleged attitude of the 
Roma towards working. The majority of the non-Roma thinks that the Roma do not want to 
work but if they want to find employment, they will face discrimination. 
An important negative aspect of the public discourse on the Roma is the emergence of the 
term ‘gypsy crime’. This term originates from the police jargon before the regime change but 
‘from 20063 on, it became more akin to a political slogan – one that is not only used by peo-
ple on the far right, but that is also more and more prevalent in the public media as well’ 
(Bernát et al., 2013, p. 1). 
During the content analysis of the Hungarian mainstream media, Bernáth and Messing (2013) 
observed that two topics dominate the media representation of the Roma: Roma related poli-
tics of the majority (national and local) and crime. Regarding employment, Bernáth and 
Messing concluded that: ‘Reports presenting the white, grey, or black employment activities 
of Roma communities are still very rare in the media, just like the coverage of the causes be-
hind the exceptionally low employment rate and demonstration how the lack of registered 
jobs affect local life in different parts of the country. This media representation fundamental-
ly contributes to the view of Roma also present in public opinion (and already shared by the 
previous government) as people adapted to draw on social benefits – for which reason, eligi-
bility should be tied to employment, forcing people unused to work to finally make some 
efforts in this direction.’ (Bernáth and Messing, 2013, p. 24) 
As to the question by whom the relationship between the Roma and the non-Roma could be 
improved, the answers were as follows: by the Roma themselves – 74%, by the Hungarian 
government – 59%, the parliament – 25%, the non-Roma – 23%, or by non-profit organisa-
tions – 18% (Publicus Research, 2009). This means that the overwhelming majority of the 
Hungarian population is of the opinion that it is primarily the Roma who are responsible for 
improving their situation. 
 
1.3.3 Public policy changes in the recent years 
In 2006, the socialist-liberal government led by Prime Minister Gyurcsány implemented 
some welfare and family policy measures in order to improve the situation of the poorest: the 
amount of family allowances payable for all children have been raised and the public aid sys-
tem for people of an active working age converted into a – very basic – family minimum in-
come system. This means that the income of the family was supplemented to meet a mini-
mum defined by the law. This change was strongly criticised and the government quickly 
backed down because of its unstable position which was due to other reasons. An article pub-
lished in 2008 in a weekly newspaper provides an excellent impression of the political dis-
pute on the issue. The following quote helps to understand the milieu where the social inno-
vation addressed in this case study evolved. 
‘The concrete implementation of the aid system definitely destroys the public moral 
and this is very dangerous, said Ferenc Gyurcsány in the parliament in early February 
before a small group mostly consisting of mayors. He found it problematic that ‘the cul-
                                                 
3
 After a violent murder committed by some Roma. 
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ture of permanently living on aid gains ground’, which is a ‘deviant behaviour’, and 
stated that the amount of the aid was too high and is an obstacle for entering the labour 
market. […] The socialist mayors of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén and Szabolcs-Szatmár-
Bereg counties warned the prime minister several times that urgent changes were nec-
essary in the field of family support. They argued that their voters disliked the fact that 
while they go to work every day for a low salary, others hang around while living on 
aid. […] all stereotypes against the Roma appeared in the disputes. […] Several fraction 
meetings discussed the financial aid; at one session, several socialists from Borsod and 
Szabolcs argued using the terminology of the mayors in the Szerencs micro region 
(groups socialised at a low level, a lifestyle of bearing children, irreconcilable cultural 
differences).’ (Varró, 2009; author’s translation). 
The dispute within the governing party resulted in a compromise. They did not proceed from 
the universal family allowance to a system of tax allowance for children but eliminated the 
abovementioned family minimum income feature of the public aid system and gave public 
works a much bigger role. (see Fazekas and Scharle, 2012) 
The Orbán government elected in 2010 continued this policy in a much more radical way in 
2011. The underlying assumption was that by cutting unemployment benefits and tightening 
conditions the unemployed would be encouraged to take on employment. At the same time 
public works programmes were implemented within the framework of which the wages are 
below the minimum wage level and which are supposed to teach unemployed people to work.  
The eligibility criteria for the contribution-based jobseeker’s allowance has become stricter 
and the maximum period in which the allowance can be paid has also been reduced by two 
thirds to 90 days. After 90 days the unemployed are obliged to accept the offered public 
work, whereby the level of their education is not taken into account. The amount paid within 
the framework of public works has been reduced to 156 euros4 per month, which is less than 
80% of the previous amount. Similarly, the unemployment benefits paid to the unemployed 
who are not engaged in public works have also been reduced, to 76 euros per month. Only 
one person per family can receive this unemployment benefit. 
Since 2011 the public works programmes have grown enormously, slowly pushing all other 
active labour market tools into the background. In 2014 the average number of people em-
ployed in public works reached 180,0005, the total number of participants was 366,0006. In 
2013 the share of people who could find employment on the primary labour market after be-
ing employed in public works amounted to slightly over 10% (Cseres-Gergely and Molnár, 
2014). 
Szikra (2014) provided a comprehensive assessment of the Orbán government’s social poli-
cies between 2010 and 2014. A quote from her conclusions: ‘From among all the diffuse pol-
icy directions, there is one which stands out: the lack of efforts to protect the most vulnerable 
from the effects of the crisis. The ‘able-bodied’ poor have been increasingly punished for 
their own situation: homelessness became criminalized and social assistance withdrawn for 
an increasing share of long-term unemployed.’ (Szikra, 2014, p. 496). 
  
                                                 
4
 At that time the exchange rate was approximately 270 – 280 HUF/euros; currently it is about 310 HUF/euros. 
For the sake of simplicity, in this paper we use 300 HUF/euros. 
5
 http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/gyor/let/let21412.pdf, p. 33. 
6
 http://www.parlament.hu/irom40/05233/05233-0001.pdf. The average length of public works employment was 
around 6 months in 2014; this is why the total number of participants is about the double of the average number 
of employees. 
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PART 2) Solution, influences, and relevant context factors 
 
The case study presented here describes the creation and operation of a Hungarian social mi-
crocredit programme, the Kiútprogram7 (‘Way out’ programme), from a social innovation 
perspective. It is not a classical case study because I also participated in the invention phase 
of the programme and I am still a voluntary member of the Kiútprogram Non-Profit Ltd. 
board. As a result, in some respect this case study is similar to an action research; in this con-
text the advantage is that I have deep insight into the programme’s processes such as no out-
side analyst could acquire; on the other hand, the disadvantage is that despite my best efforts 
I probably have a biased perspective. However, since the objective of the case study is not the 
evaluation of the Kiútprogram, I hope that this circumstance will not prove a problem. 
Since I did not want to present the study from a neutral ‘narrator’ perspective, I relate the 
events and decisions in which I took part in first person plural (‘we’); on the other hand, my 
own actions are described in first person singular (‘I’) or this perspective is otherwise made 
clear in the text.  
During the preparation phase of this case study in addition to casual conversations and ex-
change of information while working I conducted formal interviews with the other managers, 
programme field workers (for explanation, see 2.1.3, point 5.), and clients. Information from 
formal interviews are correspondingly marked. I may remember some details incorrectly, 
however, from the first moment of the conception of the Kiútprogram I have kept all hand-
written or electronic documents (including emails) and also made several notes while work-
ing on the programme; thus, I also applied a critical approach to my recollection. 
There are two very thorough external analyses of the programme which were conducted by 
the Budapest Institute and the World Bank. These analyses will also be presented. 
As to the use of the terms ‘Roma’ and ‘Tzigane’ (in Hungarian, ‘cigány’): the use of the 
words ‘Rom’, ‘Romani’, or ‘Roma’ (rather than variants of the term ‘gypsy’) was accepted 
by the First World Romani Congress in 1971.8 In the EU, ‘Roma’ has become the official 
term, but in Hungary, after a quick initial spreading of the term ‘Roma’ in the nineties, it is 
now solely used in the public sphere and in written documents; the majority of the Roma do 
not use it either. ‘If a politician comes here and says ‘Roma’ I immediately know that he is 
going to lie’, a Tzigane woman told me in a remote village in the eastern part of Hungary. In 
general descriptions I will use the term ‘Roma’ but in interviews, concrete situations, or when 
the Hungarian speaker consciously used ‘cigány’, I will do so as well. 
 
2.1 Solution approach 
2.1.1 The mission of the programme 
In the feasibility study (Reménypénztár, 2009a) on the Kiútprogram the mission and the most 
important characteristics of the programme are defined as follows: 
                                                 
7
 See http://www.kiutprogram.hu/index.php/en/ 
8
 http://romafacts.uni-graz.at/index.php/history/prolonged-discrimination-struggle-for-human-
rights/institutionalisation-and-emancipation 
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‘The mission of the Reménypénztár MFI9 is to help people living in deepest poverty – mainly of Roma 
origin – to improve their situation with dignity, by providing them with financial services, information 
and social assistance. […] The Program intends to share a vision with its future clients that motivates 
them to participate in local public affairs improving their inclusion and presenting them as examples for 
their peer group. […]’ (Reménypénztár, 2009a, p. 1) 
In the study conducted by external researchers of the Budapest Institute on the first two years 
of the operation of the programme, the Kiútprogram is defined in more general terms:  
‘The main goal of the Kiútprogram was to promote social mobility and integration of people in disad-
vantaged areas by enabling them to become self-employed and to establish small start-ups (or turn their 
informal activities into registered enterprises). The less explicit mission of the program was to reduce 
negative stereotypes about poor and vulnerable groups (especially the Roma) by promoting the emer-
gence of local small businesses, thereby demonstrating the willingness and the ability of the partici-
pants to act in an autonomous and responsible manner. So, the program’s emphasis was as strong in 
empowerment as in economic and financial inclusion.’ (Budapest Institute, 2014, p. 1) 
Both texts reveal that microlending is just a tool – but not the only one – for achieving the 
implementation of the set objectives. 
 
2.1.2 Why social microcredit? 
Improving the situation of the Roma requires complex interventions. There are two key ele-
ments to focus on: education and employment (see World Bank, 2010). The effects of educa-
tion become visible in the long term. In the short run, if the employment situation of the Ro-
ma does not improve, no change can be achieved in living conditions (income, housing, 
health, etc.) or social integration. Providing aid can save people from severe hunger and tem-
porary changes can be achieved by eliminating slums or by improving health consciousness. 
However, a lasting result can only arise from an increase in family income. This, of course, is 
not all but it is a necessary condition for improvement. 
A significant part of the Roma population lives in underdeveloped areas of Hungary. These 
areas are characterised by a low number of businesses, underdeveloped infrastructure, poor 
ability to attract investments, and a relatively low share of the service industry. Attempts to 
generate employment opportunities have failed so far. 
Another rationale for this is that, for instance, in comparison to Southern Europe the amount 
of small businesses in the transition economies is relatively low.10 Small and micro enterpris-
es play a particular role in creating employment opportunities. The objective of one of the 
seven flagship initiatives of the EU 2020 strategy is to ‘improve the business environment, 
notably for SMEs’ (European Commission, 2010, p. 6). Because of the poor ability to attract 
investments, in the most disadvantaged areas small and micro enterprises (including agricul-
tural ones) facilitating self-employment offer almost the only possibility of generating em-
ployment opportunities in the short run. This especially applies to the majority of the Roma 
population whose traditions make it easier to become an entrepreneur or primary producer 
than an employee. 
The largest obstacle for launching small and micro enterprises is the lack of financial and 
social capital. For the most deprived segments of the population in disadvantaged areas unse-
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 When we started the feasibility study the initiators of the programme used the working title ‘Hungrameen’. 
Then we started to use ‘Reménypénztár’ (Bank of Hope) instead. The final name ‘Kiútprogram’ was chosen 
before the programme was launched. I will get back to the reasons of the change in chapter 2.3. For the sake of 
clarity I will use ‘Kiútprogram’ throughout the study, except in quotes. 
10
 See Köllő (2015). 
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cured microloans supporting new enterprises that create employment opportunities could 
have a special significance. Providing networking capital such as mentoring and other ser-
vices related to the launch of new enterprises is as important as providing financial capital.  
The microcredit concept has been chosen for improving the situation of the Roma in Hungary 
partly because of its international success. As the feasibility study says: ‘The planners of 
Reménypénztár took Professor Muhammad Yunus’ Grameen Bank, successfully operating in 
Bangladesh for decades as the main example. The bank lends tiny amounts of money to the 
very poorest members of society, mainly to women. The model has been successfully adapted 
in the past years to local conditions in at least 60 countries.’11 (Reménypénztár, 2009a, p. 1) 
When adapting our Kiútprogram microcredit model, it was clear from the beginning (more 
details on the adaptation will be provided) that we cannot expect profitability or even sustain-
ability from the microfinance institution.12 It is completely unsupported and contradicts any 
economic growth model to expect that deeply disadvantaged people in underdeveloped areas 
can improve their situation without having access to significant capital. If we lend financial 
capital, the know-how and the social capital must be provided free of charge. These consider-
ations are the reason why in the title of our completed model we emphasise that it is a social 
microcredit programme.  
 
2.1.3 The original concept of the Kiútprogram 
During the 5 years of its operation the Kiútprogram has significantly changed, which is partly 
due to the experiences we gained in the course of our work and partly due to external pres-
sures. The model used today fundamentally differs from the original model. Here I will dis-
cuss the main characteristics of the original model applied between 2010 and 2012.13 Already 
in this period some important modifications were made but the fundamental structure was not 
changed. I will discuss the current model later in this chapter.  
The concept of the Kiútprogram is based on Muhammad Yunus’ essential social innovation, 
the Grameen model (Yunus, 1999). Yunus launched his experimental undertaking in 1976 
and established the Grameen Bank in 1983 after processing and assessing the results of early 
initiatives. Since then, several microfinance institutions have formed and the literature on this 
topic has grown enormously. Discussing microlending in general would by far go beyond the 
scope of this case study; therefore, the major characteristics of the Grameen model will be 
summarised here.  
A short review of the Grameen model 
The primary objective of the Grameen model is to provide financial services, basically loans 
and information to people living in deep poverty in order to enable them to make use of their 
own resources and thus improve their permanently disadvantaged living conditions, whereby 
the most important prerequisite for the model’s success is mutual trust in addition to the loan 
provided in the form of financial capital. At the core of the lending activity is a voluntary, 
self-nominated group of five loan recipients, whereby the security normally required by 
banks is replaced by mutual moral commitment. The group leader has a prominent role and is 
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 Since then, we have learned that profitable microlending and the reduction of poverty are also incompatible in 
developing countries, especially during crises; see, e.g., Bateman (2010), Ghosh (2013). However, this was not 
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usually the first who is actively interested in a loan. After the group leader has decided to 
participate in the programme, the programme field worker often finds the other four group 
members with his or her help. 
1. The first loan can only be used to finance income-generating activities, i.e. to launch a 
business. The business concept comes from the recipients of the loan. The entrepreneurial 
activities of the group are independent of each other, however, each member should ap-
prove of the other members’ business plans. 
2. Loans are granted after an interactive one-week training aiming at familiarising the appli-
cants with the entire process. There is a verbal examination to ensure that they understand 
the process. Another objective is to filter out applicants who are not willing to make a real 
effort.  
3. At the beginning, two members of the group receive the loan. Repayment starts in the 
first week and the programme field worker meets the groups every week. If the first two 
loan recipients make the payments on time, after 6 weeks loans will be granted to another 
two group members as well; then, after another 6 weeks the group leader is granted a 
loan. If in the first 6 weeks a member fails to make a payment as agreed, he or she is ex-
cluded from the group and the others have to find someone else to replace this group 
member. Further loans are not granted until the excluded member is replaced. 
4. To ensure the simplicity and transparency of the system, the maturity of the loans is uni-
formly 50 weeks. If a participant takes out a loan of 1000 units, he or she has to repay 22 
units per week, which represents a little less than 20% annual interest rate. The amount of 
the loan is flexible up to a predefined loan ceiling. Loan recipients must make a deposit of 
5% of the received loan to the joint group fund. This serves as an emergency reserve in 
case of unexpected situations and can be used at the group’s discretion. In addition, the 
involved bank offers and specifically encourages saving opportunities. 
5. The programme field workers are a combination of social workers and financial advisors 
(in one person) and play a central role in the system. In addition to searching for and iden-
tifying credit recipients, they also assist in forming the abovementioned groups or in ana-
lysing business concepts, and they help evaluate whether necessary conditions are met. 
They also examine if transactions are on the right track, help the groups eliminate prob-
lems, and are responsible for the regular and timely repayment of the loans. Each week 
the field workers hold local meetings with the groups. An important objective of these 
meetings is to discuss certain commonly-accepted living guidelines, to increase the partic-
ipants’ self-confidence, and to acknowledge achievements. One field worker manages 8 
groups at the same time. 
6. If the first loan is repaid as agreed, the loan recipient may be granted a second loan, 
which is larger in amount or can be used for a different purpose. The situation when al-
most all group members have received a loan and one of them fails to repay is one of the 
most problematic aspects of this system. In case of an emergency situation the group’s 
fund can be used or another loan can be granted as a last-resort solution. If despite assis-
tance a group member is not able to overcome his or her difficulties, refuses to make 
payments, or uses the loan for purposes other than agreed, the remaining members have to 
face punitive measures. They are not eligible for a bigger loan during the following year, 
even if they repaid their own debt. The moral pressure is often even harsher: at the joint 
meeting of the local groups they are held morally responsible (even reprehended) for not 
being able to persuade the non-compliant member to repay the loan. 
The loan recipients are, at least formally, the owners of the Grameen Bank. 
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Risk factors of the adaptation 
While working on the feasibility study several difficulties have been identified that required a 
modification of the original model. The most important difficulties in transition countries are:  
1. The most important characteristic differentiating the transition countries from developing 
countries and developed market economies is the existence and persistence of a ‘prema-
ture welfare state’(Kornai, 1992). In comparison to economically developed countries, in 
transition countries social benefits for the unemployed are so low that they do not enable 
the reproduction of labour force at an adequate level; in case of the long-term unem-
ployed the chances to find employment are gradually decreasing. Unlike in developing 
countries, on the other hand, in transition countries the willingness to take financial risks 
is reduced due to the still existing welfare system. This effect is especially strong because 
according to Hungarian law people who register for an entrepreneurial licence immediate-
ly lose their right to receive welfare benefits.  
2. Starting in 2012 the introduction of public works increased this effect and as from 2014 
the massive spread of public works increased it further to an extreme extent. 
3. In transition countries launching a new business requires more capital than in developing 
countries. If a programme aims at creating employment by means of self-employment, a 
larger loan than the usual amount granted in developing countries should be provided. 
4. Entrepreneurs have to deal with highly bureaucratic structures and the bureaucracy in 
transition countries is by far more excessive than in developing countries. In Hungary, 
bureaucratic obstacles for start-ups are extremely high. Outside of Budapest the situation 
is even worse. In section 2.4 concrete examples of the administrative burdens will be pre-
sented. For people with a low level of education and without assistance bureaucratic hur-
dles are almost impossible to overcome.  
5. Throughout early childhood and the years in school as well as when looking for employ-
ment the Roma regularly face prejudices and discrimination (c.f. section 2.2.3). Long-
term deprivation itself often leads to ‘learned helplessness’ (Peterson et al., 1993), as is 
well-known in psychology; this helplessness is further increased by experiences of dis-
crimination. The feeling ‘no matter what I do, it will get worse in the end’ becomes in-
grained. Moreover, men in some Roma communities are frequently highly frustrated be-
cause they are not able to provide a living for their families. To overcome this, most po-
tential programme clients need a strong motivation. One of the most important tasks is to 
enable them to play an active role. 
6. In the majority of the developing countries taxation is inefficient in low-income brackets. 
This is less the case in Hungary; however, the presence of the informal economy is also 
prevalent. Income-generating microcredits often create businesses operating in the infor-
mal sector. However, the initiators of the Kiútprogram were strongly convinced that oper-
ating in the informal sector does not represent a real solution to escape from deep pov-
erty.14 It may be suitable to somewhat improve living standards but unsuitable for elimi-
nating poverty. Working in the informal sector frequently even increases vulnerability 
and carries many risks. If social contributions are not paid, health risks become especially 
severe. However, operations in the formal economy carry an obligation to pay very high 
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 This view is supported by international experiences, see Bateman (2010). However, the Hungarian representa-
tive of the Open Society Institute’s Economic Development Fund has a different opinion, see chapter 2.5. 
 15 
taxes and contributions. In Hungary, there is no tax credit for the lowest incomes15 and 
self-employed persons have to pay taxes and social contributions as soon as they register 
as entrepreneur.  
7. In case of employing the long-term unemployed, the employer can receive contribution-
paying allowances, however, this possibility does not include the self-employed. The 
problem resulting from this fact and the failed attempts to change the corresponding law 
is discussed in section 2.3.3 in detail.  
8. To overcome this problem by bridging the initial phase when there is no income yet, there 
is a state support to become an entrepreneur. This support is granted for 6 months and its 
maximal amount per month is equivalent to the minimum wage. If the business closes 
within a year, the support has to be paid back. When planning the Kiútprogram, this sup-
port served as a fundamental basis; it was obvious that the majority of new businesses 
could not be viable without it. However, this support must be applied for and a detailed 
business plan has to be submitted. The application is evaluated by the local unemploy-
ment office, whereby the agency is not obliged to justify its decision. The programme is 
seriously endangered, if this support is not granted to all group members. Coping with the 
income situation after the expiration of the six-month support also proved a risk factor.  
While planning the Kiútprogram, we were not aware of the fact that two additional fac-
tors could cause difficulties. Local unemployment agencies have a centrally predeter-
mined budget for the support of new entrepreneurs. It frequently occurred that so many 
people applied for the support that the budget was soon exhausted; the relatively great 
number of Kiútprogram clients often caused this problem. The other difficulty was that 
the support was not granted for agriculture-related business activities, although they have 
not been excluded from the support by any regulation. 
9. In Hungary, the number of poor people is lower than in developing countries; the amount 
of potential clients in a settlement is relatively smaller. This has a distinct influence on the 
efficiency of operations. Furthermore, a different kind of microlending approach is suita-
ble to facilitate the integration of the Roma, since their situation as an ethnic minority 
significantly differs from the situation of the poor belonging to the majority society. 
10. Yunus’ innovation proved that it is possible to lend small amounts to the poor in a profit-
able way. Financial institutions granting consumer loans at very high interest rates, alt-
hough below the usury limit, began to operate in Hungary too. These financial institutions 
collapsed during the crisis or stopped lending money to the really poor people, however, 
the high level of distrust towards all new credit institutions has remained.  
11. In Hungary, the law regulating credit institutions and financial service providers does not 
include microcredits. The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (Pénzügyi 
Szervezetek Állami Felügyelete, PSZÁF) responded to our officially submitted question 
in a very unspecific way: non-financial institutions are not permitted to grant loans as a 
business-like activity. However, the official definition of business-like activity is not clear 
in Hungarian law (for more details, see chapter 2.4) and for the special case of the 
Kiútprogram the PSZÁF has not provided any official opinion. Under these circumstanc-
                                                 
15
 During the invention phase the tax credit was available for employees, but not for entrepreneurs. It was can-
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es the Kiútprogram could not engage in directly lending money; therefore, a different so-
lution was necessary to circumvent the problem.16 
 
Adaptation of the original model 
The objective was to change the original model in a way that the abovementioned problem 
could be solved or the risks resulting from it at least reduced.  
The most important, pre-planned changes (some others were added based on our experiences 
during the implementation phase) were: 
1. Field workers were assigned a much bigger role – they had more tasks. I will discuss their 
tasks later; however, it has to be mentioned that they had to participate in dealing with au-
thorities in order to counteract discrimination, even in cases in which clients could have 
handled it by themselves. This is why field workers had to be constantly present, which 
reduces the potential number of clients per field worker. 
2. The programme had to cover a part of the social security contributions which have to be 
paid by the clients. 
3. It is generally important to provide new entrepreneurs with free bookkeeping services. 
4. Due to the scale of public charges and the higher capital-intensity, it was necessary to 
grant relatively larger loans (but below 3,000 euros). 
5. In order to overcome the problem described in the section on risk factors (point 9), the 
following solution was found: Loans were formally granted by a commercial bank (Raif-
feisen Bank in the first two years) and as its agent a non-profit organisation administered 
the lending process. The decision of granting a loan was made by the involved non-profit 
organisation; the commercial bank conducted the formally required background tasks, 
based on an appropriate contract and within the framework of its CSR activity.  
6. As to the legal form of the actual microcredit institution, we decided to establish a non-
profit corporation that can utilise private capital; thus the Kiútprogram Non-Profit Ltd. 
was founded with Polgár Foundation as its majority owner (further details on the share-
holders can be found in section 2.2.2). The ownership structure of the Grameen Bank 
could not be adopted because it was a matter of principle. The consequence of the fact 
that the loanees are formally the owners of the bank is that the profit is realised at the 
management level, while the actual operation of the organisation loses its transparency.  
There are two important consequences: 
– Making the programme self-sustainable is impossible, even in the long run. It is necessary 
to involve net resources for continuous operations, mostly to cover the salaries and other 
costs of the field workers. This was clearly proved by our calculations, supporting the 
theoretical conclusion mentioned above: without significant capital injections underde-
veloped areas and severely disadvantaged people cannot improve their situation. 
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 In consideration of the circumstances in Hungary our decision proved to be right. In 2014 a police investiga-
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https://norvegcivilalap.hu/en/node/11226). Had the Kiútprogram granted loans by itself, its activity would have 
been a lot more business-like than Ökotárs’. 
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– The prerequisite for an efficient functioning of the programme was a cooperation with the 
state, partly to solve regulation issues and partly to secure at least a part of the financial 
resources. A programme of a considerable size would have significantly exceeded the ca-
pacity of private sponsors. 
According to preliminary estimations, if the programme was successful, it would be profita-
ble from the state’s perspective. The additional tax and contribution payments, the saved wel-
fare, public works, healthcare, and other costs of long-term deprivation would outweigh the 
expected costs for the state. Although we significantly underestimated the prospective failure 
rate (I will get back to this later; we expected 25% in the feasibility study but eventually it 
was 40%), even these results reinforced our hypothesis that the programme would socially 
pay off.  
Regarding financial resources, the programme calculated not only on state resources but also 
on some initiators’ sponsorship. (The initiators and private sponsors are introduced in section 
2.2.1, while the financial resources will be discussed in detail in 2.5) An important compo-
nent of this concept was that private donations – with full transparency as to the utilisation of 
all financial resources – can serve as a kind of safeguard for the state that its resources would 
be used efficiently. 
The ambition of the initiators of the Kiútprogram was mentioned in the feasibility study: they 
intended to create a process that could be reproduced by anyone after the pilot phase. One 
component of this objective was a training programme for field workers and the preparation 
of the curriculum.  
 
2.1.4 The EU Roma pilot project 
Around the time when the feasibility study was completed, an open call for proposals titled 
Pilot project ‘Pan-European Coordination of Roma Integration Methods’ – Roma inclu-
sion was announced by the EC Directorate-General for Regional Policy (DG Regio). The call 
had 3 categories, including Self-employment and microcredit.17 
This call was almost tailor-made for the Kiútprogram with only one – as it turned out later 
very important – drawback: the duration was very short, only 2 years (later extended for fur-
ther 3 months). The team of the Kiútprogram applied and won the grant. Since it was an EU 
pilot project, the applications were evaluated in Brussels, independently from the Hungarian 
government, which resulted in one winner in each category.  
The review period of the applications was extended several times and the results were an-
nounced almost half a year after the application deadline. In the meantime we had already 
begun to select and train the field workers.  
An important element of the agreement with the EU was the continuous monitoring of the 
pilot by experts of the World Bank and the UNDP. In cooperation with the programme man-
agement they conducted the impact assessment of the pilot and also assisted in monitoring. 
This will be discussed later in section 2.7. 
The institutional structure of the Kiútprogram during the EU pilot project (2010-2012) is pre-
sented in Figure 2. 
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 http://www.welcomeurope.com/europe-funding-opportunities/pilot-project-pan-european-coordination-of-
roma-integration-methods-roma-inclusion-2770+2670.html#tab=onglet_documents 
 18 
KIÚTPROGRAM
MFI
RAIFFEISEN
BANK
EXPERTS,
SHAREHOLDERS Government
POLGAR 
Foundation
Loans and savings
Loan guarantee
IT system
Advocacy
Feedback
Networking
Field work
Accepting business plans
Client and program administration
Loan  agency
Monitoring & evaluation
Quality control
EU connections
Main shareholder
Civil connections
Analysing social impact
Financing welfare bridge and other 
related costs
Regulation, laws
World 
Bank/UNDP
Impact evaluation
Monitoring support
Advocacy
EU DG Region
Roma integration 
pilot project
Largest donor
(1.43 M EUR)
Supervision 
Institutional structure
 
Figure 2: The institutional framework of the Kiútprogram 
 
2.1.5 The first phase of the operation of the Kiútprogram, 2010 – 2012 
Locations 
For the locations of the pilot project 3 areas with different profiles were selected (these areas 
were expanded later). The field work was started in settlements of the counties Borsod-
Abaúj-Zemplén and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg as well as in the 8th district of Budapest. Be-
fore the system change Borsod was the centre of heavy industry in Hungary and in this coun-
ty the loss of jobs after the change was highest. The target villages were in the zone of influ-
ence of the industrial cities and a significant portion of the population – including the Roma – 
had previously worked in industry. However, mass unemployment seriously deteriorated the 
social structure of the affected villages. In most villages the Roma live separately in Roma 
settlements or in streets with mostly Roma residents. Almost no one is legally employed.  
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg is the north-eastern county of Hungary and basically has an agricul-
tural background. The proportion of the Roma is highest in these two counties. The 8th dis-
trict of Budapest is mostly an ethnically mixed urban problem area. This district has the high-
est share of Roma residents in Budapest and is the most popular destination of Roma who 
move to the capital in the hope of finding employment. 
 
The process of fieldwork 
The operation of the programme can be best described through the activities of the pro-
gramme field workers: ‘The intense involvement of field workers providing a variety of busi-
ness and social support services was a key feature of the program.’ (World Bank, 2013, p. 9). 
Based on the Kiútprogram report (2012) the field workers’ main activities are: 
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1. Community selection: The communities to be included in the programme were jointly 
selected together with the Kiútprogram management, frequently after consultations with 
other actors such as the respective local government, the local unemployment agency, the 
Roma Minority Self-Government, or other civil organisations. The selection of the com-
munity included personal visits, getting to know the local residents, and finding one or 
more contact persons, i.e. people well familiar with the community. 
2. Community meetings: At the beginning, the field workers organised a first community 
meeting and often connected it with another communal event or gathering, in order to 
reach more people, to provide information on the Kiútprogram, and to generate interest to 
start personal interactions. The field workers were responsible for the recruitment of the 
potential programme clients and organised forums, usually in areas densely populated by 
the Roma; however, anyone could become a client irrespective of his or her ethnicity. On-
ly people with an income above the defined threshold were not eligible. Nonetheless, the 
fact that the focus was primarily on Roma clients was reportedly the reason for some non-
Roma to lose interest. The proportion of the Roma among applicants and actual clients 
amounts to 80%. (Kiútprogram, 2012, p. 82). 
3. Family visits: Next, field workers would meet interested candidates, often at their homes 
in order to have a real picture of the environment and the financial situation of their fami-
lies, and to explore whether the candidate had a viable business idea. During such a visit 
the field worker completed the intake questionnaire. Based on objective and subjective 
factors, the field worker decided if there was scope for follow-up with the candidate. In 
consideration of dropout rates at least 8 – 9 suitable candidates within a given location 
had to be identified in order to create at least one group. 
4. Group meetings: After the selection of 8 – 9 candidates, initial group meetings were or-
ganised to learn about the respective group’s dynamics. In order to receive a loan, people 
tend to present themselves in the most favourable light. During such initial meetings 
business questionnaires were completed in order to explore earlier business experiences 
(virtually all informal) and assets, and to discuss the new business ideas. During these 
meetings the candidates also selected a group leader, usually the most active and most 
motivated member. It was the field workers’ task to prepare and lead the group meetings. 
Beside the pre-arranged programmes (see later) the group meetings provided a good op-
portunity to discuss the problems of the local community and the personal or family prob-
lems of the group members. The organised debates also served as some kind of commu-
nication training. After gaining the group members’ trust, the field workers became their 
mentors. 
5. Filtering: In order to officially become group members, the candidates had to meet certain 
criteria: 
– In case of unpaid taxes or utility debts: Due to tax arrears, a government business li-
cense can be denied. Therefore, programme field workers would help serious candi-
dates with the settlement of tax arrears, public utilities-related debts, and unpaid loans 
by rescheduling them, by applying for partial debt relief, or by agreeing payment in 
instalments. 
– In case of unpaid loans: Per se, debts were not a reason for exclusion, however, too 
high debts were. The Raiffeisen Bank assisted in providing credit reports. In the first 
year of the pilot project the field workers had to deal with some candidates who did 
not really intend to start a business, but rather to use the loan to pay back informal 
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debts owed to loan sharks (usurers).With growing experience, field workers were in-
creasingly able to identify such candidates earlier. 
– Business draft: With the help of the field workers the candidates had to prepare a sim-
ple but realistic business draft (on a piece of paper, a so-called ‘checked paper’) con-
taining rough income and cost figures and a list of potential customers and suppliers. 
– Business scoring card: The field workers had to complete and evaluate a business 
scoring card, a management evaluation tool summarising the information collected 
from the base questionnaire, the business draft, and personal meetings. Subjective fac-
tors were also included, e.g. the candidates’ motivation, communication skills, exist-
ing networks, risk-taking and decision-making skills, family background, business 
experience, etc. 
The field workers would submit the business draft and the scoring card together with a rec-
ommendation to the Kiútprogram management team where the Credit Committee (CC) would 
review these materials. The members of the CC included the professional manager, the finan-
cial manager at the bank (an employee of the Kiútprogram), and a dedicated expert member 
of the management board. 
6. Final business plans: After filtering the group members a decision concerning the group 
was made and if the green light was given, the remaining group members would create 
their final business plans. The ideal number of group members was 6. The field worker 
would meet the group at least once a week and also work with the clients individually. 
Business plans were prepared in accordance with a template, including a cash flow plan 
for 13 months and detailed descriptions of the intended loan use, market connections of 
the planned business, potential partners, risk analysis, analysis of future outlook, and fi-
nally the assessment by the field worker. The business plan was recorded by the field 
worker based on the client’s detailed inputs. The group members discussed and approved 
each plan before submitting it. Final business plans were approved by the CC. Finalising 
the business plans took approximately half of the field worker’s time dedicated to the 
groups. 
7. Formalisation of the group: After the final business plans had been approved and the or-
der in which the group members would receive their loan determined (the group leader 
came last) the group was officially formed during a ceremony including members of the 
Kiútprogram management team. Each group member received a certificate and signed the 
group foundation document (including way of living-related rules defined by the mem-
bers) as well as the certification of group membership. The group also received a group 
diary to record the group meetings, repayments, and the taking and returning cash from or 
to the group fund. 
8. Preparing and issuing the loans: In accordance with the abovementioned loan order, the 
first two recipients started their businesses. Business accounts (for the cash component of 
the loan) as well as security deposit accounts and group fund accounts were opened. The 
security deposit worked as a savings account with a 15% interest at sight. Additionally, a 
personal account for the client – not connected with the loan – was opened. Furthermore, 
the Kiútprogram prepared the application for the support to become a formal entrepreneur 
or primary producer and clients were required to contact a bookkeeper who was associat-
ed with the programme. These bookkeepers were identified in each region and paid by the 
programme. At this point, clients also received a so-called ‘loan recipient’s booklet’ to 
track repayments, income, and expenses on a daily basis. 
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9. Creating and maintaining the business: Field workers assisted in the making of one-time 
investments and in buying inventory, accompanied the client if needed, or provided nec-
essary transportation. The field workers’ support was also useful in cases of prejudices 
against the Roma and the poor. During acquisitions, field workers continued to provide 
practical training on budgeting. This was important because the programme’s clients had 
rarely seen so much money before and they could have been tempted, for example, to 
purchase goods that were unnecessarily expensive. According to the Kiútprogram, such 
support had to be delicately balanced, since the clients also had to become independent. 
10. Field workers’ support in obtaining official licenses was also common: Most businesses 
were categorised as either retail or agricultural ventures. A small group chose forestry; 
the other groups engaged in scattered, single activities. Most businesses required one or 
more licenses, an operating license, a license to use public premises, an animal health 
control license, a food safety license, a fire safety license, a legacy protection license, etc. 
Prejudices by officials providing licences played a role in about half of the cases. 
11. Tasks connected with the repayment of loans: Finally, the programme’s field workers 
would spend a considerable part of their time tracking repayments and working with cli-
ents and the Kiútprogram management to solve problems of payment arrears. In case of 
default due to a breach of trust (maliciousness), the group or the Kiútprogram manage-
ment would decide to exclude the corresponding member from the group; the bank would 
stop lending money, and would initiate the debt collection. However, this was rather a 
psychological measure, since the loans were unsecured and therefore usually repayment 
could not be expected. The client was automatically added to the bank’s ‘black list’. 
Between 2010 and 2012 over 900 candidates were personally contacted and loans were 
granted to 138 clients. (Further details on the results of lending will be provided later.) 
Practice showed that during the planning the field workers’ tasks and consequently their costs 
had been underestimated. The following list shows some examples of the tasks a client has to 
fulfil when a business is started. These are just general requirements (for individual cases 
there are several additional requirements): 
– An official confirmation from the tax authority certifying that there are no unpaid tax-
related debts or other debts to the public has to be requested. To do so, missing tax returns 
for the past 5 years have to be completed, even if there is no taxable income. If there is a 
debt, a payment agreement has to be signed.  
– Another official confirmation has to be obtained from the local government certifying that 
there is no default of payment concerning rent, dues, or fines. If needed, a payment 
agreement has to be signed. 
– The client has to apply for support to become an entrepreneur at the local unemployment 
agency. 
– A business account has to be opened. 
– An entrepreneur’s licence has to be obtained. 
– The programme’s client has to pay contributions, submit tax returns, fill out invoices, 
handle invoices and banking receipts, create a financial balance, and find an appropriate 
bookkeeper for these tasks.  
The conflict between bureaucratic obligations, on the one hand, and the clients’ partial or 
complete financial or administrative illiteracy has to be resolved. The situation is further 
complicated by the fact that the locations of administrative offices are usually not easily ac-
cessible; even if they are not very far away, they are not easily accessible because of trans-
portation difficulties. It often takes a whole day to receive a certificate; sometimes pro-
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gramme’s clients had to return twice; therefore, the process could even last up to 3 days, 
which is not uncommon. Due to this, field workers need a car, which is also helpful if the 
field worker has to accompany the client to the respective administrative office. 
The fact that being free of tax debts and debts to the public is a prerequisite for becoming an 
entrepreneur creates a vicious circle. Public utilities-related debts or fines for working in the 
informal sector are classified as debts to the public. In the case of Kiútprogram clients, these 
debts resulted from their status, i.e. the lack of a legal job. As long as such debts are not re-
paid, there is no possibility to make a living because there are no legal employment opportu-
nities – the permission to become an entrepreneur is denied and thus debts cannot be repaid. 
Theoretically, it is possible to agree a payment in instalments but to overcome the related 
administrative hurdles exceeds even an average citizen’s capabilities. Finding a solution for 
this problem was also in the responsibility of the field workers. 
 
The correction of the model in 2011 
The recruitment of clients started much slower than expected and by early 2011 the pro-
gramme was displaying several signs of crisis, most importantly an increase in the number of 
late payments or unpaid loan instalments. Based on these experiences, changes were intro-
duced to the selection process of the clients and the implementation of the programme. The 
most important modifications were: 
– During the selection process of the clients more emphasis was put on the clients’ personal 
traits, capabilities and motivation to become an entrepreneur, credit history, the support-
ing role of the family, and any earlier experience. 
– The loan product and group formation rules were made more flexible.  
– The training of field workers was improved and made more complex. New field workers 
were hired in several stages and also replacements were made. 
– New regions were added to the target areas. 
– In addition to targeting clients by means of a wider network of relationships, economic 
network-building activities were included. 
After the modification of the model the performance of the programme improved significant-
ly. 
In parallel to the correction of the model, the Budapest Institute, an independent research in-
stitute focusing on regulatory policies, was commissioned to conduct an interim evaluation of 
the programme. They summarised their research in a thorough study, see Reszkető and Vára-
di (2012). In the following section especially one of the findings of the study is highlighted: 
The project’s objectives were over-ambitious, which has been realised too late. The tension 
between the goals and achieved results had a negative effect on the work of the programme 
management and the internal cohesion. Based on international examples, the time and effec-
tiveness needed for recruiting new clients were underestimated. In the beginning, the level of 
the clients’ distrust was high. The potential clients did not know the Kiútprogram; therefore, 
their fear of being cheated was huge. Most of the serious candidates overestimated the risks. 
Initially, it took several months for some field workers to form a single group; the lack of 
experience doubtlessly played an important role too. 
By now, the Kiútprogram has become more well-known among potential clients and there is 
a growing interest. We are still confronted with the abovementioned problems, however, less 
intensely. The potential clients’ worries, which are understandable, are additionally increased 
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by ‘well-informed’ gossip intending to disguise fear, insecurity, and to explain these with 
external causes. For illustration, let me quote from two interviews conducted in 2015. The 
first interviewee is a client: ‘There was a time when I wanted to withdraw because there were 
gossips that we would fail because 50018 (thousand) must be repaid.’ Another example is 
from an interview with a field worker: ‘There were pieces of information or rather fears or 
disbeliefs that we get 3 million per family, but we only toss them 1 or 2 hundred thousand 
forints and we are not fair with them.’ (author’s translations) The peculiarity of the situation 
is that at that time the Kiútprogram was already financed solely by private resources. I will 
get back to this topic later. 
Constant self-reflexion, analysis, and the modification of the applied processes are crucial 
characteristics of the Kiútprogram. From this perspective, the conditions of the EU pilot pro-
ject were favourable, enabling the implementers of the programme to make adjustments to the 
processes, and the loan granting institutions accepted that we had less clients than defined in 
the application. Of course, a precondition for this approval was a detailed documentation and 
analysis of the processes which had to be conducted and submitted by the implementers of 
the programme, and the decision was preceded by a visit of DG Regio in the field. 
This is important to stress because we often see that projects financed by EU resources but 
supervised by Hungarian agencies cannot be modified, even if the original concepts proved 
wrong in practice; consequently, these projects fulfil all formal requirements but fail to fulfil 
their real purpose. 
 
The cucumber subproject in 2012 
Because of its characteristics and significance, I will describe the genesis of this business 
model in more detail. First, three women within a group of a village in Szabolcs-Szatmár-
Bereg County took on a loan for cucumber growing (the other group members choose differ-
ent activities). 
What is cucumber growing about? Pickled 3 – 6 cm long cucumbers can be sold at a good 
price to packaging factories that mostly export cucumbers to Western Europe. If the cucum-
bers are bigger, the price falls drastically; the next category, cucumbers of 5 – 8 cm (catego-
ries overlap because of the imprecision of the sorting machine), is already 15% cheaper; 
therefore, much attention and precise working is needed from April or May to September or 
October, since cucumbers can grow fast and reach the next category within just one day. 
These small cucumbers are grown in a similar way to grapes; they grow upwards supported 
by wires drawn between posts19. One person can manage an approximately 250 – 300 m long 
row of cucumbers plants, which can be set up even in a yard around a house.  
Based on this technology, an economic network has evolved during the recent decades where 
the central player is the so-called ‘integrator’ (coordinator). The integrators distribute seeds, 
nutrients, and pesticides, instruct participants if necessary and finally ship the cucumbers to 
the processing factory (frequently in the possession of the integrators). Prices are agreed upon 
in advance and material costs are deducted when the produce is collected. The producers 
have to invest in the watering system, posts, and a well, if there is none on the plot. Trust 
between the integrator and the producer is of essential importance. The biggest risk for an 
integrator is that another wholesaler may arrive at harvest time and make a higher offer for 
                                                 
18
 500,000 HUF (1,670 euros). The actual amount of the loan that had to be repaid was exactly a quarter of this. 
19
 In section 2.6, more details will follow about the technological innovation leading to this solution. If anyone is 
interested, pictures taken on site can be requested from the author. 
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the product. Such wholesalers can easily do this because they did not invest in the seeds, ma-
terials, and organising or training. Producers who accept such deals make the higher profit 
only once because the integrator will not enter into a contract with them again. Involving new 
producers is another huge risk for the integrator, because there is no guarantee that they will 
adhere to the rules when growing the cucumbers. However, the producers also take a risk if 
the integrator tries to pay less than originally agreed.  
What was the role of the Kiútprogram in this context? At the beginning, loans of a little more 
than 400 euros per participant were granted for drilling wells and paying the watering system 
and the posts. Also social security contributions had to be paid. Due to the lack of trust to-
wards the Roma, integrators work with them only in exceptional cases. Within the framework 
of the Kiútprogram the cooperation with the Roma became possible by means of a trilateral 
contract between integrator, the producers, and the Kiútprogram. 
Because of the contributions that must be paid and the repayment of the loan, growing a 250 
m long row of cucumber plants is not profitable in the first year. However, with the help of 
family members women cultivated a much bigger area, thus achieving a net income. A real 
profit can be expected in the second year when no new investments have to be made and con-
tributions are not to be paid anymore. However, the integrator told the producers that due to 
increased shipping costs he could only afford to enter into a contract with them, if they re-
cruited additional trustworthy partners in the village. 
The initiative was a huge success and group members, under the group leader’s guidance, 
recruited 20 new growers, mostly Roma women, and some non-Roma. Trilateral agreements 
were made among the growers, the integrator, and the Kiútprogram. For new participants, the 
Kiútprogram continued to provide loans to cover the cost of investments and contributions, 
except for the steps of regular group forming and sequential lending. However, forming the 
initial group of participants at the beginning has proven useful, since without the efforts of 
the group the recruitment of further growers would not have been successful.  
 
Results of lending 
The EU pilot project ran until September 2012. Table 6 summarises its activity in that period. 
 
Table 6: Base performance indicators between 2010 and 2012 
Settlements screened 202 
Persons screened (personal connection with field workers) 900 
Number of intake questionnaires 447 
Pre-groups 60 
Groups formed 44 
Settlements with formed groups 38 
Group members 192 
Number of loan recipients (clients) 138 
Entrepreneurs 75 
Mobile retailers 33 
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Shopkeepers 14 
Forestry, timbering 10 
Other 18 
Licensed primary producers 63 
Animal husbandry 32 
Plant cultivation 31 
Number of loan disbursements a 153 
Value of total portfolio 235,000 EUR b 
Source: Kiútprogram (2012). 
a) One person can receive more than one loan. 
b) Calculated at 300 HUF/EUR exchange rate. 
 
The summary loan indicators are presented in Table 7. Depending on whether their groups 
were formed before or after the model correction, the clients are referred to as belonging to 
the 1st or 2nd batch. Since cucumber growing is partly a different model, these clients are re-
ferred to as 3rd batch. 
 
Table 7: Summary loan indicators by batch 
 1st batch 2nd batch 3rd batch Total/average 
Groups formed 12 26 6 44 
Loan recipients 41 74 23 138 
Still operating as entre-
preneur in September 
2012 
13 59 23 95 
Loan disbursements 49 81 23 153 
Average loan per person 2,360 EUR 1,710 EUR 510 EUR 1,700 EUR 
Average duration 52 weeks 43 weeks 26 weeks  
Source: Kiútprogram (2012). 
 
The EU pilot project expired in September 2012, however, the Kiútprogram staff kept track 
of the clients. Table 8 presents the final repayment indicators. 
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Table 8: Repayment indicators, status on 15 May 2013 
 Persons Still operates as 
entrepreneur 
Loan  
totally  
repaid 
Arrears per  
payments due 
(%) 
Payment per 
credit ratio (%) 
1st batch 41 4 0 62 44 
2nd batch 74 37 14 45 62 
3rd batch 23 22 2 22 81 
Total 138 63 16 51 55 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
 
Before including them in the programme, an intake questionnaire was conducted with the 
clients and several potential clients who showed serious interest; one year later a follow-up 
survey was conducted. More details about the survey will follow in chapter 2.7. The analysis 
of the survey results can be found here: Kiútprogram (2012, pp. 78–98) and World Bank 
(2013, pp. 14–26). Presenting these results would exceed the scope of this case study. 
 
Costs of the programme 
In the two-year pilot period operating costs were high: the costs of identifying, issuing, and 
subsequently supporting a loan of 1,000 euros almost amounted to 6,000 euros. The highest 
costs resulted from the programme field workers’ wages and material expenditures. Per 20 
field workers 5 staff members were required in the Kiútprogram headquarters, including 
highly qualified lending professionals. 
According to the estimations prepared in 2012, a continuous operation at full capacity costs 
approximately 200 euros per month per client (gross) or 120 euros per month per client (net, 
i.e. after deduction of taxes and contributions). Under regular operating conditions estimated 
loan losses totalled approximately 30%; in accordance with this calculation the full net costs 
of regular operation would be 163 euros per client per month.  
‘Comparison with the cost of public works suggests that the Kiútprogram net operating costs 
are lower. The net wage paid to public work participants with only primary education in 
Hungary was EUR 15720 during the program period (77% of the net amount of the minimal 
wage). Considering the costs of public work programs, this amount must be supplemented by 
the costs of employing managers, the administrative costs and the costs of equipment. Alto-
gether, the annual client costs of Kiútprogram may be comparable to the cost per person per 
year in the public work program. While public work does not necessarily increase the chanc-
es of getting employed, within the framework of Kiútprogram a majority of clients estab-
lished a self-sustaining business paying taxes and contributions in the long run.’ (World 
Bank, 2013, p. 23) 
 
                                                 
20
 We have adjusted the amount of 165 euros of the original calculated at 280 HUF/EUR exchange rate in ac-
cordance with the 300 HUF/EUR exchange rate used throughout this study. 
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2.1.6 The operation of the Kiútprogram from 2012 on 
The closure of the EU pilot project, new ways of financing 
The EU Roma pilot project ended in September 2012. At a closing conference in Brussels in 
September 2012 we presented our experiences and a report on the Kiútprogram (2012), which 
has been prepared specifically for this occasion. We also discussed both the achieved results 
and the failures.21 The officials of DG Regio and the experts of the World Bank provided a 
positive feedback on the results and the lessons learned from the programme. (As to the eval-
uation by the World Bank, see World Bank case study, 2013.) The representative of the Hun-
garian Ministry of Human Resources (today it is called Ministry of Human Capacities) also 
participated in the conference where she said in a statement – without further explanation – 
that the Hungarian government does not wish to support the Kiútprogram.  
The management of the programme was already aware of this fact because the Ministry of 
National Development sent a notification to the Kiútprogram in summer 2012 informing us 
that the ministry wished to terminate the agreement with the Kiútprogram22 and would not 
continue to provide further financial support. Although the lawfulness of the termination was 
highly disputable, the management of the Kiútprogram decided not to argue with the gov-
ernment, since this would certainly not have been in the clients’ interests; for this reason, the 
Kiútprogram consented to the termination of the agreement by common assent. 
As to the reasons, Zoltán Balog, the head of the Ministry of Human Resources and former 
secretary of state ‘with responsibility for social inclusion’, stated with regard to the inclusion 
of the Roma: ‘The programme was extremely inefficient, since the issuing of one loan unit 
required six units of operating costs used by its so-called ‘management’. Furthermore, they 
did not examine who the money was given to; loans were not necessarily given to the suitable 
people among the mostly unschooled Tzigane living in deep poverty. While they wasted a 
vast amount of money on this, they advertised it abroad.’ (author’s translation)23 I will return 
to the other elements of this interview in chapter 2.3 on narratives and discourses. 
In view of the results obtained to date, the private initiators who supported the Kiútprogram 
anyway had already decided to continue financing the programme, despite the cessation of 
other resources.24 However, a drastic financial cutback was necessary because of the size of 
the remaining resources. The situation worsened due to the fact that during 2012 several 
loans were issued to the clients and had not been repaid by the end of the EU project. The 
original plan was to complete these loan cycles partly by means of private donations and part-
ly through the financial resources provided by the ministry under the agreement. The latter 
resource was no longer available.  
Despite the above facts, the Kiútprogram completed all clients’ loan cycles and in parallel 
gradually let go all programme field workers. Unfortunately, it was only possible to keep 
track of our clients and assist them until May 2013. We achieved the original goal that no 
client should be in a worse situation than before entering the programme. 
 
                                                 
21
 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2012/09/04/self-employment-through-social-microcredit 
22
 As to the birth of the agreement, see more details in section 2.2.2. 
23
 http://mno.hu/magyar_nemzet_belfoldi_hirei/versenykepessegunk-mulika-sikeres-romafelzarkoztatason-
1127526 
24
 Their motivations as well as their roles in initiating the programme will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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The continuation of the cucumber-growing project 
Finally, we made the decision that the Kiútprogram will only continue with the cucumber 
project in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County. The decision was motivated by two factors: sig-
nificantly lower unit costs and the extreme pressure on field workers from the potential cli-
ents after the success of 2012. The resources at our disposal allowed for the employment of 
only two field workers and two assistants during 2013. At the locations where the Kiútpro-
gram was already present all new applicants were approved, if they were poor enough. As a 
result, the Kiútprogram entered into contract with too many clients and there were not enough 
human resources to support them. The number of field workers increased in 2014 and the 
programme could also be implemented at a new location in cooperation with the local gov-
ernment (see more details in section 2.2.3). In the meantime the number of participants be-
came somewhat smaller (Table 9).  
At the end of 2012, the Raiffeisen Bank stopped supporting the Kiútprogram and lending 
money as well. Previously, the guarantee of cooperation was connected to the managing di-
rector; with the change of management the cooperation ended (for more details, see the fol-
lowing chapter). The Kiútprogram contracted the local savings cooperatives to issue loans at 
market rates; however, the credit terms were rather unfavourable. 
 
Table 9: Number of clients and loan recipients in the cucumber project, 2013-2015 
Year New loan  
recipients 
Old clients Total clients  Arrears per  
payments due 
(%) 
2013 87 22 109 66 
2014 53 43 96 68 
2015 55 23 78  
 
Compared to 2012, both 2013 and 2014 were rather unfavourable years for cucumber grow-
ing and this is why the production results were lower than before. Consequently, ‘raider’ 
buyers appeared and many clients sold their produce to them in order to achieve a higher im-
mediate profit and did not repay the loan either to the Kiútprogram or to the integrator. In the 
long run, these clients made a wrong decision, since they will not be professionally supported 
by the Kiútprogram any more and integrators will not enter into any contract with them. 
In addition, some integrators cheated the clients in several ways. The biggest loss was caused 
when they sold necessary pesticides at extremely high prices, which were often 30% higher 
than the retail prices. This is also why many people sold their produce elsewhere. A different 
kind of dishonesty occurred when some of the buyers working for the integrators lied to the 
clients stating that the smallest and most expensive cucumbers are not accepted temporarily – 
but they are willing to buy them at the lower price paid for the bigger sized product. They 
encouraged producers to mix the small cucumbers with the bigger ones, and paid the lower 
price for the mixed produce. Later on, they sorted the smaller cucumbers out, and reckoned 
with the integrators at the higher price, thus cheating the clients and the integrator alike. 
Based on the experiences and due to these problems the Kiútprogram decided to partly take 
over the integrators’ tasks. This decision was simple because a new sponsor experienced in 
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cucumber growing joined the programme (see next chapter). The characteristics of the pro-
gramme model formed by 2015 are: 
The Kiútprogram offers the following services to the clients: 
– Interest-free loans for the investment costs (drilling a well, watering system, pump, posts, 
etc.) with a duration of two years. 25% must be repaid in the first year and 75% in the 
second year. The size of the loan is about 340 euros (100,000 HUF), depending on the 
costs of drilling a well. 
– Necessary pesticides for the seedlings and production at regular market prices in the form 
of consumer loans. The costs of the pesticides will be deducted up to a maximum of 50% 
from the amount obtained from the sale of the cucumbers. 
– Winter training and a continuous presence of a production consultant. 
– Trilateral contract with the buyers. 
This model significantly differs from the original model. The advantages are: 
– It guarantees the possibility of joining an existing production network.  
– While working, the clients can learn about production processes and acquire general agri-
cultural knowledge in the most efficient way possible; for example, after two years clients 
who are often without a finished primary school education are able to follow the instruc-
tions on the pesticides’ packages and to calculate the dilution ratio by themselves.  
– Producers face a very low risk; the worst possible loss for them is working for a low crop 
yield. Therefore, there is no material loss if no other work is available. 
– Some decisions must be made in the course of the process (whether to plant early-season 
cucumbers or a late-season variety, how often to pick the cucumbers, how many metres to 
cultivate, etc.) but no real entrepreneurial skills are required. 
– Unlike the frequently promoted self-sufficiency farming, within this programme people 
can earn money. I will get back to the possible income and its effects on the clients in 
chapter 3. 
Disadvantages: 
– Cucumber growing is the only possibility the Kiútprogram can currently offer – there is 
no other option. 
– The programme can only be implemented where the soil is suitable for cucumber grow-
ing. 
– The cucumber growing can only be done in places where the Roma have their own gar-
dens or where the leaders of the village provide them with the necessary land. 
– The possible income largely depends on the weather. 
– The programme can only secure work and income in the summer. 
The short-term objective of the Kiútprogram is to provide loans for foil tunnels to those who 
learn the technology of cucumber growing. In this way the duration of the production period 
can be increased and the participants can also grow other plants. This progress mostly de-
pends on finding new sponsors. 
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2.2 Actors and networks 
2.2.1 The generation of the idea 
Main actors 
The Polgár Foundation for Opportunities was established at the end of 2007 by an economist, 
András Polgár. This foundation was the initiator of the Kiútprogram and is still the majority 
owner of the Kiútprogram Non-Profit Ltd. I will review András Polgár’s career in more detail 
because it reveals several interesting aspects and his striving for innovative solutions is an 
important trait.25 
In the first half of the 1980s András Polgár worked at the Central Bank of Hungary, the Na-
tional Planning Bureau, and then at a research institute where his primary focus was the con-
version of state-owned firms into incorporated companies and thus simulate the market with-
in the framework of state ownership. In Hungary, there had been attempts to move towards a 
marketisation of the economy; as a part of these efforts, the state insurance company – at that 
time in a monopoly position – was divided into two divisions in 1986. Many young, dynamic 
professionals joined the newly established Hungária Insurance Company, including András 
Polgár who became the head of the strategic planning department. After several years of 
preparation the firm became an incorporated company, in which he played a major role; the 
Allianz Insurance Company became a shareholder of the company, however, at that time as a 
minority owner, while the state remained the principal owner. 
Polgár was not interested in being promoted within a large organisation. Therefore, he decid-
ed in 1992 to test himself in the real private sector. Together with an investor he established 
one of the first stockbroker companies but at that time they could mostly trade with state 
bonds. He left after a year and started to acquire bankrupt, previously state-owned firms 
which he then fixed and sold, while also keeping some of them. 
By 2006 or 2007, he felt that his work was so unsatisfactory that he started to sell some of his 
accumulated capital and spend on social purposes. ‘I believe that I am a problem solver who 
was always interested in creating something, in solving issues, and in creating constructions 
and entire storylines. It is always crucial to have a gain from my efforts but not in financial 
terms... […] To me it mattered to fix companies in a way that people would not lose their 
jobs; to do it in a comprehensive way and make it a win-win situation. While I was in busi-
ness, I tried to make both parties feel that they had won. I don’t know if this is the situation at 
other places or just in this region but the so-called businessmen think that a good deal to 
make the other party loose. I never understood this attitude’ (quote from an interview with 
András Polgár, author’s translation). 
At the beginning Polgár had the intention to do something socially beneficial, ‘to save the 
world’, as he self-ironically stated. Then he started to consciously search for potential fields 
of action. One of them was art: partly for personal family-related reasons he started to support 
independent theatres. Here, this field will not be focused on.  
His motivation to help disadvantaged people resulted from his experiences at elementary 
school where he was irritated by the fact that in comparison to children from poor families he 
was – as a child of intellectual parents with a higher social status – in a privileged position. 
Since then, he has always been aware of this social problem. Therefore, he turned his atten-
tion to the field of equal opportunities and selected the Roma because they are the most seri-
                                                 
25
 Based on an interview with András Polgár. 
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ously discriminated against in the Hungarian society. Six months after starting the founda-
tion, he said in a TV interview26: ‘I selected the Roma because in the business world I learned 
that you try to invest your money in the most efficient way and this is not enough money to 
fundamentally change anything. It is too much for one person27 but very little on a universal 
scale. I wanted to select a field that receives little support but would be in need of a lot of 
resources. I thought that the issue of the Roma was the most neglected one. How to put 
this…, it is relatively simple to collect donations for children with cancer28 and it is very im-
portant but plenty of organisations already work in that area.’ 
After making this decision Polgár was not intending to start his own foundation but tried to 
find existing foundations or other organisations whose programmes he could support. He 
spoke with many committed professionals and activists working on Roma issues, contacted 
several foundations, and observed their activities from up close. This is how he met the peo-
ple who together with him became the initiators of the Kiútprogram.  
A short presentation of these people is interesting in two aspects. Firstly, as we will see, three 
of the initiators had previously a banking carrier, which played an important role in creating 
the narratives about Kiútprogram (see chapter 2.3). Secondly, it was important to some par-
ticipants (though not to all) that they had not attended socially homogeneous schools. I joined 
the programme somewhat later but this also applied to me. Coming from a working class 
background, my parents were adults when – after World War II – they had a chance to attend 
university and become intellectuals; I attended school in Józsefváros, the poorest district of 
Budapest with the highest rate of Roma residents. I still live here, and had very similar expe-
riences to András Polgár. Maybe it is a bold assumption but there are several signs that inte-
grated education may play a role in social innovation regarding marginalised social groups.  
András Ujlaky, the secretary of the board of the Chance for Children Foundation29 (CFCF) 
and a retired banking professional, was among other positions the managing director of the 
London subsidiary of the National Bank of Hungary. Then he led the Phare office of the Min-
istry of Education. The CFCF, founded in 2004 at his initiative, uses legal measures to fight 
against the segregation of Roma children, mostly by starting lawsuits against local municipal-
ities. 
Péter Felcsuti also used to work for the National Bank of Hungary. In 1990 he became man-
aging director of Unicbank (now Raiffeisen Bank) and held this position for 20 years until his 
retirement. Starting in 2008, he was the president of Hungarian Banking Association for 18 
months. By means of his own foundations he supports the Dr. Ámbédkar Primary and Sec-
ondary School in Sajókaza in one of the regions of Hungary where young Roma are most 
disadvantaged30. 
Judit Szőke was born to a peasant family in a small village close to the Romanian border. Her 
father was a railroad worker, a switchman, and the family also did some farming. After fin-
ishing primary school, she was admitted to a secondary-level talent programme in a relatively 
big town with 30,000 inhabitants in the early 1970s. ‘Unlike students in the János Arany Tal-
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 http://polgaralapitvany.hu/media/friderikusz-most-2008-06-18/ 
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 Later in the interview it is mentioned that the interest of 3.3 million euros (approximately 1bn HUF) will be 
used for this purpose. In the interview with me it turned out that ultimately a higher amount was spent to support 
Roma programmes, approx. 330,000 euros (100 million HUF) per year. All quotes from the interview are my 
translation. 
28
 The relevance of this consideration is highlighted in section 2.3.3 (The third failure).  
29
 http://www.cfcf.hu/en 
30
 http://www.ambedkar.eu/ 
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ent Programme today31, where they segregate the students of the programme, we learned in 
an integrated setting together with the students from the town. It was a big deal that we went 
to a town school and that’s when we left this very strange village identity behind, the isolated 
small village way of thinking about perspectives, ethics, interests, and values. It helped us 
realise that there was something else, urban people, different cultures. I think this is even 
more important than nurturing the talent’(quote from the interview with Judit Szőke, author’s 
translation). Since she was engaging in student advocacy (‘I spoke my mind’), she was sent 
to study law, which she actually did not like. 
After graduating from university she started to work as a village clerk or notary (called 
‘council secretary’ at that time) in a small village in south-western Hungary with a high rate 
of Tzigane residents. She had connections with a Tzigane family through one of her brother’s 
friends and as a result of this relationship she became a non-Tzigane social worker at a Tzi-
gane cultural centre in Budapest. In 1997 she founded the first Tanoda in Józsefváros. This 
was an innovative after-school and weekend educational institution for disadvantaged (mostly 
Roma) children, which was initially financed by the Open Society Institute and then mostly 
by international grants. Later it became a model institution; today there are several hundreds 
of similar tanodas in Hungary.  
In contrast to the previous situation in Hungary, between 2002 and 2006 integrated education 
became more important. In 2003, the Ministry of Education established the Office of the 
Ministerial Commissioner for the Integration of Roma and Disadvantaged Children and the 
National Educational Integration Network as a part of the commissioner’s office. Judit Szőke 
became manager of the National Educational Integration Network. She left the organisation 
in 2008 because of professional differences. 
 
Establishment of the foundation and the birth of the idea 
Even after a long search András Polgár could not find a foundation that corresponded to his 
ideas. He liked several of them, however, their profiles were too limited. The problem with 
bigger organisations was that they wanted the money but would not provide insights into the 
processes. Another problem was that bigger organisations mostly operate by means of grants 
and select projects for which they can obtain grants or money. Instead of following their own 
goals they frequently adapted their activity according to the conditions of the available grants. 
Finally, András Polgár decided to establish his own foundation. His original concept was that 
the foundation would work for children, focus on educational issues, and support tanodas and 
similar institutions. He selected Judit Szőke, who had been recommended by several people, 
as director of the foundation. Péter Felcsuti joined as the foundation’s board member. 
Judit Szőke’s concept was to visit some very disadvantaged locations, find local contacts, 
assess the local people’s wants and needs with the help of volunteers, and then to decide what 
to support and what not to support. ‘This is still a valid idea and if there are any positive find-
ings, this is it’, András Polgár later said. The result was that contrary to the prejudices men-
tioned in chapter 1.3 what the people needed and wanted most was work. An intense joint 
brainstorming on the possible ways of creating employment opportunities from the available 
resources was conducted.  
One project started by the foundation was the establishment of small local cooperatives. In a 
village in south Borsod County the leader of the local Roma Minority Self-Government ar-
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gued that if they had land, the local Roma would grow cucumbers that could be sold at a rela-
tively good price. The foundation bought land for them and supported the setup of a coopera-
tive with the initiator as the leader.32 While considering the potential employment forms, both 
Judit Szőke and András Polgár started to think about the applicability of microlending in 
Hungary. Péter Felcsuti was the strongest opponent of the idea arguing that although micro-
lending worked in developing countries, it could not work in Hungary because of a very dif-
ferent tax and social security system. After reading Prahalad’s (2004)and Yunus’ 
(1999)books he started to have doubts about his argument. 
Finally Polgár, Felcsuti, and Ujlaky agreed to systematically explore the possibilities to test 
microlending in Hungary, specifically in order to improve the situation of the Roma on the 
labour market. After gathering information, reading Yunus’ book, and exploring prior experi-
ences in Hungary, the first paper, titled Microlending to the Roma – a Proposal, was com-
pleted for internal use by András Ujlaky by summer 2008. The first paragraph of the paper 
says: ‘We agreed that microlending and entrepreneurship fostered by it have proved to be 
successful in diminishing deep poverty in a number of countries with different cultures and 
economic backgrounds. There is no rational reason why we should not try it for the Roma’ 
(non-published manuscript, author’s translation). 
So, the original idea was not much more than to take part in the diffusion of an already exist-
ing social innovation concept.  
 
2.2.2 The invention phase 
One year after the abovementioned paper the feasibility study was conducted. An improve-
ment of the adaptation of the social innovation model has been achieved through the profes-
sionalism of the corporate sector, which is quite unusual under the given circumstances in 
Hungary. The three initiators used their professional network and invited a large number of 
experts from various fields to the first meetings: on the one hand, banking professionals in-
terested in social issues, businesspeople, researchers (economists and sociologists), lawyers, 
and communication experts were invited and, on the other hand, professionals who were also 
engaged in field work, e.g. educators, social workers, anthropologists, and ethnographers 
focusing on the Roma.33 Although not in the function of official representatives, some experts 
of the Hungarian Ministry of National Development and Economy specialising in the devel-
opment of small and medium enterprises also participated in the work. 
The team of the feasibility study was formed by itself: it consisted of those who took part in 
the first brainstorming sessions and were willing to do the subtasks. The process was coordi-
nated pro bono by some employees of the Deloitte Central Europe who joined the project 
through Péter Felcsuti’s network. The Institute for Training and Consulting in Banking34 and 
the Raiffeisen Bank also provided pro bono services during the invention phase; the addition-
al members of the team joined as individual participants. Altogether 28 people participated in 
the creation of the feasibility study. With the exception of the field research sponsored by the 
Polgár Foundation all other components were created by volunteers. 
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It is worth taking a look at the motivation of these young, yuppie-like people coming from 
the abovementioned companies. They were not volunteers in the sense that their work for our 
project was part of their regular job; however, they chose to participate. An overwhelming 
majority has never been in a direct, personal contact with people living in deep poverty, even 
less with the Roma, but they were aware of the problem and their fundamental emotion re-
garding the issue was frustrated helplessness.35 This feeling cannot be eliminated by means of 
mere donations (most of them did not donate for this reason), since ultimately donating mon-
ey alone does not help solve the problem. Here, however, these young professionals felt that 
they participated in a project where there was at least a chance to achieve real change. The 
intellectual challenge of solving a problem was another important aspect.  
The coordination of the subtasks and the joint creation of written materials were greatly en-
hanced by the fact that the Deloitte project members were permitted to access the internal IT 
system of the company. Apart from this, the core members of the project met at least once per 
month at a location provided by the Raiffeisen Bank. Of course, the volume of the feasibility 
study says nothing about the quality of the study, however, it signifies the invested effort: the 
complete study was approximately 100 pages long including appendices (detailed documen-
tation of a field research on 5 micro-regions) and financial and lending feasibility simulations 
created in Excel. As far as I know, preparation at this scale has never preceded any project 
targeting social progress in Hungary.  
However, the team had one very significant shortcoming: no Roma participants were in-
volved. Several team members worked closely with Roma people and from time to time they 
included their Roma colleagues in consultations but in the end none of them became a long-
term team member.36 One of the reasons is that amongst the unfortunately still very few intel-
lectuals who identify themselves as Roma or work as Roma in a public context there are no 
economists, bank professionals, or lawyers competent in economic issues. For people (not 
only Roma) working in humanities the fundamental idea of the project to apply an economic 
approach (lending money) instead of the usual social assistance or education-related approach 
was very strange or even confusing.  
This problem had an effect on the initial part of the invention phase: people from the banking 
or financial and the social field do not speak the same language. Therefore, my role (as the 
only participant who more or less spoke both languages) during the first months was that of 
an ‘interpreter’. Serious efforts had to be made in order to organise the joint working, howev-
er, these efforts brought results. The interaction of the various approaches contributed to the 
success of the innovative process.  
These very different approaches arising from the economic field, on the one hand, and the 
social field, on the other, also played a role in connection with government actors. We expe-
rienced failures mostly in connection with the social side, which will be discussed in detail in 
section 2.3.3. However, László Kállay, Head of the Department for Enterprise Development 
at the Ministry for National Development and Economy, had a very important supporting role 
at that time. At the beginning he participated as a private individual with a professional inter-
est in the innovative process. Later he played a crucial role when the ministry and the already 
existing Kiútprogram signed an agreement (March 2010) on a sponsorship amounting to 
670,000 euros (200 million HUF) in order to support the business training and loans for the 
programme’s clients. Since this amount came from the ministry’s unexhausted 2008 budget 
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 At the beginning of the invention phase we had high hopes as to a Roma member (a sociology researcher) of 
the Polgár Foundation board but in the end he was not able to join due to other obligations; he still works abroad 
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dedicated to the support of small and medium businesses, the social work part could not be 
financed by means of this money. Government actors were absolutely unable to cope with the 
integrated nature of the project.  
The results of the feasibility study showed that it would be best to establish the Kiútprogram 
as an Ltd. We managed to invite many and diverse shareholders. The capital was mostly pro-
vided by the Polgár Foundation but there were also some other supporters providing relative-
ly higher amounts, i.e. amounts equalling to one or two months’ average wage in Hungary. 
There were 57 founding shareholders, including many well-known Roma and non-Roma pub-
lic figures, actors, theatre directors and staff members, journalists, and even a former minister 
of the first Orbán cabinet. Later it turned out that most of them were not really interested in 
the programme but wanted to express their solidarity with the Roma cause.  
 
Connection with similar projects 
Between 2005 and 2007, the Hungarian Autonómia Foundation was already running a micro-
credit pilot programme37 with the financial support of the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP). While working on the feasibility study, we often consulted with the foun-
dation and discussed their experiences in detail. They fundamentally regarded their project as 
a failure. Some of the failed solutions were due to external pressure and we learned much 
from this. Their experiences also contributed to our decision, which has already been made 
during the planning phase, that programme field workers have to be constantly present at the 
target location and that occasional visits are not satisfactory. 
Later on the Autonómia Foundation had a successful pilot project applying a different micro-
credit method connecting the microcredit with microsaving. In that case the objective was not 
to create some income-generating activity but to teach home economics and how to cope with 
extreme income fluctuations. Later, this difference in approach actually became an obstacle 
for cooperation. The originators of the Kiútprogram were interested in generating income and 
facilitating social mobility and not in merely teaching programme participants living on a low 
income how to deal with financial straits. 
Microlending was a hot topic at that time. In parallel to the Kiútprogram several similar ideas 
were born. The initiatives were invited to a conference by the Roma Research Network, an 
organisation belonging to the Central European University (CEU). However, apart from the 
Kiútprogram and the abovementioned Autonómia Foundation programmes, eventually only 
one of the presented programme initiatives has been realised, i.e. a web-based community 
lending site; after some years of struggle with the bureaucracy the initiative had to give up in 
2013. On their website there is only the announcement: ‘Under the current legal conditions in 
Hungary we do not see a chance for individuals to lawfully lend money to each other with 
interest. Lacking this option, at this time it is impossible for us to continue operating this 
site.’38 
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2.2.3 The innovation phase 
The field workers 
The main actors of this phase were the field workers. Their recruitment started with announc-
ing the positions and the first selection criterion was their attitude towards the Roma. The 
selection was made by Roma co-workers of the foundations mentioned above. This was fol-
lowed by a three-week training with field work components.  
The first group of field workers consisted of very different young people (there were no ap-
plicants over 40 years of age), social workers, educators, a sociologist working on his PhD, a 
loan agent, and a healthcare worker. We tried to include as many Roma as possible.  
At the beginning the field workers’ places of residence and the locations previously identified 
during the field research did not always correspond; therefore, the programme rented a house 
at one of the locations in Borsod County. It soon became apparent that only field workers 
who knew the area would work out; however, field workers should not work in their home 
village or town. This latter consideration became irrelevant in the cucumber project. Some of 
the field workers were overwhelmed by the complex nature of the job. 
As to the field workers, it proved essential to unite the activities of a social worker and a loan 
agent within one person. If these two functions were separated, the field workers operating as 
social workers would adopt the role of clients’ advocates, regardless of the clients’ actual 
potential to establish a successful enterprise; thus, field workers operating as loan agents 
would only aim at achieving the loan repayment, while the objective of creating sustainable 
businesses would play a secondary role. As an unavoidable result the performance of the pro-
gramme would either decrease or field workers would contract clients of ever-higher status. 
An important innovation of the Kiútprogram was the creation of a new profession, i.e. a 
completely new type of social work. 
Employment fluctuation was high, especially in the first period; several recruitment rounds 
had to be done, which was rather uncomplicated because information about the Kiútprogram 
started to spread and applicants had a clearer picture of what to expect. Slowly a precise pro-
file of the field worker emerged: they should have a college education, be young, live in the 
area, and have good problem-solving and interpersonal skills. Obviously, they should not 
have any aversion to the Roma or they should be Roma themselves. Furthermore, they should 
not be averse to poverty but pity should not dominate their emotions. Field workers should 
look at poverty as a problem which has to be solved. (To avoid any misunderstandings, com-
passion is a natural feeling under such circumstances. However, taking on the emotional bur-
dens of the situation too much may cause serious problems.) 
At first sight it seems to be too difficult to meet these requirements but the applicant pool was 
rather large. There are talented, dynamic young people who cannot find a suitable local job 
corresponding to their skills or the employments offer a very low salary. It is extremely diffi-
cult to move within Hungary, there is no adequate rental housing system39, houses in de-
pressed areas can be sold at very low prices (if at all), and the money is not sufficient to find 
housing somewhere else. In this respect the Kiútprogram is an employment-generating tool 
not only for the clients but also for the field workers. Based on the interviews with the field 
workers the multi-faceted nature of the work was very attractive to them because their earlier 
jobs offered less opportunity for independent, creative working. 
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Relationships with the local governments and local organisations 
A good relationship with the local government, various offices, especially the local unem-
ployment agency, the local Roma Minority Self-Government, and local churches makes the 
operation of the Kiútprogram much easier and improves the position of the clients. As it was 
already mentioned in section 2.1.5, one of the first tasks of the field workers was to get in 
touch with them. 
The actual relationship depends primarily on the local conditions and the extent of discrimi-
nation against the Roma population. Field workers reported that when dealing with the ad-
ministration the clients faced discrimination in about half of the cases, which without the in-
tervention of the field worker could have resulted in a failure of the procedure. Discrimina-
tion is not systematic on the part of the administration or the service providers but depends on 
the individual person. However, officials who showed discriminatory behaviour, which is 
illegal, were not withheld by the risk of being held responsible for it. In the majority of the 
cases the intervention of field workers could defy discrimination and also generated some 
sort of learning process on the administration’s or service providers’ side. Field workers have 
an indispensable role in counteracting discrimination. This experience proves that consistent 
state action against discrimination could greatly improve the employment situation of the 
Roma too. 
In some cases we managed to establish good long-term relationships with the local unem-
ployment agencies, which later on made our clients’ official business related activities easier; 
however, the building of this network was interrupted due to the unavoidable reorganisation 
of the Kiútprogram in 2013 (see section 2.1.6). 
The significance of good relationships with the local mayors increased during the cucumber 
project phase, partly because of the fact that it involves relatively higher number of people 
within a settlement. Another important cause was the spreading of public works (see section 
1.3.3). There are fundamentally two types of mayors, who have different attitudes: Firstly, 
mayors who intend to improve the living conditions of the poor (including the Roma) as 
much as possible; we managed to establish good relationships with these mayors. Our clients 
do not receive public work in the most labour-intensive period, the two-month harvest time; 
however, in the less labour-intensive period they do. This favours not only the clients of the 
Kiútprogram but similarly also applies to other kinds of labour, e.g. casual or seasonal labour. 
Secondly, there are mayors who primarily aim at strengthening their own position. Their ob-
jective is to have the poor of the village entirely at their mercy and make clear that it is them 
whom the people’s income depends on. Such mayors try to squeeze the Kiútprogram out of 
the village. Considering the cucumber-project, they employ the clients in public work at the 
worst time possible. Their behaviour may be even worse, if they intend to get more non-
Roma votes by handling the Tzigane with an iron fist.  
Of course, it is easier for the Kiútprogram to deal with the cooperating mayors and it is also 
easier to establish local relationships, recruit clients, find the best suppliers, perform logistic 
tasks, and build networks with other civil organisations. For example, in a small town in Nyí-
rség that has village- and farm-like parts we could create a very extensive cooperation, most-
ly thanks to the town clerk’s help. The leaders of the town connected an EU financed agricul-
tural training programme for people with a low level of education with the cucumber-
growing project of the Kiútprogram, thus creating significant synergies for both programmes. 
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The emergence of an important new actor 
At the end of 2013 the Kiútprogram managed to find a new sponsor, Csaba Balogh, the retir-
ing president of KITE Ltd. (a leading agricultural company in Hungary) who had led the 
company for 20 years. KITE is the biggest agricultural integrator in Hungary and the inventor 
of a greenhouse cucumber-growing technology (see more details in section 2.6). The majority 
block of shares was sold at a twentyfold price in 2013 (the annual revenue of the company is 
670 million euros, approximately 200 billion HUF).40 
From a professional perspective, the joining of Csaba Balogh, who also joined the board of 
the Kiútprogram in 2015, made room for another improvement in 2015: the Kiútprogram 
partially took on the integrator’s role (see section 2.1.6).  
According to Mr. Balogh, the success of KITE was based on its exceptionally good risk as-
sessment system. This is why the company could survive when all the other big agricultural 
integrators collapsed in the mid-1990s because of the rapidly growing arrears resulting from 
the swiftly rising interest. Under these circumstances it is especially interesting that he joined 
the Kiútprogram, because its clients would not have met any of the requirements of the KITE 
risk assessment conditions. In an interview he illustrated his personal motives:  
‘I studied mechanical engineering and was specialising in agriculture, and during the summer 
breaks I worked in a cooperative as assistant operator of a harvester. The operator of the har-
vester is always the best mechanic available and the assistant operator was usually a coopera-
tive member’s child. My chief harvester operator was a Roma, uncle Dezső, who had a very 
different attitude from mine. He was a dark-skinned, short, stocky man, constantly grum-
bling, but he worked like a beaver. I have never seen such a hard-working man in my life. I 
was his opposite, young, white-skinned, we were like fire and water. After some minutes of 
mutual scrutinising, we somehow really took to each other. I learned agricultural work in 
practice from uncle Dezső. We competed like crazy with the other harvester teams and we 
always won the competition.’ (all quotes from this interview are translated by the author) 
Regarding his professional motivations, he said: 
‘As a result of the technological progress in agriculture less and less people are needed. Addi-
tional workforce is only seasonally employed for manual harvesting. Many unemployed peo-
ple can get work this way. We made many efforts in the corporate sector to make the small 
integrators coordinate it. […] We failed five times. There were never enough people in the 
district to achieve this. This is a bad thing because the culture of intense agricultural labour is 
unfortunately on the wane in Hungary. […] 
I said that once I had retired, I would like to help deal with this problem because this really 
creates values. I am convinced that uncle Dezső is an example that it is not true that people 
cannot be taught to work well. However, motivation and financial interest are needed, and the 
system has to be build up. This is what I search for in the Kiútprogram; something that is 
worth engaging in, something people would not regret to have committed themselves to – and 
I am talking about Roma entrepreneurs. They will show good work ethics, have self-esteem. I 
believe in this. From the financial perspective, I wanted to sponsor this project when I am not 
engaged in another undertaking and I will support this programme because this hits close to 
home for me. It is that simple.’ 
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2.2.4 The diffusion phase 
The model of the Kiútprogram had no followers so far. As long as the state does not cooper-
ate with such programmes in Hungary at all, it is unrealistic to expect any followers. This is 
not primarily about financial support but about the legal and regulation framework, paying of 
contributions, and the decision-making mechanism in programmes financed by EU funds. 
However, it makes sense to discuss the geographical diffusion of the programme. As has al-
ready been mentioned, the first steps of the field worker in a settlement are always very diffi-
cult. After some years news about the Kiútprogram reached more and more people in the ar-
ea. We have already seen this effect in the second year of the first phase but the programme 
could not benefit from it; however, we could use it in the cucumber project. 
 
Diffusion within a settlement – the role of the clients 
The first and simplest phase of diffusion is within the given settlement. Based on our experi-
ences the first clients belong to two very different groups:  
1. Very committed and strongly motivated people who try to take any opportunity to im-
prove their situation41 and have some kind of entrepreneurial dream (this was important in 
the first phase) or some agricultural experience (the cucumber phase). 
2. People attracted by the loan; they believe that it is an easily obtainable resource and they 
do not intend to pay it back. 
It is the field workers’ important task to differentiate between the two types, which is not 
easy. (And it does not depend on the size of the income.) It is worth looking at this somewhat 
closer, although it is only indirectly related to the diffusion. As to the second type of first 
clients, a field worker said: ‘Those who sell the cucumbers somewhere else will take it, it 
does not matter what we do. They decide in the first moment that they will trick us anyway, 
which is very difficult to identify; if they do not decide it early on, they will try to create con-
flicts to make it happen.’ (author’s translation) 
The original Grameen model uses group lending and peer pressure to avoid this (section 
2.1.3). This, however, did not work under the Hungarian circumstances. In the first phase of 
the Kiútprogram group formation proved to be a useful tool that was helpful in the selection 
of clients but the gradual loan issuing and peer pressure did not work. During the implemen-
tation of the programme we came to the conclusion that using peer pressure is not right nei-
ther from a theoretical nor practical standpoint. The theoretical problem is that from a cer-
tain point on there is no difference between peer pressure and coercion.42 
I will illustrate the practical side by means of an interview with a client. This client is the best 
producer in the village, a role model for most people in the local Roma community. ‘I tell 
you that I trusted the people who tricked me most. We were good friends. They would not do 
it to me. And as to people I did not trust, this is what I discussed with R. [the field worker], I 
knew they would cheat. Those were the first to repay the loan.’ (author’s translation) The 
level of identification is shown by the fact that this client felt that the clients who cheated the 
Kiútprogram also cheated him. Still, he misjudged two families, people whom he had known 
since childhood. According to the Grameen model (and several other microcredit models), he 
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should have been ‘punished’ in some way. In addition to being unjust, such a measure would 
have destroyed the credibility of the programme in the eyes of the Roma in the village.  
If we want to avoid psychological coercion, the selection of clients can only be the result of a 
carefully built process of several years’ duration, which, however, has additional costs.  
Returning to the question of the diffusion of information about the programme within a set-
tlement, in the first year most people just wait. They observe the first entrepreneurs’ results 
with interest. Some of them do not trust the programme; they fear that it is cheating and that 
in the end they will have to repay much more money. The local mayor and clerk may have a 
key role in establishing trust. There are people who have never done similar work, are afraid 
of the unknown and of failure. Others fear that they will not earn enough money, loose public 
work, or miss other seasonal work opportunities. Understandably, people in the worst situa-
tion have the lowest self-confidence and the biggest fear of failure. 
One new client, who joined because he worked with cucumbers as a day labourer in the 
neighbouring village, said about the abovementioned ‘observers’: ‘If we succeed, they will 
take heart; now, they are still afraid. At the beginning they did not want to participate in the 
programme but now that they see that it is growing they regret that they did not join. Now 
they are sorry and many of them ask me to give them P.’s phone number because they want 
to join next year. They come and examine the dripping system and ask me how to start. In my 
street at least 15 people would have started it after seeing what happened.’ (author’s transla-
tion) 
There is a problem for the Kiútprogram in this situation. If the programme aims at financial 
security too much, people who are in the worst situation may not be included in the pro-
gramme. On the other hand, if too big financial risks are taken, in case of failure no one can 
be helped at that location any more. The team of the Kiútprogram is aware of this dilemma 
but it is not easy to establish a dynamic balance. This also demonstrates that an important 
prerequisite of successful social innovation among marginalised people is a high risk toler-
ance of innovators and sponsors. 
 
Diffusion between settlements 
Information spreads in two ways between settlements: through relatives, acquaintances, or 
the media. On several occasions potential clients contacted the field worker based on infor-
mation they received from existing clients from other villages. 
Another typical way is that the mayor or other local leader contacts us because they heard 
about us in the media. The already mentioned small-town case is an example but this also 
happened elsewhere. This is how the programme reached a neighbouring county from its cur-
rent central area. There were some absurd cases in which the mayor who wanted to cooperate 
was not re-elected (for some other reason) and his successor opposed the Kiútprogram just 
because his competitor had supported it. 
It is clear that there are many advantages if the local leadership is supportive, however, there 
are risks too. If the programme gives supportive locations too much preference, it lets down 
those who need help most because of the hostile local leadership. Finding the right balance 
can be the only solution to this problem. 
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2.2.5 The dissemination 
During the EU Roma pilot programme phase the team of the Kiútprogram presented its expe-
riences and results at several European conferences and workshops connected with micro-
credit and Roma-related programmes. For purposes of dissemination we held workshops in 
Macedonia, Romania, and Slovakia in order to share the findings of the programme. 
The conferences and consultations offered relatively little help in the creation of the Kiútpro-
gram concept because we did not encounter similar initiatives. From the microlending per-
spective the Kiútprogram seems exotic because it does not target profitability or even sus-
tainability and uses employment-generating active labour market programmes as a bench-
mark. We found some Western European programmes that similarly used lending for the in-
tegration of immigrants. However, the differences were so huge (mostly the legal and regula-
tory environment and the availability of resources) that they became an obstacle for the ex-
change of applicable information. This is why we did not join any of the European micro-
lending networks. 
The Kiútprogram received a relatively significant media attention; more than 100 articles 
were written about its successes and failures. We attended several Hungarian conferences and 
also organised conferences. At the Hungarian conferences we tried to include clients and field 
workers in addition to the expert presentations. During the last two or three years the 
Kiútprogram has regularly been invited to workshops and conferences on people living in 
deep poverty, equal opportunities (especially regarding the Roma), and employment genera-
tion.  
The central objective of informing the public about the Kiútprogram is to reduce prejudices 
against the Roma. The Kiútprogram joined the Katalizátor Network43, which aims at ‘facili-
tating the synergic connections of state, religious, non-profit, and private organisations and 
programmes working on the social integration of the Roma living in the most disadvantaged 
micro-regions of Hungary, and at building a network of these parallel efforts.’ As a result of 
these connections, the volunteers of the Kiútprogram receive more and more invitations to 
university courses (economy, sociology) and to continuous teacher training where the objec-
tive of our participation is to sensitise the audience to poverty and especially to the Roma 
who suffer discrimination. 
 
2.3 Narratives and discourses 
2.3.1 The objectives of the Kiútprogram to influence the discourse on the Roma 
As has been mentioned in chapter 1.3, more than 80% of the Hungarian public agrees with 
the prejudice that ‘the problems of the gypsies would be solved if they finally started work-
ing’. At the same time, an overwhelming majority of the Roma is discriminated against at 
their workplaces or when looking for employment.  
An explicit objective of the Kiútprogram was to influence this public opinion. The feasibility 
study listed, amongst others, this expected positive effect of the programme: ‘The success 
achieved by the programme participants will reduce the social prejudices against the poor and 
the Roma. It will prove that mass unemployment is a product of the lack of opportunities and 
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not the intention of the marginalised. This way social tensions in connection with this prob-
lem area will decrease’ (Reménypénztár, 2009b, p. 21; author’s translation). 
When the feasibility study was completed, the working title of the planned programme was 
‘Reménypénztár’ (‘Bank of Hope’) but we involved marketing experts before addressing the 
public. Their input was that ‘Reménypénztár’ could lead to the assumption that the target 
group only hopes for external help. Therefore a more dynamic title expressing activation and 
mobility would serve our purpose better. Their first suggestion was ‘Kiút’ (‘Way out’) but 
this title was already reserved; therefore, we decided to call our project ‘Kiútprogram’. Dur-
ing the discourses, discussions, and interviews this proved a good and important decision 
positively influencing the narratives regarding the programme. In addition to expressing the 
possibility of change and progress, to exclude ‘pénztár’ (‘bank’) from the title also proved to 
be important with reference to later developments. 
Another decision with an eye on possible future narratives was to use the term ‘field worker’, 
a somewhat clumsy expression in Hungarian but an absolutely neutral professional term, in-
stead of ‘mentor’ that is conventionally used in similar programmes. The word ‘mentoring’ 
implies that the mentee lags behind the mentor and should be raised to the mentor’s level. 
However, the basic principle of the Kiútprogram was that the mentor-mentee relationship 
should be an equal client-service provider relationship. An important part of the narrative was 
that the Kiútprogram does not simply want to help the clients but to enable them to improve 
their situation through their own active role. This is reflected in a quote by Amartya Sen, 
which was selected as the motto of several studies and presentations related to the Kiútpro-
gram: ‘With adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their own desti-
ny and help each other. They need not be seen primarily as passive recipients of the benefits 
of cunning development programs. There is indeed a strong rationale for recognising the 
positive role of free and sustainable agency – and even of constructive impatience.’ (Sen, 
2001, p. 11). 
 
2.3.2 The emergence of the Kiútprogram in the media 
The first article about the developing Kiútprogram was published in a daily political newspa-
per with the highest circulation at the time of writing the feasibility study.44 The article in-
volved an interview with the three initiators and was preceded by a longer, clearly supportive 
introduction which, however, included a framing that proved unfavourable in the long run. 
Based on Yunus’ book title ‘Banker to the Poor’, the journalist decided for the expression 
‘bank to the poor’ and used the term ‘the poor’s bank’ in the title of her article. The article 
emphasises that the initiators of the Kiútprogram are three successful businessmen, which is 
not exactly correct, as has been discussed in the previous chapter. Péter Felcsuti immediately 
expressed his concern about this term in the interview: ‘I don’t like the term ‘the poor’s bank’ 
because it may suggest that it is about banking, while it is just a tool, even if all the character-
istics of banking business are included. It is a tool to reach and assist people who participate 
in the market economy only as consumers, but not as producers. Credits are the tool of the 
assistance.’ (author’s translation) The interviewed initiators also pointed out that for them the 
programme is not a business undertaking in any way. 
Still, the terminology ‘bank to the poor’ or ‘the poor’s bank’ obstructed the programme for 
several years; almost all reports on the topic used it, mostly in their titles. Although it was 
clear from most media reports that it was not a business endeavour, the term and the presence 
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of bankers or businessmen as initiators suggested to the superficial media consumer that it 
was. This negative effect was strengthened by political propaganda against banks and bank-
ers, which emerged in the aftermath of the economic crisis, has significantly grown, and has 
been nurtured by the Hungarian state ever since.  
At various conferences and in personal encounters we experienced that even the representa-
tives of non-profit organisations working with the Roma and people living in deep poverty 
looked at the Kiútprogram with prejudice, assuming that the programme was about the crea-
tion of a bank by means of which unscrupulous businessmen intended to profit even from the 
poorest while pretending to pursue humanitarian objectives. Eventually, information about 
the actual operation of the programme dispelled these prejudices. Similar assumptions (dis-
cussed in section 2.1.5) also emerged among the clients. 
More than one hundred newspaper articles, reports, and interviews on the Kiútprogram were 
published; most of them were objective, informative, or distinctly positive (see section 2.3.4 
on the negative reviews). On several occasions also the most popular TV channel in Hungary 
aired interviews with the experts, clients, and field workers.45 This positive media coverage 
mostly focused on the programme’s effects related to the clients, namely on two aspects: 
− the fact that the poor Roma actually repay the unsecured loans; 
− the fact that the programme’s achievements illustrate that the high unemployment rate 
among the Roma is caused by a lack of possibilities; if there are real opportunities, they 
try to seize them.  
On several occasions the second aspect was also connected with a comparison between the 
Kiútprogram and public works; the advantages of the programme were also compared with 
public works. Primarily web portals (including the two most popular ones) used the Kiútpro-
gram during its cucumber project phase to present the Roma in the media in a new way, em-
phasising work instead of poverty (as to the traditional presentation in the media, see chapter 
1.3.2).46 
As has already been mentioned in section 2.2.5, we receive more and more invitations to talk 
about the programme in economy, sociology, or other advanced courses at universities. The 
discussions following the presentations prove that the results of the programme are convinc-
ing enough to raise doubts about the prejudices of young people against the Roma, mostly 
about statements such as ‘the Tzigane are lazy, don’t want to work, rely on welfare’. Those 
students who are free of prejudices (according to our experiences, mostly sociology students) 
can use the programme for arguing against prejudices. 
The managers of the Kiútprogram (including myself) have written several articles about the 
programme, its wider background, the situation of the Roma, the possible solutions, and the 
public discourse on the issue. Here is a quote from our two-part article titled ‘The Roma, the 
majority, and the bridges’47: ‘Except for a narrow intellectual circle, the most characteristic 
approach of the public discourse on the Roma is to look for the responsible party to blame. Or 
rather whom to blame: the Roma or the Hungarians? Just to mention two typical approaches: 
firstly, the problem is that the Roma are lazy and they don’t want to work; secondly, the situ-
ation is so bad because the Hungarians are racists. Everyone has an opinion on what the oth-
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ers should do to change the situation. […] Instead, a discourse focusing on problem solution 
would be necessary. We should always ask what we can do in order to improve the situation. 
A prerequisite of this approach is an unpretentious discourse that is comprehensible to the 
public and at the same time very precise.’ (author’s translation) 
The article received very little feedback, but a sharply critical article was published in re-
sponse: ‘The decent and smart people favouring straight talk are really convinced that declar-
ing the sins of the Roma will bring the left and right, conservatives and liberals, Roma and 
non-Roma, closer to each other. [….] The article written by Péter Felcsuti, György Molnár, 
and András Ujlaky published in Népszabadság has been written in a similar spirit.’ 48 
The term ‘sins of the Roma’ needs to be clarified for readers who are unfamiliar with the sit-
uation in Hungary. After a violent murder committed by some Roma, the term ‘gypsy crime’ 
has spread and a demagogic demand has emerged to ‘openly discuss the sins of the Roma’ 
(see section 1.3.2). As someone involved in the dispute my opinion cannot be objective; 
however, this criticism is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of our original point. The 
author of the article equates our standpoint that it is necessary to talk about the issues to be 
resolved with the opinions of those who want to discuss the ‘sins of the Roma’. Obviously, 
this is a misinterpretation of our opinion, but it is worth clarifying the underlying (very real) 
differences among those who clearly denounce prejudices and discrimination against the 
Roma. There is a disagreement as to the question whether the discourse exclusively focusing 
on human rights is an efficient tool in the fight against prejudices and the social influence of 
racism that is gaining ground. In my opinion, the human rights aspect has a very important 
role in fighting against discrimination, reminding the state to fulfil its obligations, and facili-
tating the empowerment of the Roma. However, this aspect is unsuitable for decreasing the 
prejudices against the Roma and unable to change public discourse. 
 
2.3.3 Failed attempts to influence legislation 
The following section would rather fit in with the next chapter (rules, norms, and policies) 
but one strand of the discourses on the Kiútprogram cannot be interpreted without it. 
 
The problem 
The purpose of the Act 123 of 2004 (the so-called ‘START card law’) was to grant contribu-
tion-paying allowances to employers in order to facilitate the employment of people who are 
disadvantaged on the labour market. The included circle of people has changed several times; 
when the Kiútprogram was in the process of planning and in the first two years of its opera-
tion, the following groups were included (without extensive details of the conditions): 
– young people entering the labour market, 
– people returning to the job market after receiving child care support in some form, 
– the long-term unemployed. 
People meeting these conditions were eligible to receive the so-called START card49. If they 
were employed, they submitted the card to the employer who could be given a total or partial 
exemption from the obligation to pay pension and health insurance contributions for the em-
ployee for a shorter or longer time. The duration and the rate of the exemption were especial-
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ly beneficial to the long-term unemployed over 50 years of age50 or to those with only ele-
mentary education. In the most disadvantaged regions employers were given a total exemp-
tion from paying contributions (27% of the gross salary) for three years. 
Already at the time when the programme was planned we were aware of the problem that the 
START card law would not apply to the self-employed. If long-term unemployed people 
started a business in any legal form, they would not be eligible for the allowances that anoth-
er business could receive for employing them. Since the projected clientele of the Kiútpro-
gram would consist of self-employed people, two seemingly insurmountable obstacles would 
emerge: 
Firstly, the competitive disadvantage. If someone with a good business idea started a business 
and another existing local business copied the idea and employed people eligible for the 
START card, this second business would have a significant cost advantage. 
Secondly, in comparison to other countries in Hungary the tax burdens related to employing 
people are very high.51 In 2008, the employee contribution rate was 15.5%, in addition to the 
employer contribution; the income tax calculated for the minimum wage was 17%. In this 
context the self-employed were clearly disadvantaged. Tax allowances can be granted up to 
the full amount of the income tax for employees earning the minimum wage – but not for the 
self-employed. Contributions corresponding to the minimum wage have to be paid, even if 
the business does not generate any income.52 The same also applies to primary producers in 
the first year of their operation; this principle absolutely contradicts the seasonal nature of 
agricultural operations. It was obvious that the previously unemployed new entrepreneurs 
would not be able to pay both these taxes and the loan instalments.  
While analysing the text of the law, we came to the conclusion that this discrimination was 
unintended and was due to an error in the legislative text: the lawmaker did not realise that 
the self-employed are employers and employees in one person. It seemed easy to eliminate 
this error but attempts to do so failed during three consecutive governments. These three 
(very different) unsuccessful attempts offer valuable lessons regarding the necessary condi-
tions for social innovations as well as the role of institutions and cognitive frames. 
 
The first failure 
After identifying the problem we submitted a written proposal to the lawmaker, the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Labour, in November 2008 in order to modify the abovementioned reg-
ulation and we quoted the unsubstantiated discrimination contained in the legislative text. I 
negotiated with the ministry about the issue and the following is based on my notes and per-
sonal recollection. During the negotiations we worked with the assigned deputy secretary of 
state who asked us to supplement our proposal by explaining whether the proposed modifica-
tion could be abused and what effects the modification would have on the budget. 
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In the extensive justification of the proposal we explained as follows: ‘The modification 
would have no costs; in fact, it would lead to additional income. At the moment of receiving 
the START card the people we are talking about have not paid any contributions or income 
taxes for some time. In comparison, granting them a temporary exemption from the contribu-
tions will not result in a negative change. As to the state budget, the positive aspect is that 
these people would immediately start paying income taxes. The majority of the people affect-
ed by the law earn the minimum wage or approximately this amount; on account of the ap-
plied tax credit, they do not pay any income taxes. However, this does not apply to the self-
employed entrepreneurs who pay a 17% income tax, which means an immediate increase in 
income for the budget. If their businesses are profitable in the long run, they will also become 
steady contribution payers.’ (author’s translation) 
Regarding the risk of abuse, we managed to reassure the experts of the ministry; however, we 
were less successful in the negotiations on budgetary considerations. The difficulties resulted 
from the fact that during the implementation of the START card law the amount of the 
waived contributions had to be transferred from the Labour Market Fund (overseen by the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour) to the Health Insurance Fund and the Pension Insur-
ance Fund overseen by other state agencies. Therefore, although our reasoning was not ques-
tioned, if it had been accepted, it would have restricted the free utilisation of a resource fall-
ing within the ministry’s competence. 
This situation was further complicated by the fact that although we emphasised that our pro-
posal was meant to have a general effect, in the minds of the ministry’s experts it still re-
mained strongly connected with our microcredit plans. They started to assess whether in 
comparison to their plans, which were different, the microcredit was a more efficient tool to 
influence the labour market. They also expressed their doubts whether the distressed Roma 
would actually repay the loans. Our attempt to convince the ministry to modify the law came 
to a halt. 
 
Partial success equalling failure 
In April 2009, one year prior to the elections, a new government – still supported by the so-
cialists and the liberals – was formed under Gordon Bajnai’s non-partisan leadership. In July 
2009 one of the main sponsors of the Kiútprogram, Péter Felcsuti (see section 2.2.1), wrote a 
letter concerning microcredit ideas to the prime minister and the finance minister. The letter 
contained two proposals: the first one suggested a modification of the START card law and 
the second one suggested that future clients of the programme should be able to apply for the 
support to become entrepreneurs not only as individuals but also as a group (see section 
2.1.3), which would not require a modification of the law. Felcsuti also wrote that we con-
tacted the prime minister with these relatively unimportant questions because ‘…we experi-
ence a certain kind of hurt professional pride and bureaucratic resistance from the leadership 
of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, and this is why we must ask for your help [….] 
we believe that without high-level support we will not be able to start this otherwise undoubt-
edly valuable experiment.’ (author’s translation) 
As a result of the letter the prime minister convoked an expert meeting where he personally 
participated together with the deputy prime minister responsible for political affairs, the for-
mer and the current Minister of Social Affairs and Labour, several secretaries of state, and 
additional experts from the ministry. I participated in this meeting together with three 
Kiútprogram originators. Compared to the importance of the proposal, the scope and level of 
the meeting was exaggerated. The socio-political background described in chapter 1.3 and the 
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lack of new ideas for improving the situation of the Roma must certainly have contributed to 
the fact that the importance of our cause had been magnified to that extent. 
During the talks two types of counter-arguments were brought up. The first referred to the 
issue of an exaggerated budget outcomes of a law modification already rebutted in prelimi-
nary written documents. The second argument, brought up by the Minister of Social Affairs 
and Labour, was that turning the unemployed Roma into entrepreneurs is an illusion, since it 
is difficult to get them to work even as employees. During the debate a participating politi-
cian suggested a compromise: the law would not be modified but resources would be allocat-
ed for the additional contribution-paying obligations and for further support of the pilot pro-
gramme. 
Later on, the programme faced several negative consequences resulting from the fact that a 
one-off solution was created instead of a normative one. After further lengthy negotiations 
the agreed compromise became a government decree within a couple of months, and as a 
result, the item of ‘creating and operating a community lending system of microloans’ was 
included in the amount of 130 million HUF (450,000 euros) allocated to the Ministry of So-
cial Affairs and Labour in the 2010 state budget (approved at the end of 2009). 
Because of the extreme bureaucratic slowness of the ministry, the agreement between the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour and the Kiútprogram was signed only five months later 
on 22 April 2010, after the first round of the then two rounds Hungarian electoral system dur-
ing the last days of the old government. However, the question as to whether this delay re-
sulted from the regular operation of the ministry or from the special treatment of the Kiútpro-
gram remains open. 
 
The third failure 
One of the first measures of the new government was the suspension of the contracts signed 
during the last few weeks of the previous government. This fundamentally endangered the 
implementation of the programme, since the contract with the European Commission (see 
2.1.4) had not been signed yet. Mr. Polgár, the president of the Kiútprogram board, contacted 
the successor of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, the Ministry of National Re-
sources.  
During the negotiations with the high-level officials of the ministry we managed (mainly be-
cause of the already received EU grant) to dispel the suspicion that the agreement with the 
previous government signed in the last moment was a covert way of party financing. Howev-
er, we were often asked about our motives (‘What is your interest in this?’), even at secretary 
of state-level. The negotiating partners seriously disbelieved that wealthy people would spend 
their money on social issues without having any individual interests or covert intentions53. 
(This kind of disbelief is supported by the fact that the wealthiest Hungarian entrepreneurs 
usually combine donations with some kind of self-promotion.) The confusion was even big-
ger because the financial sacrifice was meant to serve the interests of the Roma population. 
The following question asked by a ministry official shows the typical attitude: ‘Mr. Polgár, if 
you have so strong humanitarian feelings, why do you want to help the Roma instead of the 
blind, for example?’54 (author’s translation) 
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As a result of the negotiations, the modified contract between the ministry and the Kiútpro-
gram was officially signed in autumn 2010. In this agreement the Kiútprogram had to re-
nounce up to 75% of the originally intended amount of money, however, the remaining 25% 
were granted. In addition, the ministry committed itself to reimburse the contributions paid 
by the clients, entrepreneurs, or small-scale producers to the programme up to an amount of 
100,000 euros until the end of 2011.  
As an important part of the negotiations we presented our suggestions regarding the START 
card law again and provided additional supporting materials. As a result, the abovementioned 
agreement laid down that the special reimbursement must be paid only until ‘the scope of the 
Act CXXIII of 2004 is extended to the small-scale producers and entrepreneurs included in 
the Kiútprogram.’ (author’s translation) We prepared the detailed text for the modification of 
the law and submitted it to the officials but it never reached the parliament. We asked about 
the reasons but we have never received an answer. 
Presently this issue does not make a difference anymore because the law has changed and the 
long-term unemployed only qualify if they become employed in public works. This way, the 
discrimination against the self-employed was eliminated; however, in reverse direction, eve-
ryone lost the allowance except public works employment. 
During our work we found that several other laws should be changed. In Hungary, the entire 
microcredit field is unregulated. However, what we described above was in every respect our 
first and simplest modification proposal, i.e. we intended to refine only two sentences in the 
then-existing law. Since we failed to achieve a change in this law, we made no further at-
tempts to modify other laws. 
 
2.3.4 Government narratives on the Kiútprogram 
In section 2.1.6 I already mentioned Minister Zoltán Balog’s statement regarding the 
Kiútprogram. For the sake of simplicity at that point I referred to Zoltán Balog as the former 
secretary of state with responsibility for social inclusion. However, we have to clarify the 
precise name of the Hungarian government office when discussing narratives because the 
official English name for it – State Secretariat for Social Affairs and Inclusion (emphasis 
mine) – is misleading. In the Hungarian name, the term is not ‘inclusion’ but ‘társadalmi 
felzárkózás’ which means ‘social catching-up’. Similarly, in Hungarian the expression for 
National Social Inclusion Strategy55, which focuses on deep poverty, poverty among chil-
dren, and the situation of the Roma, is Nemzeti Társadalmi Felzárkózási Stratégia; here, the 
third word also means ‘catching-up’ and not ‘inclusion’.  
It is not nitpicking to discuss this topic because it was an intentional change of terminology 
conducted by the new government in 2010 and there is a real, strategic concept behind it. The 
term ‘felzárkózás’ (catching-up) clearly suggests that those who need to catch up are at a 
lower level. It also means – and there are daily disputes on it, even lawsuits in the field of 
education – that before integrated education can take place, Roma students have to catch up 
first, i.e. Roma children can be taught together with non-Roma children only if they have 
reached their level. 
It is worth quoting from the letter of the Hungarian Catholic Episcopacy to the Ministry of 
Education in 2005, since it is an important intellectual antecedent of the current government’s 
position: ‘If it is really adapted to the needs of the individual, the development of skills, 
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which aims at counterbalancing the disadvantages resulting from the social circumstances 
and developmental stage of the student, cannot be conducted with the rest of the students in 
the same community, class, or group. It is necessary to find a suitable method for the devel-
opment of students who study in accordance with individual development plans; integration 
is not necessarily the appropriate method. Forcing integration has a two-sided negative effect: 
it will only increase and deepen the learning failures and the developmental and psychologi-
cal disadvantages of the child needing development; at the same time, it will have an obstruc-
tive influence on the development and full unfolding of the mentally and physically healthy 
children. We protest against forced integration and its consequent irreversible effects in the 
name of equal opportunities and humanism!’56 
Although it is not explicitly expressed in the text, for people familiar with the public dis-
course in Hungary it is obvious that this is a protest against the integrated education of Roma 
children. The letter was written in reaction to the attempt of the Ministry of Education to in-
troduce integrated education instead of the earlier so-called ‘catching-up classes’. I would 
like to refer to the fact that the director of the Polgár Foundation (major owner of the 
Kiútprogram) is the former leader of the National Education Integration Network (see section 
2.2.1). 
Having reviewed the context, let us get back to the statement of Minister Zoltán Balog , since 
it connects the Kiútprogram to the dispute on integration:  
‘[Journalist:] What were the mistakes made by the socialist-free democrat governments in the 
field of catching-up of the Roma? 
- While human rights are fought for by means of declamations and billions are wasted on so-
called integration, disadvantages have grown, ethnic conflicts have flared up, and the cause of 
the Roma fell victim to party politics. The Kiútprogram – launched in 2005 (sic) – is a good ex-
ample of such unproductive and ill-advised policy; the essence of the programme was to pro-
vide unsecured microcredits to the participating Roma to start a business. The programme was 
extremely inefficient, since the issuing of one loan unit required six units of operating costs 
used by the so-called ‘management’. Furthermore, they did not examine who the money was 
given to; loans were not necessarily given to the suitable people among the mostly unschooled 
Tzigane living in deep poverty. While they wasted a vast amount of money on this, they adver-
tised it abroad. After all this, the European Commission resented that I would not support the 
programme. They sent me a message that the Hungarian government should be ashamed of it-
self.’57 
This statement (that mentions no other concrete example) shows that due to the situation de-
scribed in the previous section, the new government’s departments in charge of Roma issues 
regarded the Kiútprogram as a programme of the previous government and therefore rejected 
it. By the way, the abovementioned protest by the European Commission (more precisely, the 
DG Regio) was sent at the time of the temporary suspension of the support by the Hungarian 
government, before the actual implementation of the programme. In summary, the one-off 
support (instead of a normative support) provided by a government decision put the pro-
gramme in a false political context, since the Kiútprogram had nothing to do with any of the 
previous governments. 
At the same time, there is actually a substantial difference regarding the attitudes towards 
integration. The Minister’s statement is true in the sense that the objective of the Kiútprogram 
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is to facilitate integration into the labour market, which differs from the government’s con-
cept of a segregated labour market in the form of public works. 
The minister’s statement was followed by a short press campaign including some articles in 
the government-friendly media58 stressing the low efficiency of the programme which is evi-
denced by the high ratio of costs and issued loans.  
 
2.4 Rules, norms, and policies 
In chapter 1.3 I covered the social development and related public policies that contributed to 
the marginalisation of the majority of the Roma population in Hungary. A particularly big 
difficulty when analysing the policies about the Roma is that the narratives in official docu-
ments and the actual practice often contradict each other. This is the reason why certain as-
pects of this problem have already been covered in the previous chapters (sections 2.3.3 and 
2.3.4). 
With regard to the complexity of the problem, a detailed exploration of public policies on the 
Roma would extend the scope of this case study; therefore, I will only cover the components 
directly influencing the Kiútprogram. The National Inclusion Strategy (Hungarian Govern-
ment, 2011) mentions the programme by name, probably due to the EU grant: 
‘As regards micro-credit programmes, we must process, further improve and extend the expe-
riences of the Way Out Programme that targeted Roma communities in Hungary and provid-
ed micro-credits, and must supplement them with sub-programmes specifically targeting 
Roma women. By drawing from multiple financial resources, subsidies59 combined with mi-
cro-credits enhance the sustainability of results.’ (Hungarian Government, 2011, p. 85, em-
phasis in the original) 
The updated version issued in 2014 (Hungarian Government, 2014) omitted the programme. 
However, the importance of microcredit programmes is still included and the last sentence 
quoted above as well (Hungarian Government, 2014, p. 94). 
Still, as already mentioned in section 2.1.3, the law regulating credit institutions and financial 
service providers does not include microcredits. As a result, the Kiútprogram cannot issue 
loans as a business-like activity. The legal definition of business-like activities specifies that 
three conditions have to be met at the same time: 
– parties involved in the business transactions are not defined in advance, 
– there must be a regular business activity, 
– the purpose is to generate wealth or profit. 
The Kiútprogram conducts business-like activities in accordance with the first two conditions 
but not the third since it is a non-profit organisation; however, the meaning of this third con-
dition is not clear. As seen earlier, it can be interpreted to qualify activities similar to those of 
the Kiútprogram as illegal. This lack of clarity made the operation of the Kiútprogram very 
difficult and forced the programme to repeatedly make suboptimal detours.  
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59
 Quote from the official English version of the strategy; however, the term ‘subsidies’ is a translation error. In 
Hungarian, the word ‘support’ refers to non-financial support. 
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In spite of the theoretical declaration of the importance of social microcredits, in the recent 
years not one grant financed by Hungarian or EU resources, which organisations engaging in 
social microcredit activities could have applied for, has been announced in Hungary. 
I have already provided a detailed description of the anomalies regarding allowances and of 
the rates of the taxes and contributions that have to be paid by entrepreneurs (see 2.1.3 and 
2.3.3). Therefore, at this point I will not discuss this again. A further difficulty is that people 
automatically lose their welfare benefits when they receive an entrepreneur’s licence. This is 
where the support to become an entrepreneur is supposed to help. However, this support is 
not normative; therefore it is difficult to count on it. 
With regard to the cucumber project the situation is better, since registered primary producers 
earning less than 20,000 euros per year remain eligible for welfare benefits and are subject to 
paying contributions only in the first calendar year. (The intention of this latter regulation is 
not clear but it is beneficial to the programme.) This component of the regulatory environ-
ment was a strong motivation for the Kiútprogram to orient towards agricultural activities. 
As has been discussed in section 2.1.3, in Hungary the administrative burdens on start-ups are 
extremely high, which is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Administrative burdens on start-ups, Hungary and neighbouring countries, 2008 – 
2013 
Note: composite index 0 – 6 scale (0: least restrictive, 6: most restrictive), which includes the number of proce-
dures, cost and time required to register a new company and get licenses. 
Source: OECD (2015, p. 55). 
 
Between 2008 and 2013 administrative burdens on start-ups remained high in Hungary, while 
they have decreased in all of its neighbouring countries. ‘For individual companies, the time 
required to complete procedures in Hungary is four times higher than in the Slovak Republic 
and the gap is even greater compared with other neighbouring countries.’ (OECD, 2015, p. 
56) The cited study states that taking the largest business city of the given economy into ac-
count, the relative position of Hungary is much better, i.e. it is below the CEEC and OECD 
average (OECD, 2015, p. 58). This means that in the regions where the Kiútprogram operates 
the situation is far worse. 
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The difficulties of launching a business, which are especially detrimental to the undereducat-
ed clients of the Kiútprogram, is listed under the process of fieldwork, section 2.1.5. Here 
only one further problem is added. For most businesses activities, including cleaning ser-
vices, a so-called OKJ certificate (issued by the National Registry of Qualifications, OKJ) is 
needed. However, for the majority of our clients OKJ training measures are not an option 
because they are refinanced and only conducted in large groups. 
Since travelling is difficult (in many places there is only one daily bus going to and from the 
location of running errands), fulfilling these obligations can take several weeks, if people 
have to do it on their own, without having access to a car. 
As to the administrative process, it is much easier to obtain the primary producer’s licence. 
 
2.4.1 Advantages of the public benefit organisation status of the Kiútprogram Ltd. 
While the Hungarian regulations on (micro) finance and on starting a new business create 
some serious obstacles for the Kiútprogram, the programme’s status as a public benefit or-
ganisation has also some advantages. Since 1 July 2007, it has been possible to establish non-
profit business companies in Hungary. The condition for this public benefit organisation sta-
tus is that the profit gained from business operations is not divided among the owners.  
Similarly to non-profit organisations, professional or sports associations, etc., non-profit 
business companies can also apply for the public (or prominently public) benefit organisation 
status. When the Kiútprogram was founded the law60 regulating public benefit organisations 
contained an itemised list of public benefit activities. This list included activities such as the 
promotion of equal opportunities for groups in a disadvantageous social position or the pro-
motion of training and employment for those having a disadvantaged position on the labour 
force market. The new regulation applicable from 201261 says that all activities are of public 
benefit if they ‘directly or indirectly serve the fulfilment of public duties, contributing to the 
satisfaction of the mutual needs of the society and the individual.’ (author’s translation) An 
organisation can be qualified as a prominently public benefit organisation if it signs a contract 
to take on and perform a state duty. 
The Kiútprogram was qualified as a public benefit organisation in 2011; however, it does not 
meet the requirements to become a prominently public benefit organisation. 
The advantages of being qualified as a public benefit organisation are as follows: 
– No personal income tax (PIT) has to be paid for the donations received by private indi-
viduals from public benefit organisations. In principle, the Kiútprogram provides loans 
and does not donate money; however, this regulation enables us to qualify the contribu-
tions paid for our clients as donations; thus, these amounts are exempt from PIT.  
– Public benefit organisations may employ volunteers. 
– There is a tax allowance for donations to public benefit organisations for both private 
individuals and business companies. Individuals may lower the tax base of the PIT by 
30% of the donation (up to a certain limit) and business companies may lower their pre-
tax income subject to corporate tax by the full amount of the donation (or even more in 
some cases) up to 20% of the tax base. 
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 Act 156 of 1997. 
https://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Hungary/Hungary_Act_CLVI_1997_on_Public_Benefit_Organizations.PDF 
61
 Act 175 of 2011. 
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In practice, the use of this last advantage is limited by the fact that donations to prominently 
public benefit organisations, especially cultural institutions or sports associations, receive a 
much more favourable treatment. As a result, companies that focus on tax optimisation do-
nate to such organisations, which limits our fundraising capabilities. Still, those who decide 
to support the Kiútprogram receive tax allowances, which usually increases the amount of the 
donation. 
 
2.4.2 Some components of the EU policy 
It is characteristic not only of Hungary but also its neighbouring countries that the respective 
national Roma strategies, which are locally implemented, include (social) microcredits and 
the development of micro businesses; however, almost nothing of that is realised in practice 
(see, e.g., (Kiútprogram, 2012, pp. 45–47). Grant resources are very inefficient in reaching 
the Roma (State Audit Office of Hungary, 2008). This is due to the fundamental lack of inter-
est on the part of the political sphere; it is impossible to gain in popularity by improving liv-
ing conditions of the Roma in the short run. 
Consequently, it is worth to consider the modification of EU policies announcing more and 
longer EU grants for the integration of the Roma, as it was the case with the Roma pilot pro-
ject the Kiútprogram participated in.  
I cannot go into details here but it is worth mentioning that the microfinance programme of 
the EU (Progress Microfinance, a formerly independent programme now integrated into the 
EaSI framework)62 is not suitable for non-traditional social microcredit programmes similar 
to the Kiútprogram that provide very small loans with a high rate of failure. As an example, 
the upper limit of the loans available in Progress Microfinance is 60 times higher than the 
average loan issued by the Kiútprogram. A structure where the upper limit is that high is built 
on very different foundations than social microcredit.  
The dogma of sustainability as a policy requirement for microcredits is an obstacle to the 
implementation of inclusive, social microcredits (For more details, see Molnár, 2015). 
 
2.5 Resources 
Financial resources have already been discussed but I will also summarise them in the follow-
ing. In the first phase of the project, between 2010 and 2012, the majority of the funds came 
from the EU pilot project, altogether 1,425,000 euros; 1,125,000 euros (close to 80%) were 
spent on the costs of the programme and the rest on official travels to Brussels as well as on 
international dissemination and costs of monitoring and impact assessment conducted by the 
World Bank and the UNDP. The resources of the programme’s finances are shown in Table 
10. 
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Table 10: Resources of the Kiútprogram between 2010 and 2012, in % 
EU Roma Pilot (incl. dissemination and impact assessment) 69 
Hungarian government 18 
Raiffeisen Bank CSR 4 
Other private resources (Polgár Foundation, private persons) 9 
Total 100 
Source: Kiútprogram financial reports. 
 
Government support came from two sources: about two thirds came from the agreement with 
the Ministry of Human Resources (see 2.1.6) and one third from the agreement with the Min-
istry for National Development and Economy (see 2.2.2). Partly due to the lower-than-
expected number of clients and partly because of the cessation of the support, the Kiútpro-
gram finally received less than one third of the contractual amount. The Raiffeisen Bank pro-
vided back-office services in addition to financial sponsorship.  
It is worth mentioning that despite government support, the Hungarian state in fact gained a 
net income: altogether the Kiútprogram paid 1.5 times the support amount received in the 
form of taxes and contributions for the wages of the field workers and other employees, plus 
additional taxes. The taxes and contributions paid by the clients and their businesses during 
the first two years somewhat exceeded the amount of the entrepreneurial support paid to our 
clients. This balance does not include the amount of welfare benefits saved by the state or the 
taxes paid by businesses that are still operating after the first two years. 
After the EU grant and government support have expired, the financial resources fell to ap-
proximately 10% of the previously available amount, i.e. to about 130,000 – 150,000 euros 
per year between 2013 and 2015. 20,000 euros came from the Aegon Insurance Company and 
the rest from the Polgár Foundation and private sponsors. 
The cooperation with the local government of a small town in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg Coun-
ty mentioned in section 2.2.3 did not provide actual financial resources but relieved the local 
field worker from several administrative burdens; therefore he could work with more clients. 
Volunteer work is another resource of the Kiútprogram and is mostly done by the members of 
the management.  
In some sense the investments of the clients are also resources. Considering the capacities of 
the families, field workers encourage clients to contribute 15 – 30 euros to the investment 
costs. During the first phase of the project this was not required consistently but we found 
that even small contributions are important from a psychological perspective. If it is absolute-
ly impossible for the clients to contribute, in case of the cucumber project they have to start 
preparing the soil before receiving the loan. 
 
2.6 Social and technological innovation 
The cucumber-growing project was enabled by a technological innovation developed in Hun-
gary by KITE Ltd. 30 years ago. In this chapter I will summarise the precursors, the birth, 
and the diffusion of this innovation, primarily based on an interview with Csaba Balogh (see 
section 2.2.3).  
 55 
KITE (an acronym coming from the Hungarian name meaning Corn and Industrial Crops 
Production Cooperation) was founded in 1972 by means of a cooperation between nine agri-
cultural cooperatives in Eastern Hungary and located its headquarters in Nádudvar. The es-
tablishment of KITE was connected to the economic reform launched in Hungary at the end 
of the 1960s. The founders’ objective was to use the latest scientific and technological 
achievements and to introduce and apply modern technologies as well as work and produc-
tion management processes (KITE was the first to import machine systems based on John 
Deere tractors into Hungary, a step requiring political approval at that time.) Within 5 years 
the number of participating cooperatives grew to more than 400.63 
After its establishment KITE started to develop large field crops and to work on horticultural 
plantations (which were suitable for using a uniform technology) on large areas of land only 
in the early 1980s. For this purpose the company studied primarily North American and more 
specifically Californian technologies. During harvesting and processing many manual labour-
ers were employed on the plantations but prior to these phases huge fields could be farmed by 
means of large machines and precise technology. 
In Hungary horticultural production was mostly characterised by working on small areas and 
by using mostly manual labourers. Horticultural production on large fields requires techno-
logical rigor: a strict following of instructions. It has also greater risks than traditional farm-
ing; however, if all instructions are precisely followed, a higher crop yield can be achieved. 
While exploring the possibilities, KITE identified some suitable kinds of vegetables: pepper, 
tomato, and the simplest of all – cucumber. As to cucumbers, there is a demand for good 
quality produce categorised by size. However, if cucumbers are grown on the ground, it is not 
easy to see their size and it is extremely hard physical work to pick them. Therefore, between 
1980 and 1982 Géza Búvár, the then production director who later became the managing di-
rector of KITE, developed a new technology by adapting a method already used in connec-
tion with other plants, i.e. to lift cucumber plants off the ground. As far as we know, KITE 
was the first in the world to apply the cordon growing system to cucumber growing; this 
method is similar to the one used in viticulture. The technology was complemented by a drip-
ping watering system.  
In addition to a good visibility of the produce, this new method offered several other ad-
vantages. It made it possible to move between the rows as well as plant and spray pesticides 
by means of machines; the cucumbers got more sunshine and better ventilation. The technol-
ogy also made it possible to achieve a good crop yield on sandy soil with poor water supply 
and to use water in a very efficient way resulting from the dripping water technology using 
underground pipes.  
By importing and adapting the most advanced Western European technologies, KITE devel-
oped a so-called small soil seedling container technique. In addition to technological devel-
opment and seedling growing, KITE’s most important task was to spread technology, not 
only for cucumber production. From the mid-1980s on, more and more cooperatives started 
to use this cucumber-growing method. The agricultural cooperatives and the household plots 
connected to them cooperated really well in this case64; most of the work was done by means 
of large-scale production but the families of the cooperative members and other locals, from 
teachers to clerks, were also involved in harvesting.  
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 A contemporary research paper on this topic by Csizmadia (1985). 
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The technology spread to the gardens of family houses through the household plots; due to a 
partial dismantling of agricultural cooperatives after the regime change65, it became dominant 
in these small-sized gardens in some regions of the country or other privately owned lands. 
The integrator network came into being in order to ensure the connection between the pro-
cessing industry and the producers.  
 
2.7 Social impact measurement 
As mentioned earlier, during the EU Roma pilot programme phase the experts of the World 
Bank and the UNDP conducted an impact assessment of the pilot project and also assisted in 
monitoring. A survey was completed by all serious candidates and it was repeated after a 
year. The monitoring was supported by an online database created by the World Bank where 
the field workers recorded their clients-related activities. The size of the programme and its 
experimental nature did not enable the completion of an impact evaluation suitable for statis-
tical inference.  
The monitoring and impact assessment activities exceeded the original analytical purposes by 
far and due to the cooperation, they were continuously used as measures supporting the im-
plementation of the project. The electronic monitoring of the field workers’ activities greatly 
supported the evaluation of their performance. The analysis of data also revealed that field 
workers spend much more time preparing business plans than originally anticipated. There-
fore, the methodology of business planning was corrected by providing more central support 
for this activity; furthermore, the content of the training was also modified.  
The questionnaire for the impact assessment was embedded in the operation procedures. We 
surveyed all potential clients who showed serious interest. The questionnaire was used for 
double-checking the upper income limit during the screening of clients, to examine their level 
of debts, and also to assess some subjective aspects. It proved very efficient that field workers 
conducted the surveys, thus obtaining a deep insight in the income level and living conditions 
of the clients. Altogether 450 baseline and 186 follow-up questionnaires were completed. 
This decrease in questionnaires was caused by the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
those who did not become clients, mostly by their own decision, did not want to complete the 
follow-up questionnaire. The results of the surveys were processed by Kiútprogram (2012) 
and World Bank (2013) studies. 
During the programme, at the time of the modification of the model it was also deemed nec-
essary to have external independent experts who would analyse the operations. The Budapest 
Institute primarily evaluated the Kiútprogram’s internal documents and interviewed the man-
agement, the field workers, and the clients.  
During the cucumber project phase we did not conduct systematic impact measurement for 
financial reasons but we completed client questionnaires. We could also gather information 
on the production costs and income of the clients, unless they sold the cucumbers to someone 
else. 
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2.8 Further drivers and obstacles for the diffusion of the SI 
2.8.1 The dogma of sustainability 
When preparing to replace the expiring EU grant, the Kiútprogram repeatedly tried to receive 
support from the Open Society Institute (OSI) because it is the biggest non-profit sponsor of 
the Roma programmes in the CEE countries, including Hungary.  
At the institute’s request we submitted a large amount of presentations, analyses, and calcula-
tions concerning the Kiútprogram and we participated in negotiations on different levels. 
During these negotiations we identified three major issues: 
1. We believe that the purpose of the Kiútprogram is to generate employment and we regard 
active labour market programmes and public works as a benchmark, while microfinance 
is just a tool; by contrast, the OSI believes that if we engage in microfinance, the 
Kiútprogram is a microfinance institution and should be handled as such. Consequently, 
decisions regarding our programme should be made by the Soros Economic Development 
Fund (EDF) within the OSI. 
2. Micro-financed businesses supported by the EDF typically operate in the informal sector 
of post-Soviet or Balkan countries. The representative of the EDF disapproved that the 
Kiútprogram works differently. Although it is against our principles to operate in the in-
formal sector (see section 2.1.3), in some respect it is legitimate that a non-profit organi-
sation does not want to support the state through taxes. 
3. The most important differences of opinion showed with respect to sustainability. The rep-
resentative of the EDF insisted that microfinancing should at least be self-sustaining. The 
Kiútprogram obviously cannot meet this requirement even in the long run and we did not 
want to pretend that we could do it to receive the grant. 
In my opinion this last point shows the extreme importance of cognitive frames. In principle 
the Open Society Institute supports humanitarian programmes or educational, cultural, social, 
and empowerment projects in which sustainability does not even play a role with huge 
amounts of money. However, once an economic component has emerged in a programme, the 
programme is placed in another frame of reference where the dogma of sustainability be-
comes relevant. (This is about the sustainability of the organisation also providing micro-
loans. The clients’ businesses must not only be self-sustainable but also profitable; otherwise 
the project does not make sense.) 
According to this approach, there is a vast gap between pure support and the activities which 
at least aim at self-sustainability. For the origin of the sustainability dogma, see Molnár 
(2015). On account of the importance and nature of this dogma, I quote from an EU docu-
ment: 
‘Self-sustainability is a major issue for a microcredit fund. One way of achieving this goal 
can be to charge an above market interest rate. An above market rate is acceptable where the 
risk is higher. For example, in a pure subordinated loan, with no collateral at all by the micro-
entrepreneur, the interest rate can be higher than for a traditional loan in order to cover all 
risks.’ (European Commission, 2003, p. 29).  
This quote demonstrates the extraordinary power of the cognitive frame that the complete 
self-contradiction of the cited idea is not apparent to the experts. According to this logic, 
charging marginalised people a higher interest rate will improve their relative position. 
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2.8.2 Charity versus active solidarity 
Non-profit organisations, churches, and activists working with people living in deep poverty 
or with the Roma often argue about the relationship between charity and active solidarity. 
One view says that the most important task is to feed the hungry and provide shelter to the 
homeless, and that everything else comes later. This is especially characteristic of church 
organisations. Another view says that ‘the Roma need solidarity instead of protection. They 
should protect themselves. We can express solidarity with them, but they have to take charge 
for their cause. The same is true for charity. I see solidarity and charity as opposing concepts. 
By charity, the relationship between donor and recipient is reproduced. I am not working on 
changing it, but reinforce it while – in secret, even being dishonest to myself – I even expect 
gratitude.’66 
In practice, the government clearly supports the social work of churches and non-profit asso-
ciations connected to religious organisations and shifts the balance towards charity. 
The management of the Kiútprogram thinks that both approaches can be useful in a given 
situation but our approach is closer to the second view, whereby solidarity alone is by no 
means enough: clients living in deep poverty should be enabled to become active, i.e. they 
need an initial boost. The loans serve this purpose. After the joint work in the first year, cli-
ents regarded the loan and professional counselling as equally important; however, initially 
the loans are always more important, not just because of the money. As a Roma client said, ‘I 
think the most important to the Roma is the fact that we get a loan. Because it means that they 
are not afraid that we would not repay it. For us, it was the first objective that they give a loan 
and that they give it to us. This raised our attention: they give a loan to us.’ (author’s transla-
tion) 
For the Kiútprogram fundraising is very difficult because it is relative complex and difficult 
to classify, and because there is a lack of discussion on the issues described above. Those 
who donate to people in distress prefer to donate for more obvious and directly visible objec-
tives. 
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 Interview with András Bíró. He is the doyen of the Hungarian human rights movement, and recipient of the 
Right Livelihood Award, also known as the Alternative Nobel Prize. 
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PART 3) Impact of the social innovation 
 
3.1 First phase 
3.1.1 Impact on the clients 
The effects of the first programme phase on the clients are summarised mostly on the basis of 
the 2013 World Bank case study (see chapter 2.7). 
An overwhelming majority of the clients said that the business they started improved the fam-
ily’s financial situation (Table 11). 
 
Table 11: Beneficiary opinions on loan impact 
 Very much Somewhat Same as 
before 
Negative 
impact 
Did the loan contribute to improving your 
business? 90% 8% 0% 1% 
Did the loan contribute to improving your 
family's financial situation? 48% 32% 14% 7% 
Did the loan contribute to improving your 
fulfilment in life? 45% 27% 22% 5% 
Source: World Bank (2013, p. 22). 
The actual results are somewhat less favourable because of the selection bias: the most un-
successful clients did not complete the follow-up questionnaire. A negative effect manifested 
itself in cases where the business had completely failed and the client missed other income 
opportunities. It is noteworthy that a large majority of clients said that the loan improved their 
personal fulfilment in life. This often happened even in cases where the business was not re-
ally successful; several clients managed to find a job after being unemployed for some years. 
This was mostly to the result of their increased self-confidence and the new skills learned 
during training sessions. 
Table 12 summarises the impacts of the various characteristics of the programme. The closer 
environment of the participants was generally supportive. By contrast, a wider neighbour-
hood was reported as supportive by only 38% of all loan recipients. Although the replies to 
our question do not reflect it, but the extended family (parents, grown-up children, siblings 
living in separate households) contributed to the failure of some clients. It repeatedly hap-
pened that the new entrepreneurs with a promising business earned a larger income and their 
families immediately demanded to be supported – and they felt obliged to help. In more than 
one case helping the family exhausted the resources to continue the business. 
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Table 12: Kiútprogram characteristics and loan performance: beneficiary feedback 
 Helped my  
activity Neutral Counterworked 
Functioning of the group 70% 23% 7% 
 Very adequate Adequate Inadequate 
Quality of the information provid-
ed 59% 38% 3% 
Support in running my business 58% 37% 6% 
Support in bookkeeping 60% 39% 1% 
 Helpful / Sympa-
thetic Neutral Hostile 
How did your close neighbourhood 
relate to your participation? 77% 8% 14% 
How did your wider neighbour-
hood relate to your participation? 38% 35% 27% 
Source: World Bank (2013, p. 23). 
As has been mentioned earlier, in retrospect a significant number of our clients appreciated 
receiving training and acquiring a bank account more than the loan itself (Table 13). 
 
Table 13: Importance of different financial services: beneficiary feedback 
 Very  
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Not  
important 
Offering financial literacy training improves 
your life. 53% 41% 5% 
Offering financial savings support improves 
your life. 69% 18% 13% 
Offering microcredit for business improves 
your life. 45% 37% 18% 
Source: World Bank (2013, p. 24). 
 
3.1.2 Impact on the social environment 
In this section I will mostly rely on the reports of the field workers. At the beginning of their 
activities the field workers always contacted the leader of the given settlement and the local 
unemployment agency; both almost always said that the idea of the Kiútprogram is nonsense 
and that no one will repay the unsecured loans. Later they were surprised to see that Roma 
clients could handle the administrative hurdles related to their businesses and repay the loans. 
Officials and administrators could not imagine that these people were willing to undertake 
such a huge risk in order to seize even the slightest chance to improve their own lives and 
their families’ future. 
A similar phenomenon also happened in the case of the business partners. On account of the 
lack of trust, the field workers’ intervention was often necessary to establish business (seller-
buyer) relationships; it became clearly visible that because of fair business relationships the 
non-Roma business partners’ attitudes towards our clients have undergone a positive change.  
Since there is no systematic research on the topic, we cannot tell whether this phenomenon 
had any spin-off effects (and to what degree) and whether, as a result, the attitudes towards 
the Roma have changed at the given locations. However, it is clear that the reports on our 
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successful entrepreneurs, the short videos about them on the website of the programme, and 
the positive newspaper articles and television reports contributed to a reduction of prejudices 
against the Roma. 
As is shown in Table 6, almost half of the clients started some kind of retail and often began 
competing with the only shop in the village which had a monopolistic position. In several 
cases the competition resulted in reduced prices for the residents. It is known from experienc-
es on the international level that retail businesses using microcredits may have a crowding out 
effect. Because of the short duration of the Roma pilot, we did not come across this problem 
in practice. 
 
3.2 The cucumber-growing phase 
3.2.1 Impact on the clients 
Impact on the income 
An advantage of the cucumber project is that if two conditions are met, participation has no 
real financial risk:  
– Apart from rare casual informal work, there is (almost) no other employment opportunity 
for undereducated, long-term unemployed people in the settlement; 
– the local government is cooperative. 
The first condition is automatically met because the Kiútprogram operates in such settle-
ments. The importance of the second condition has already been discussed in section 2.2.3. If 
the local leadership is hostile and does not give public work assignments to clients taking part 
in the cucumber project, and if the cucumber yield is for whatever reason (weather, pests, 
etc.) lower than wages achieved in public works, the clients’ income may decrease. Clearly, 
the extreme boost of public works projects decreased many people’s interest in participating 
in the Kiútprogram. 
Even if there is no financial risk, there is a moral risk. If the yield is very poor, the clients and 
their families suffer a double loss: firstly, they worked in vain and secondly, the unpaid loan 
is a psychological burden. The field workers suggest to these unlucky clients that they should 
give the project another try the next year, since the necessary investments have already been 
made. This is a rational decision because if the production instructions are adhered to, the 
value of the yield cannot be less than the cost of the financial investments, unless there is a 
hailstorm, for instance. 
After having discussed the risks, I will now describe the volume of work necessary for grow-
ing cucumbers and the achievable surplus income. Then I will illustrate its impact on the fam-
ilies’ financial situation by means of two examples. The volume of work is relevant because 
of the comparison with alternative money-making opportunities. 
One person can typically take care of 300 running meters of plants and even more, if several 
family members work during the harvest. The production area also depends on the available 
land. 
In the first year of the production the preparations take about four weeks, usually in April 
(digging the posts, stretching the wires, placing the water system in the ground, etc.). From 
the second year on, preparing the soil takes only 2 – 3 days. Planting takes about 2 – 3 days in 
early May; then only the water supply and the amount of nutrients added to the water have to 
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be supervised. From then on, removing the tendrils and spraying pesticides, if needed, take 2 
– 3 hours daily, on average. Picking the first produce takes about the same. 
Depending on the weather, during the 2 – 3 months of the harvest one person has to work all 
day, 10 – 12 hours, and from time to time two people are needed full time if they want to 
produce the smallest size of cucumbers (which can be sold at the highest price) on these 300 
running meters. 
The average production cost of one meter of cucumbers is 1.7 euros, investment cost not in-
cluded. The potential gross income of experienced producers is 3 – 4 times higher than 1.7 
euros, i.e. between 5 – 7 euros. The income of the best producer was 8.5 euros per meter. 
Beginners and those who do not precisely adhere to the instructions may not be able to earn 
more than the double of the production costs.  
As there is no systematic data collection, I will use the examples of two families, whereby 
one family achieved a lower than average income from cucumber growing and the other is 
the most efficient producer. 
The first family produced 600 meters of cucumbers. Because of a mismanaged pests prob-
lem67 the family earned a net amount of 1,150 euros, and they were also repaying the remain-
ing investment loan from the previous year. In the labour-intensive season the daily wage for 
12 hours of seasonal work is about 10 – 12 euros (for picking apples, sour cherries, cucum-
bers on someone else’s land, etc.) If the head of the household can go to seasonal work every 
day for two months, he or she can make about half of this amount but realistically the usually 
possible duration is only 2 – 3 weeks. In comparison, growing cucumbers is much more prof-
itable. 
How does this compare to the monthly income of the household? The first family consists of 
two adults and two children. Usually one of the adults is participating in public works. This 
family has no other income; their income is 323 euros for the four persons, including the tax 
credit for the children and the family allowance. The older child is very smart and attends a 
secondary school.68 Despite the fact that the family is poor, the state covers only a part of the 
dormitory fees; in total, the cost of accommodation, food, supplies, and transport amounts to 
approximately 92 euros. Consequently, the remaining three members of the family have to 
live on 231 euros per month, i.e. 2.5 euros per person per day. Compared to this, 1,150 euros 
is a significant amount, which is mostly used to buy firewood, to repay the debt at the grocery 
shop, and to buy school supplies and clothes for the children at the beginning of the school 
year. It is certain that without participating in the cucumber project it would have been im-
possible for this family to finance the secondary school education of their older child. 
The income of the abovementioned family (not counting the income from cucumber produc-
tion) is about average in the region. The living conditions of families with more children and 
less public work are even worse. 
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 Although it is not an income problem, it offers valuable lessons as to how this could happen. These clients 
have grown cucumbers for the second year. When the pests appeared, the damage was similar to an earlier inci-
dent; therefore, they thought that they knew what pesticide to use and they still had some of this pesticide left. 
Out of pride and thinking that they could handle the situation, they did not report the problem to the expert of 
the Kiútprogram. They only reported it when the pesticide was not working (since it was a different kind of 
pests). 
68
 From the interview with the mother: ‘V. would like to be a police officer. He has two more years in Csenger 
and then he goes to Miskolc for two more years, and then he will have his job at the police, God willing. There-
fore, I need most of the income for this. And for living.’ (author’s translation) 
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The net income of the second family, the best producer, was 4670 euros; to achieve this in-
come two adult family members worked almost day and night. This family has a somewhat 
higher monthly income; they are on good terms with the mayor and often both parents are 
employed in public work. In comparison to the first family’s situation, this provides an addi-
tional monthly income of 170 euro. The family has three children and lives with the wife’s 
parents in a very small house but they would like to live independently. They work with ex-
traordinary ambition and attention, which results in an excellent yield. Almost one third of 
the income coming from the cucumber-growing in 2014 was spent on firewood and food and 
the rest of the income was used to pay for half of the price of a house in the village. While 
this study was written they successfully paid the remaining amount from the income achieved 
through cucumber growing. 
 
Further impacts 
The most important impact of the programme is that the participants learn about agricultural 
production. Although the majority of the clients often work as seasonal workers during the 
harvest, they do not fully understand the whole production process. In addition, for a long 
time even the non-Roma working in agriculture have not been well acquainted with modern 
agricultural technologies.  
Typically, two things are especially difficult to understand for the beginners. Firstly, they 
have to understand that an excessive use of fertilisers is harmful. This is difficult because 
initially using too much fertiliser seems to enhance the plants’ growth. Secondly, they have to 
understand and learn the technique of removing the tendrils: the yield will be better if some 
of the new sprouts are removed. In this way the clients of the programme gain a more general 
agricultural knowledge, which not only applies to cucumber growing. 
The Kiútprogram clearly proved that learning integrated into practical work is more efficient 
than learning plant growing by means of a theory-focused, school-like education programme.  
 
3.2.2 Impact on the social environment 
The respect towards our successful clients who repaid the loans clearly increased in their vil-
lage. (It is important to note that the Kiútprogram does not reveal any information about the 
status of the repayment, but the information spreads among the clients very quickly.) One 
sign of this is that they are granted interest-free credit in the village shop because the shop 
owner thinks they do not pose a risk. It is worth quoting from an interview with a field work-
er on this topic:  
‘Good clients are more respected; they like going to the village [from the ‘Tzigane 
streets’ on the outskirts of the village] and when they do so, people listen to what they 
say and they are confident to go to the shop. They are not discriminated against in the 
local pub and if they go there, the others talk to them. Bad clients, however, fall in the 
local hierarchy and have a lower position than before […]. There are some people in 
the village I haven’t talked to yet and I hear their opinions haven’t changed a bit. They 
think the Tzigane are what they used to be and say derogative things. But people we 
have closer connections with, those who meet their neighbours or saw them work very 
hard or live within a 1-km radius, close to our clients, they are different. In some situa-
tions we helped them too [i.e. non-Roma neighbours by lending tools, giving advice]. 
Sometimes they come over and see that we are in the garden all the time and they ap-
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preciate our help. They said that they would help the people we support and they would 
help us too.’ (author’s translation) 
Of course, it is impossible to draw conclusions from one incident but the following statement 
illustrating the effects of a Roma family buying a house in the village, as mentioned in sec-
tion 3.2.1, is noteworthy: 
‘Our clients are very happy; they see that this is as a triumph, an achievement. And they 
help B. to move house and visit the family often. The moving house is not complete yet 
but they spend a lot of time in the yard, they meet, cook outside, etc. The non-Roma 
have a mixed opinion, some are happy, some are not. Altogether, I believe that more 
people are supportive. They see how far B. has come and what he achieved by himself, 
with our help. To good people, decent people, this is always positive... [About the fu-
ture neighbours:] They were happy. They know the family, they know that the lot will 
be kept in order, so they are all right.’ (author’s translation) 
In this village, where the Kiútprogram has the highest number of clients, the candidate who 
was later elected mayor visited the parts of the village where Roma people live for the first 
time during an election campaign. This has not happened at other locations yet. 
The impact on the broader environment (newspaper articles and photo reportages) has already 
been discussed. 
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PART 4) Discussion and key lessons 
The purpose of the Kiútprogram is to develop feasible tools in the given social environment 
for the most marginalised group, the socially excluded Roma, and thus to facilitate their so-
cial integration. The given social environment means that neither the majority of the Hungar-
ians nor the policy makers agree with our purpose; support from policy makers can only be 
expected at the EU level. The experiences of the Kiútprogram are particular in this sense and 
not all experiences necessarily lead to similar conclusions in cases where the situation is dif-
ferent. Most conclusions are of a general nature, while others apply to microcredits only. 
There are several key lessons that pertain to both the innovators and the policy makers, whom 
I do not group because it will be clear from the context.  
 
General key lessons 
− (Partially) marginalised versus socially excluded social groups. There is a significant 
difference between the position of groups that are marginalised in some way and the so-
cially excluded groups. If the social innovation based on social action only targets the 
most disadvantaged, the probability of failure is higher and the potential of the innovation 
may be lost. If only less disadvantaged, marginalised groups are included, the exclusion 
of the most disadvantaged may increase. This trade-off must be taken into account by 
both the innovators and the policy makers and it also has a cost effect. 
− Complexity. The economic integration of socially excluded groups can only be facilitated 
through complex tools with both social and economic components. Mutual prejudices 
amongst innovators, sponsors, and other participants must also be eliminated. This should 
be a targeted effort. It is an advantage if an innovator is also, at least partly, a sponsor and 
vice versa.  
− Bridges between social groups. Social innovation targeting excluded groups is impossible 
without creating connections between people of different social groups. It is an advantage 
if the innovators have such connections or used to have them in the past.  
− Planning and flexibility. It is important to carefully plan the innovation in advance (a re-
source-demanding task in itself) but flexibility and a fast response to experiences are 
equally important. It is crucial to have the possibility of making adjustments during the 
implementation. This is an important aspect not only for the innovators but should also be 
considered when creating grant systems. 
− Planning the coverage. In a non-supportive environment it is crucial to plan not only the 
innovation but also the coverage. 
− Long-term thinking and risk tolerance. Facilitating social inclusion is a long-term task. 
Grants with a fixed period and other time-limited financing structures do more harm than 
good. The already started but then halted programmes may reinforce learned helplessness 
of socially excluded people. An important prerequisite of successful social innovation re-
garding marginalised people is a high risk tolerance of innovators and sponsors. 
− The dogma of sustainability of the supporting activity. Without significant capital injec-
tions underdeveloped areas and severely disadvantaged people cannot improve their situa-
tion. The dogma of sustainability as a policy requirement of microcredit (or other activity 
facilitating economic integration) is an obstacle to real social inclusion. Once an econom-
ic component has emerged in a social programme, the programme is placed in another 
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frame of reference where the dogma of sustainability becomes relevant. Regarding finan-
cial resources, there is a vast gap between pure support and the activities which at least 
aim at self-sustainability.  
− The role of trust. Trust is a key issue among the socially excluded. It is important to de-
clare that we trust them and to maintain the trust; we have to do exactly what we promise. 
Nothing dubious should be promised. 
− Support versus agency. Social innovation can be most effective if instead of just trying to 
improve the marginalised people’s positions it enables them to improve their situation by 
themselves. 
− Bureaucracy. High bureaucracy in the economy (e.g. with reference to starting a busi-
ness) increases the probability that marginalised people are excluded. Reducing bureau-
cracy is a prime tool of social inclusion. 
− Normative solutions. In supporting social innovation, normative solutions are crucial: the 
one-off support (instead of a normative support) provided by a government decision can 
put a programme in a false political context. 
− Social innovation and the state. The efficiency of the innovation can be considerably in-
creased by the cooperation of the state and the social innovators. A joint (state and pri-
vate) financing of projects can be beneficial to both parties; using private resources re-
duces the moral hazard of the state.  
 
Lessons regarding microlending 
− The consequences of learned helplessness. A strong initial boost is necessary to overcome 
learned helplessness. Microcredits are a good tool to achieve this. 
− Role of the field workers. Well-trained field workers are key figures in microlending.  
− Employment discrimination versus entrepreneurship. In the case of social groups that face 
employment discrimination microcredits are a useful tool in supporting them to become 
entrepreneurs.  
− Sustainable enterprises. The enterprises created by means of microcredits must be profit-
able. External support should support the elimination of disadvantages and the develop-
ment of capabilities but not the enterprise itself. This is the precondition to enable the cli-
ents to become active agents of their own development.  
− Networks versus agency. Economic integration is impossible without connecting with 
existing economic networks. If the clients’ entrepreneurial ideas and knowledge do not 
enable such connections, the microfinance institution must provide pre-conceptualised 
models (e.g. cucumber growing); this, however, contradicts the principle of agency. This 
is a trade-off we should be aware of. 
− Regulation of the microcredit. The regulation of lending should consider the special cir-
cumstances of microcredit. 
− The role of peer pressure. During the implementation of the Kiútprogram we came to the 
conclusion that using peer pressure is not right neither from a theoretical nor from a prac-
tical standpoint. The theoretical problem is that from a certain point on there is no differ-
ence between peer pressure and coercion. Using coercion will worsen the efficiency of 
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the programme in the long run, while avoiding peer pressure will make microlending 
more expensive. 
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Note: Parts of this case study have been taken directly from Lodemann and Ziegler (2014); 
exact quotations are marked by italic letters. 
However, please be aware that also other parts – though not explicitly marked – have been 
written in close connection to Lodemann and Ziegler (2014). 
ICS - PART 1) Social problem addressed 
1.1 Problem area 
In which field(s) of activity does the targeted social problem arise (e.g., health, care, 
economic development, work integration)? Are there also any interrelated effects in other 
fields? 
 
Flood prevention policy with large or medium-sized dams is an example of an established 
approach in many countries and has been identified as part of the ‘hydraulic mission’ of the 
20th century. Michal Kravčík, recognized social entrepreneur, and his Slovakian NGO Ľudia 
a Voda (People and Water, PW) promote a system of small catchments as an alternative, 
which they claim has positive effects beyond merely flood prevention. They argue it also 
contributes to landscape revitalization, revival of tradition and last but not least, local 
empowerment. This idea is far from being established. The mission of Michal Kravčík and 
PW is to provide this approach to water management to rural, and to a much lesser extent 
urban, communities mostly within the Carpathian Region and to enable these communities to 
deal with questions of water management by themselves. 
 
The theoretical basis of this approach is the so-called New Water Paradigm (NWP; referring 
to the title of a central publication by M. Kravčík, J. Pokorný, J. Kohutiar, M. Kováč, E. 
Tóth: “Water for the Recovery of the Climate – A New Water Paradigm”, 20071). The NWP 
suggests a conceptual approach with specific policies to regenerate the water cycle and to 
take responsibility for human management practices that fail to do so. The approach yields 
water-specific management implications – mainly the construction of small water catchments 
– that focus on water retention, matter loss and local cooling in catchments. 
 
Kravčík and PW aim to bring this small-dam idea to the national level, and ultimately the 
global one. The idea is in conflict with the established water management techniques in 
Slovakia, such as the construction of large dams. The implementation of the idea mainly 
draws on local labour and delegates responsibility to the municipalities, whereas the 
construction of large dams requires (outside) experts for construction and maintenance. 
Hence the idea demands a change in the flow of resources and authority. In Kravčík’s view, 
this disruptive side is linked to innovation:  
 
“People do not like innovation, they are conservative. They are still thinking that, if 
school is finished, then everything [is] ok. But now, after 40 years, things have 
changed: everything is in process. There is a need for better understanding of 
processes, for taking different perspectives” (Kravčík, interview in 2010). 
 
                                                 
1http://www.waterparadigm.org/download/Water_for_the_Recovery_of_the_Climate_A_New_Water_Paradigm.pdf 
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1.2 Targeted beneficiary group(s)  
Who are the targeted beneficiaries? What specific characteristics do they have that might be 
relevant for or a symptom of their marginalisation (e.g., economic vulnerability, physical 
handicaps, migration status, lack of access to the education system, etc.)?  
 
PW states its mission as follows: “to facilitate the development of urban, rural and 
disadvantaged communities (especially) within the Carpathian Euroregion. A special focus of 
the activities of the NGO is the development of the ancestral heritage of an ecological and 
economical sound management of water resources as well as the theoretical and practical 
dissemination of this heritage in Slovakia and abroad. The activities of the NGO are based on 
the principles of the civil society, the preservation of traditions and the peculiarities of the 
regions” (translation of PW’s website, www.ludiaavoda.sk). 
 
Villages in rural regions of Slovakia – especially Central and Eastern Slovakia – suffer from 
a higher rate of unemployment than cities (especially Bratislava): whereas the unemployment 
rate for predominantly rural areas was 15.6% in 2013, the unemployment rate for 
predominantly urban areas was 6.3% (ages 20 – 64, women and men; source Eurostat, access 
July 2015). The unemployment rate among Roma communities is much higher; in 2010 the 
employment rate among Roma people was estimated to be merely 13%. In 2012 the Roma 
Communities Inclusion Strategy was approved, which inter alia aims at enhancing the 
unemployment situation. 
 
The rural areas have major net migration losses, resulting in ageing communities; the 
growing lack of young people in small communities is undermining social capital and 
capacities for public organization (Baláž and Kusá, 2012). Migration has already been subject 
to policy in Slovakia and the first Slovak Migration Policy was approved in 2011. However, 
this policy does not tackle the problem of internal migration by Slovak citizens, but rather 
focuses on immigration and trafficking. 
 
The case study will focus mainly – but not exclusively – on the “Programme of landscape 
revitalization and integrated river basin management in the Slovak Republic” (PLRIRB; see 
section 2.1) between 2010 and 2012 as this programme was until now the largest opportunity 
to scale out the NWP on the national level. The municipalities that became part of the 
PLRIRB were spread out all around Slovakia, with a slight focus on Eastern Slovakia2. The 
PLRIRB required the participation of long-term unemployed people in the programme (ten 
people per village who have been out of work for at least 90 days); there were no further 
differentiation for participants. In some villages, Roma people participated in the programme; 
however, the inclusion of Roma people was a side effect of the programme, not the main 
task. 
 
1.3 Problem background 
Please describe the context conditions that are relevant for the emergence of the social 
problem or the marginalisation of the target group. This could be the general economic 
situation, political situation, welfare policy, a poor education system, religious constellations, 
                                                 
2
 There might be several reasons why there were slightly more municipalities involved in Eastern Slovakia: a) 
Kravčík´s former projects were mainly located in Eastern Slovakia – there he might have his strongest network 
of mayors; b) Central and (North-)Eastern Slovakia is characterised by hills and rugged mountains (High 
Tatras). The ideas of the NWP are (mainly) specific to these types of landscape; etc. 
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demographical development, technological development, etc. and/or more specific problems 
such as market power abuse, discrimination, corruption, etc. 
 
During the 1940s in Slovakia, with industrialisation and increased economic development, 
the demand for water by industry, agriculture and private households began to exceed the 
technical capacity of the water supply (Szolgay et al., 2009). These factors also increased the 
demand for energy. Large dams were built to improve the water supply and to increase 
energy production. These large engineering structures replaced many small dams and micro-
hydropower facilities. According to the inventory of waterworks made by financial 
authorities in Slovakia in 1930, more than 2,650 small hydropower plants were then in 
service in Slovakia (Dušička et al., 2009). Most of these are no longer in use. The Slovak 
National Committee on Large Dams registered 50 large dams in total (SNCLD Slovak 
National Committee on Large Dams, 2010); almost half of these dams (42%) were built 
during the 1950s and 1960s. In 2010, an amount of 2,399.24 MW of hydropower accounted 
for almost 30% of the energy production in Slovakia (Lodemann et al., 2010). 
 
According to the country’s five-year plan in 1959, statistics reported a 40% increase in 
agricultural productivity (CCSDPL Common Czecho-Slovak Digital Parliamentary Library, 
2010). The main reason for this increase was the conversion of non-agricultural land like 
meadows, forests and wetlands in the East-Slovakian lowland into homogeneous arable land. 
This so-called melioration programme was accompanied by a sustained effort to drain 
agricultural land for the production of crops such as wheat, barley and maize. Slovakia’s 
system of drainage channels now has a length of 15,154 km, one third of which are 
artificially regulated rivers (MASR Ministry of Agriculture Slovak Republic, 2000). 
 
The centralist approach of water management that began during the Soviet Era in Slovakia, 
and was implemented mainly in the second half of the 20th century, had many consequences. 
Among the ecological consequences of these policies, the Slovak organization ZMOS 
(Association of towns and villages in Slovakia) lists advancing soil erosion, decreasing 
biodiversity and presence of functional vegetation in the landscape, drying up and warming 
of the land, deteriorating quality of available water resources and thus increasing investment 
requirements (ZMOS Slovak Association of Towns and Villages, 2008). Among the social 
consequences, it lists a reduced influence of the community and local municipality on the 
management of water resources in their area (instead the municipality and the community 
passively bear consequences of inadequate protection and use of water resources and soil in 
their own territory and respective river basin) and a low awareness for water and soil users 
about their co-responsibility for the sound protection of water resources (Lodemann et al., 
2010). 
 
Currently in Slovakia, there are two state-owned companies that are responsible for the 
streams: the state-owned Slovak Water Management Company (Slovenský vodohospodársky 
podnik) and the Slovak Water Construction Company. The streams above ground are 
‘owned’ by the Slovak Water Management Company; municipalities are sometimes given the 
opportunity to rent and then manage the part of the stream that is within their area. 
 
High economic costs due to floods are well known in Central Europe, including the upper 
parts of the river basins. During interviews in 2012 conducted mainly with mayors and water 
engineers, the feeling prevailed of being left alone by the Slovak Water Management 
Company and Water Construction Company – the companies doing too little, the wrong 
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measures or nothing. The following statements are to give an exemplary overview of 
opinions: 
 
“My opinion is that it is not necessary to change managers or authorities managing 
economically important water courses. Let it be professionally done by the Slovak 
Water Management Company because it is important for the security of the whole 
country. What was missing here until now is maintenance of small catchments and the 
absence of this task is visible and makes itself felt through the destruction of the 
landscape surface. To repair this it is necessary to develop coordinated and professional 
initiatives and it should have some direction and rules. That’s why a municipality is 
good for this.“ (Miroslav Hrib, owner of VodaLes, an implementing company in the 
PLRIRB, interview on 22.02.2012) 
 
“It is under their management [i.e. Slovak Water Management Company, note of the 
author]. I was thinking of renting it [i.e. the water course, note of the author]. I did not 
sign the contract yet because if I would like to manage it, I would need some monetary 
budget and an idea of what to do.” (Vladimir Ondrus, mayor of Vernar, interview on 
24.02.2012) 
 
“It [i.e. flooding, note of the author] was a problem for people for maybe ten years and 
nothing was done.” (Branislv Nociar, mayor of Hrnciarske Zaluzany, interview on 
23.02.2012) 
 
“…the problem is not the stream itself. It is no threat to our village, but the land above 
the village, meadows and fields or cut forest. The water managers are criticizing the 
project that they should do it but they do the regulation of the stream and the threat is 
still there for the village. Often the stream does not even flow through the village. The 
problem is up here above the village. We have crops, and the soil cannot hold the water. 
And it all comes down and goes through the village and only then comes in the stream. 
(Vladislav Basista, mayor of Demjata, interview on 27.02.2012) 
 
“People who have been threatened by floods see that something was done. People who 
have been working in the project learned what to do, but the education should continue. 
Sadly in Slovakia the hydro-construction lobby fights against such type of measures.” 
(Jan Podmanicky, the mayor of Stara Bystrica, interview on 28.02.2012) 
 
Jaroslav Fekula, the mayor of Radostka, explains the seeming lack of interest of the 
Slovak Water Management Company as follows: “…because it is under one company 
and they look only on the bigger rivers, where they have power plants and business. 
They have nothing from the small streams, only sorrows.” (Fekula, interview on 
28.02.2012). 
 
“Short term interest of the responsible. There is no national strategy, every government 
that comes will give some money for four years and they work on a small part. They let 
their close companies earn money and only when EU funds came, are they requested to 
do public procurement for such tasks and so on. Making strategies for a four-year 
period is complete nonsense when regarding phenomena that are present throughout the 
geological history of the Earth. […] Because decision makers have short-term goals and 
economic goals are mixed with the political ones. And secondly, in our countries, 
people have been moving out of the country to the cities. They lost the connection to 
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nature, and they think that when they sit in their block of flats they are safe. They don’t 
have the feeling that they should do something to be protected against floods. They 
think we have a state company for that, who are protecting us. But when they do 
nothing, they still think there is an institution taking care of it. A personal relationship 
between nature and man is lost and people think they are safe in the city. They lost the 
ability to observe nature or this ability is decreased.” (Miroslav Hrib, interview on 
22.02.2012) 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 Which individual (or collective) capabilities of marginalised people are 
deprived? Which functioning could not be achieved? 
 How are conversion rates affected by the context conditions and how do they 
contribute to marginalisation? 
 Can power structures be identified according to Mann’s adapted framework 
that are relevant for the problem situation? 
WP 3 Is there a clear beneficiary that is being targeted? 
 Is the social problem addressed individual-specific or group-specific or 
context-specific? 
 How do contextual conditions that were/are relevant relate to each other? (e.g., 
complementarities, co-evolution, etc.) 
WP 4 Did technological innovation cause marginalisation or make existing 
marginalisation worse? 
 Did technological innovation pave the way for social innovation? 
WP 5 Can specific networks (actor constellations), cognitive frames or institutions be 
identified that are relevant for the problem situation? 
 Do social problems addressed by SI emerge in certain context conditions? 
WP 6 Which policies/political constellations did/do contribute to the social problem? 
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ICS - PART 2) Solution, influences and relevant context factors 
2.1 Solution approach 
How does the social innovation approach address the social problem? Describe the most 
relevant activities to prevent, mitigate or solve marginalisation (e.g., services provision, 
lobbying, advocacy, etc.)? 
What is the novelty in terms of goods, services or processes (including new forms of 
organisations, resources, or communication)?  
 
To have a better understanding of the emergence of the NWP a short introduction in the 
development of the idea will be given.  
In the 1990s there was a plan to construct a large dam for flood prevention and drinking 
water provision in Tichy Potok, which is in the upper part of the Torysa River. The dam was 
projected to flood approximately 123 ha of the Upper Torysa River Valley area, including 
Tichy Potok village and other small villages, so that a resettlement of the inhabitants would 
have been necessary. According to the mayor of Tichy Potok, Lubica Dzuganova (interview 
in 2010): “We were told that there would be an apartment block in Košice for us, carrying the 
name of our village.” Kravčík and his organization Ľudia a voda (People and Water) 
successfully supported villagers in their protest against the dam. In their anti-dam struggle 
they formulated the Blue Alternative, a system of small dams and water holdings meant to 
offer the same level of security against floods as well as an increase in the drinking water 
supply. 
 
However, the Blue Alternative and the relative success of PW – Kravčík received the 
Goldman Environment Prize in 1999 and EU-US Democracy and Civil Society Award in 
1998 – resulted in many problems (Kravčík, conversation on 30.07.2010). In Kravčík’s 
experience, other NGOs did not want to acknowledge his international success and in 
reaction tried to make it more difficult for him to receive funding on the national and 
regional levels (Kravčík, 30 July 2010, Košice). In the early 2000s it became more difficult to 
obtain funding owing to the increase and maturation of civil society and the consequent 
increase in competition for resources.  
 
PW therefore widened its spectrum of activities, including areas such as regional 
development and handicraft, as well as the inclusion of ethnic minorities. The cooperation 
with outside partners also became more important due to the limited possibilities of co-
operation in Slovakia. During this period Kravčík and colleagues began formulating Blue 
Alternative in a more theoretical fashion – and translating the information into English – 
leading to the publication of the book “Water for the Recovery of the Climate – A New Water 
Paradigm” in 2007 (see section 1.1). 
 
The following list provides an overview of activities until the PLRIRB: 
 
• 1993: Water for the Third Millennium – an integrated water management concept, 
integrated into the Slovak water policy in 1994. 
• 1994-2001: Blue Alternative – an alternative water management programme for the 
Upper Torysa River in response to the construction of a dam, including pilot projects, 
summer camps and a regular publication. 
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• 1997-1999: Village of the Third Millennium, Carpathian Euroregion – a conception 
for regional rural development, including pilot projects (family farming, biological 
water treatment, fish farming). 
• 1998: Village and Democracy, Levoca Mountains – a dissemination of materials and 
organization of 14 discussion forums as part of a civil society campaign for fair 
parliamentary and municipal elections. 
• 1999-present: Blue Torysa Foundation – a volunteer non-profit organization that 
supports local community activities through small grants. 
• 2001: We Live in One Basin – a civic participation project based on stakeholder 
discussions. 
• 2001-2003: Crafts for Children – children’s camps for learning crafts. 
• 2004-2005: Košice Water Protocol – a political framework approved by the Košice 
City Council for the mobilisation of communities around the globe for water 
restoration in water cycles. 
• 2005-2006: Water Forest, High Tatras – a project to decrease run-off and restore the 
forest area of High Tatras after a storm. 
• 2007-2008: Water for Tatras Botanical Garden – a water supply system for a 
botanical garden. 
• 2007-2008: People’s University of Water – an educational project regarding water 
management to build capacity in municipalities. 
• 2008: Erosion treatment for Košice forest – a water retention project. 
• 2009-2010: Water Without Borders – a Slovak-Ukrainian project on water 
management. 
 
In fall 2010, following both a change in government and a period of major floods, an 
opportunity opened up to implement the PW approach on a much larger scale. The 
government of Prime Minister Iveta Radičová (SDKU-DS, Slovak Democratic and Christian 
Union, Democratic Party) – who Kravčík knew from civil society work in the early days of 
the Velvet Revolution – initiated the PLRIRB in close cooperation with Kravčík, creating a 
special office under the Prime Minister headed by Martin Kováč (co-author of the NWP). 
However, though the programme was discussed and approved (some comments were made) 
by the democratically elected government, it faced opposition (e.g. some ministries said: “We 
know now how, we do not need Michal Kravčík”; personal communication with Michal 
Kravčík)3. At a first glance, the PLRIRB had two major foci: to help municipalities in flood 
prevention (direct community goal) and to create jobs, focusing on long-term unemployed 
people. As already stated this case study will strongly focus on the PLRIRB as it is the first 
implementation of the proposed alternative approach to water management on the national 
level in Slovakia – beforehand the projects were more locally or regionally anchored. The 
following is an outline of the first implementation phases of the PLRIRB. 
 
A Pilot project was launched in 2010 with 23 municipalities in the catchments of Ondava, 
Torysa, Vah, Kysuca and Hornad Rivers; it had a budget of 580,000 € from the Slovakian 
Prime Minister´s reserve. The aim was to gain practical knowledge about the construction of 
                                                 
3
 The programme was pushed through approval very fast in order to avoid the formation of opposition; e.g. 
Martin Benko, the mayor of Hranovnica (2012): “If the programme preparation took longer, it would not go 
through. It had to be done fast. And of course if you do something fast it has its limits, right now it is a pressure 
of water management companies. If it would be done step by step, it would not exist because the lobby against it 
would be stronger. Here it was quick. Of course the pilot phase and the second phase looked different because it 
was improving.” 
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water holdings. Over a period of 3 months, 341 people were employed and a water retention 
capacity of over 140,000 m3 was installed (Kravčík et al., 2012). 
 
The First Realization Programme (1st RP) was approved by the government March 9, 2011, 
with 190 municipalities; it had a budget of 24 million € from the SR4 government and the 
European Social Fund. It focused in particular on capacity building with local companies 
(knowledge for building catchments). The programme created 2500 jobs for a period of six 
months and a water retention capacity of 6.1 million m3 was installed (Michal Kravčík et al. 
2012). 
 
The Second Realization Programme (2nd RP) was approved by the government in fall 2011 
with 354 municipalities; it had a budget of 18.5 million € from the SR government and the 
European Social Fund. It focused in particular on including unemployed people from local 
rural areas and created 4200 jobs for a period of six months. A total water retention capacity 
of 3.9 million m3 was installed. 
 
The Third Realization Programme (3rd RP) had already been planned but was finally 
stopped owing to a change in the SR government in March 2012. The third round was 
supposed to include, for the first time, cities and their role in water retention. 
 
At least five elements can be spotted that Michal Kravčík and PW use to support their 
approach: 
 
a) Identifying contact persons willing to take on responsibility for local project 
implementation, respectively fostering the sense of responsibility of decision makers on the 
local level and establishing close relationships to these decision makers. 
 
A main topic in Michal Kravčík’s and PW’s work is the principle of subsidiarity. Projects and 
programmes like the PLRIRB aim at transferring responsibility for local water management 
to the municipalities. Palo Varga, staff member of PW, describes the political self-
understanding of PW as being middle right; according to him, inherent in this position is the 
idea that people must be responsible for themselves. During the Soviet Era, Varga argues, 
people and communities were not entitled to participate in decisions, and bottom-up ideas 
were not accepted by the central government; people therefore lost the feeling of being 
responsible, and this needs to be regained (Varga, interview on 29.7.2010).  
 
In both the cases of Tichy Potok and the PLRIRB, local officials were contacted by Kravčík 
and PW. In 1993 when the idea of constructing a huge dam came up in the case of Tichy 
Potok, Kravčík got in contact with all of the mayors in the Upper Torysa Region (comprising 
five villages). The mayors felt they had no power to avert the construction: “We are not very 
strong. […] Please help us” (Kravčík quoting the mayors, interview on 18.7.2010). During 
the Tichy Potok case, (re-)establishing responsibility on the local level by overcoming the 
feeling of powerlessness played a major role. As Lubica Dzuganova, mayor of Tichy Potok 
since 1994, describes it: “[PW] has opened our eyes – we went beyond the borders of our 
normal vision, they showed us what we can do” (Dzuganova, interview on 23.7.2010). 
 
In the case of the PLRIRB, the governmental office responsible for the programme contacted 
all mayors via email. The application for the PLRIRB was on a voluntary basis. The mayors 
                                                 
4
 SR = Slovak Republic. 
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served as contact persons during the whole process of project implementation and Kravčík 
kept constant contact with them via emails and visits. 
 
In both cases trainings, workshops and regional meetings took place. Maxi Hronsky, staff 
member of PW, stresses the idea of individual contact (partnership) not only with mayors, but 
also with other active people. PW initiates meetings for disseminating information; an 
important by-product of this is that interested people are discovered and connected: “after the 
meetings [...] I am sure [...] some people come to us with good ideas” (Hronsky, interview on 
27.7.2010). 
 
b) Providing projects that are feasible on a local level. 
 
In the case of the PLRIRB, the application process was simplified. Normally a municipality 
has to do cost-intensive planning before applying for government money. As Martin Benko, 
mayor of Hranovnica, puts it: “Usually the procedure is that you prepare the project 
documentation, and wait if you will be successful; if it does not get through, we can throw the 
projects in the dustbin” (Benko, interview on 20.2.2012). In contrast, to apply to become part 
of the PLRIRB, there was no need for preliminary work – the only requirement was to fill in 
an online questionnaire. When a municipality was chosen to participate in the PLRIRB, only 
then was project documentation necessary before the money was finally handed over. Thus, 
the municipality had almost no costs before a decision was taken. 
 
The ideas for water holdings and dams fostered by Kravčík and PW are based on simple 
techniques – the construction of small structures usually made out of wood, stone or earth. 
These techniques need a certain level of know-how, which is established via workshops and 
training. The municipalities participating in the PLRIRB had the possibility to adjust the 
constructions according to their ideas; they also could decide whether to contract a 
construction company or to build the measures on their own. According to Kravčík, the 
concept of landscape revitalisation and flood protection by way of many small measures is a 
much more cost-effective way than building large structures (especially large dams) – a 
reason, he states, why the measures of the revitalization program are disliked by the state 
companies. 
 
c) Anchoring projects and ideas in tradition 
 
According to Kravčík, the concept of water management via the building of small barriers – 
in order to dissolve the energy of water, to increase the amount of infiltration of water and to 
stop sediment loss etc. – is based on traditional knowledge that was forgotten during the 
Soviet period. As Miroslav Hrib puts it: “All these measures [proposed in the scope of 
PLRIRB] are 200, 100, 50 years old“ (Hrib, interview on 20.2.2012). As presented to 
journalists, at conferences and in blogs, the NWP is seen as a rediscovery of tradition. That 
water is a heritage (see section 2) thus receives a specific meaning here in relation to 
innovation: the innovation is not positioned as the new that takes away from the old, but as a 
return and revival of tradition. 
 
In presentations, Kravčík and PW repeatedly emphasize the link between their approach and 
a traditional sense of home and place in Slovakia. For example, they present the PLRIRB as 
part of the healing of the scars and wounds of the homeland (Kravčík et al., 2012) and 
propose a response they claim resonates with tradition: 
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“In our country we have sufficient evidence to date about how responsibly our 
ancestors looked after their home soil that fed them. If you travel around Slovakia with 
your eyes open and know what to look for, the land is like an open book offering the 
wisdom of old solutions. In Slovakia there are still the last remnants from the time of 
the Wallachian colonization that divided farming into small fields. This prevented 
rainwater from rapid draining into gullies and streams and avoided dramatic flash 
flooding […]” (Kravčík et al., 2012). 
 
d) Creating visibility 
 
In the beginning of the Tichy Potok campaign, journalists played an important role (e.g. by 
accompanying Kravčík on his first visit to Tichy Potok, through press conferences). Vladimir 
Holčík, staff member of the Slovak Water Construction Company in Bratislava, describes 
Kravčík as “an eloquent speaker at conferences […] He can present himself perfectly in front 
of a camera” (Holčik, interview on 22.07.2010). Media visibility makes it more difficult for 
opponents to attack the proposal, for example as a misuse of government funds into the 
pockets of PW. 
 
Unlike before, Michal Kravčík experienced a “media race” (personal communication with 
Kravčík) against the PLRIRB. To better the image of the programme, a press conference was 
organized, which was attended by around 20 mayors who were part of the PLRIRB. 
 
In the context of his current work, Kravčík runs a blog which he updates regularly. He uses 
this blog to make ideas and actions visible. During field trips if he sees water-retention 
constructions that interest him (for various reasons) – e.g. constructions that have been built 
during the PLRIRB – he takes pictures and writes brief summaries of the constructions for his 
blog. The blog has proved to be outreaching: an entry praising the inclusion of Roma people 
in the PLRIRB had already been visited in January 2012 by 14,000 people and had received 
120 comments. Kravčík also sends materials collected in the field via email to his database of 
mayors across Slovakia. Communication via publications and blogs, as well as the 
presentation of the program in traditional terms, is a way to promote and protect the approach 
by using and co-shaping cultural space. 
 
Though Kravčík’s blog activities are mainly focused on Slovakia (he mostly writes in 
Slovakian), he does not confine himself only to Slovakia but actively searches for 
international cooperation. According to Jaroslav Tesliar, Kravčík’s concept of water 
management has survived because of strong international support; otherwise, it would not 
have survived in Slovakia. Having a network of cooperation is therefore very important; it 
“gives faith to fight” (Tesliar, interview on 28.7.2012) and also provides financial support 
(e.g. Ashoka Fellowship, Goldman Environmental Prize). 
 
e) Generating political support on the regional and national level. 
 
As the project list (see section 2.1) shows, Michal Kravčík and PW have repeatedly made 
legislative proposals and protocols, which along with their publications communicate the 
content of the NWP and seek to generate political will for its implementation. In this context, 
Michal Kravčík and PW also actively seek support from abroad in order to communicate that 
the paradigm is part of a larger, international development (see also above, Jaroslav Tesliar). 
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The above five elements put together suggest the following approach to the scaling of an 
idea: to implement the NWP, Kravčík and PW focus on scaling out the idea via the 
identification and empowerment of people in villages (mayors and to some extent local 
businesses). The approach to water retention is low-tech, which makes it possible to adopt 
the techniques at a local level. Main barriers of this scaling strategy to implement the 
approach are the provision and allocation of money and the distribution of authority. 
Therefore, a strategy of scaling up is also part of the theory of change: Kravčík and PW try to 
use and create political space through repeated attempts to change legislations and granting 
conditions for public money. In the case of the PLRIRB, the SR government adopted the idea 
of the NWP and this provided an opportunity to scale out. 
 
As Michal Kravčík states, the idea of creating small water catchments is “not new on [an] 
international level but in Slovakia it is innovative.” The idea of building small dams in 
Slovakia is new in a temporal context. Kravčík argues that the ancestors before socialist time 
also built wooden measures or at least barriers of a similar type. This knowledge has been 
lost in the last decades, so Kravčík. In short, Michal Kravčík and PW carry out an idea that is 
new relative to the temporal and spatial context. 
 
 
Figure 1: The PW approach on scaling (Lodemann and Ziegler, 2014) 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 Which cognitive frames, networks and institutions are addressed by the SI? 
 To what extent has the social innovation been incremental (adaptive change in 
practice, e.g. with a focus on products or services that address(ed) identified 
market failures effectively), institutional (changes in the Social Grid practice, 
e.g. reconfiguring existing market structures to create social value), or 
disruptive (radical change in practice, e.g. with a focus on politics and social 
movements, changing the cognitive frames around markets and social 
systems/structures) across its diffusion process? 
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WP 3 How stable are social innovation solution approaches? How dependent are 
solution approaches to contingencies (individual characteristics of 
promoter/inventor, contextual circumstances)? 
WP 4 Which kind of technological artefacts and infrastructures are required for the 
development of the SI? Which kind of novel technological artefacts (TA)5 and 
/ or new infrastructures are involved in the development of the SI? 
 Which kinds of key techniques (TC)6 are required for the SI? 
Is it necessary to acquire new techniques (TC) in order to implement the SI? 
 How does education/training contribute to diffusion of the social innovation? 
Does the solution involve support in acquiring the relevant technological 
artefacts (TA)? 
Does the solution involve support in access to the relevant infrastructure (TI)? 
WP 5 … 
WP 6 … 
 
2.2 Actors and networks 
Can specific networks or individual actors be identified as key players in the idea generation, 
invention phase, the innovation phase and the diffusion phase of the social innovation? Are 
relevant actors or members of networks personally affected by the social problem addressed? 
Is the target group involved in the value creation process? Do members of the target group 
take any collective action? 
Which networks or other actors were/are important as catalysers, multipliers, or adapters 
(e.g., sponsors, public authorities, politicians pushing for beneficial changes in legal 
frameworks, celebrities that increased public attention, etc.)? Where those actors particularly 
powerful? Why? 
Did/do those actors and networks influence legislation, education curricula, or other 
institutions? 
Which influence did/do these actors and networks exert on narratives and public discourses 
regarding the social problem/social innovation? 
Are there also typical “adapters” that did not necessarily develop the social innovation 
(incremental innovation), but adapted it to their context and accordingly contribute(d) to the 
diffusion of the social innovation? Can they be located in a specific societal sector (civil 
society, market, public)? Did/do networks play a role in the adaptation process? 
 
This case study strongly centres on the person of Michael Kravčík as he is the main promoter 
of the NWP. For a better understanding, Kravčík’s background will be shortly introduced in 
the following. 
 
                                                 
5
 Technological artefacts (TA) including “hardware” (TAh), i.e. any kind of material artefacts, and 
“software/Apps” (TAa), i.e. any kind of software apps, protocols, services, blueprints …. 
6
 This can include: TCs – Somatic techniques (e.g. swimming, singing …), TCe – Exosomatic techniques (e.g. 
making fire, writing, haircutting, riding a bike or car …), TCp – Primary production techniques (meaning human 
appropriation of net primary production in agriculture and exploitation of the lithosphere), TCi – Industrial 
techniques, TCc – Communication techniques, etc. 
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Kravčík has a professional background in hydrology. He studied water management in 
Bratislava (1975-1980) and worked for the Institute of Hydrology and the Institute of Land 
Ecology at the Slovak Academy of Science as well as the Soil Management Institute. His 
background has a strong connection to science and to water experts and he still feels 
connected to these areas. During his career he experienced several dismissals due to 
confrontations with the conservative approach to water management; this led him to connect 
with the activist scene. He reports that he experienced the period of glasnost (openess, 
transparency) and the end of the Cold War (sametová revoluce, Velvet Revolution) as very 
liberating: “Our group of young ecologists was encouraged by this policy [of glasnost] and 
we were not afraid to speak out” (Kravčík, 2009). He belonged to a group of Slovaks that 
used the change in regime to found their own NGOs; in 1993 he co-founded the NGO L’udia 
a Voda with Jaroslav Tesliar (located in Košice, Slovakia; he has remained its director up to 
the present). During this time he established contacts to people in the field of water 
management that are – at least partly – still valid. Like already stated, Kravčík and colleagues 
have spelled out their holistic vision of water management in the book “Water for the 
Recovery of the Climate – A New Water Paradigm” (Kravčík et al., 2007; see section 1.3). 
 
His autobiography, and his track record with official Slovak institutions, indicates that he 
views resistance and dissidence as an aspect of his way of doing things. Accordingly, when 
Kravčík was employed by the government for the implementation of PLRIRB, he presented 
this employment with considerable unease. In a lecture in Greifswald January 9, 2012, he 
said that he used to belong to the party of freedom, but would now belong to bureaucracy – a 
change that obviously troubled him. This temporarily turned him from a social entrepreneur 
to a social intrapreneur, who pursued his goal from within a large organisation, i.e. 
government, using the opportunity to be taken more seriously by the administration. 
 
With the change in government in March 2012, Kravčík’s working period as a bureaucrat 
(employee of the government) ended and he is now back full time with PW. In June 2012 
Kravčík and colleagues published the book “Po nás púšt´ a potopa?” (“After us, the desert 
and the deluge?”), which presents the results of the PLRIRB from their perspective. 
 
In general, the focus on integrated water management implies the following stakeholders for 
implementing the NWP (see also Figure 1): 
 
• (Active) people in upstream villages as the key target group for the implementation of 
projects; in particular mayors, as well as local or regional businessmen implementing 
the projects and the organisations supporting and co-ordinating villages (main actor is 
ZMOS). As mentioned before, mayors are a key group that is focused upon by 
Kravčík (see e.g. PLRIRB). 
• To a much lesser extent, people in downstream villages as potential beneficiaries (if 
flood policy works) or being at risk (if flood policy does not work) as well as potential 
partners for extending the NWP in an urban context, such as urban planners. So far 
there is only little contact with either of these groups of stakeholders. 
• The various levels of government, municipalities, regions or state (and their 
ministries), as the partners that need to agree to and legitimise the policy. In case of 
the PLRIRB Kravčík’s personal connection to Prime Minister Ivety Radičová seems 
to have played an important role in the initiation of the programme.  
• The media such as TV, print news and the Internet (e.g. Kravčík’s blog). 
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• The established players of the ‘conventional approach to water management’ (Kravčík 
et al. 2008), i.e. the organisations that view flood prevention policy as a matter of 
large dams and river modification further downstream. 
• International organisations and partners for financing and further promoting the NWP. 
 
During a conference in March 2012 in Bratislava (the last conference before the PLRIRB was 
stopped), which was attended by mayors, engineers who had been involved in the PLRIRB 
and people advocating the old water paradigm, the difficulties of reconciling the different 
views of the actors in water management became obvious. With the subsequent change in 
government the programme was suddenly stopped, though another phase was already 
projected. Since then the programme has been deeply contested within political parties and 
ministries. 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 How did/do networks relate to institutions and cognitive frames? Which 
dynamics of change did/do occur? 
WP 3 Which complementary actors needed to be involved contemporarily? 
 Distributive aspect: which actors have access to the SI process? Which barriers 
can be identified at different levels (e.g., geographical distance, knowledge 
gaps, etc.)? 
WP 4 Which scientific networks (e.g. disciplines) contribute(d) to the success of the 
SI? 
 Which industrial actors contribute(d) to the success of the SI? 
WP 5 How do different societal spheres (e.g., civil society incl. philanthropy, private 
markets, public authorities, etc.) contribute at different points of dissemination 
of the SI? How do they interact? 
 How do marginalised groups contribute to different forms of social innovation? 
WP 6 … 
 
2.3 Narratives and discourses 
Please, indicate which narratives or discourses accompany / are relevant for the addressed 
social problem and the social innovation. Do they inhibit or foster social innovations? Can 
already any changes be detected?  
In which social domains can these discourses and narratives be located (media, 
parliament/city council, civil society/community)? What are the instruments of the discourse 
(reports, petitions, opinion leaders, media campaigns, letters to the editor etc.)? 
Who is involved in these discourses (e.g. the beneficiaries)? Can any parties be identified that 
dominate these discourses or narratives? Why can they do so (e.g., power, knowledge)? 
Do those narratives influence the perception and acceptance of legislation, education 
curricula, or other institutions? 
Do they affect the perception and acceptance of any networks? 
 
The ideas of the NWP are connected to discourses like climate change, flood prevention, 
landscape revitalisation, heritage etc. The ideas are advocated in various meetings, 
conferences etc. (see paragraph 2.1 Solution Approach). PW included numerous educational 
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efforts from the start. These efforts include the publication of a regional journal called Blue 
Alternative (from 1995-2001 with five to six issues per year), the organisation of numerous 
water-related conferences in the region, the hosting of regular summer work camps in the 
Tichy Potok area (one each year from 1995-2001), the organisation of a People’s University 
of Water (2007-2008), the maintenance of an active blog as part of a national news portal 
and recently the organisation of regional conferences with mayors. In short, the history of 
PW exhibits a concern with education. Kravčík himself writes: 
 
“The citizens of the disadvantaged villages grasped very quickly that they also had 
allies, and their self-confidence grew. They learnt how to present their views publicly; 
they could lead sound and assertive discussions. At the final public meetings held in the 
affected villages, the situation was such that the state officials and investors deputies’ 
could not answer the citizens’ well-complied and well-founded questions” (Kravčík, 
2009). 
 
One of the key components of the approach is that natural resources are to be managed on 
the local level, e.g. by a local association of villages. The work that has to be done in the 
realm of management should be done by locals if possible or at the very least should include 
locals. Moreover, Kravčík and his collaborators seek to recover the knowledge of local 
farmers in water harvesting and retention in order to form solutions. These techniques were 
neglected by the state’s hydraulic mission, which favoured large-scale infrastructure 
dependent on the expert knowledge of engineers from outside the villages, i.e. mainly coming 
from the state-owned water companies. Therefore the discourses on water management were 
mainly confined to the experts (Water Management Company, Water Construction Company, 
Water Research Institute, ministries). Discussions about water management mainly took 
place on the impacts of these mainstream centralised approaches (e.g. municipalities: 
‘nothing is done’, see exemplary quotes in paragraph 1.3 Problem Background). 
 
In the case of the PLRIRB, two discourses played a major role in the discussions: a) flood 
prevention and the role of municipalities; and b) unemployment in rural areas. The emphasis 
on these two discourses changed depending on the specific actors and situations; however, 
the majority of mayors saw flood prevention as the most important reason to take part in the 
programme. 
 
a) flood prevention (already discussed, see above) 
Interestingly, the claim that flood protection is a topic in need of experts has 
seemingly not been very much challenged by the participating workers of the 
programme. The question “Flood protection requires experts and their technologies” 
posed in a survey sent to the workers gained general agreement (ca. 85% in fall 2011, 
n=687; ca. 91% in fall 2012, n=139). 
 
b) unemployment in rural areas 
The programme was open to all villages in Slovakia and as such was linked to the 
local political structure of Slovakian villages and its mayors. In the spirit of a Green 
New Deal job creation programme, there was the requirement regarding the inclusion 
of unemployed people (ten long-term unemployed people per village). There were no 
specific provisions regarding gender or ethnicity. The creation of jobs was only 
seasonal. The inclusion of unemployed people proved to be difficult due to the legal 
situation and the amount of wages they could earn. The difference between potential 
wages and social subsidies was negligible: “The difference between working and not 
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working is very little for them. There is very little stimulation” (Jaroslav Fekula, 
interview on 28.02.2012). The monthly salary was 327 € and working conditions were 
harsh – especially during the Second Realization Programme, which took place in 
winter.  
Another problem arose in regards to the duration of time people could be employed in 
the programme: to not lose their social subsidy claims, people had to step out of the 
programme after the completion of one phase for at least three months. Apparently, this 
legal constraint was altered during the programme, i.e. in the end it was possible to 
employ people with no temporal limit without losing their claim. Due to these 
problems, some municipalities could not find ten long-term unemployed people from 
their village to employ in the programme, and had to extend the call to neighbouring 
villages or even retired people. 
 
Beyond the creation of at least seasonal jobs, the programme claimed to teach skills and 
provide working experience, thereby helping unemployed people more easily find a 
new job afterwards. This claim has not yet been proved. Some interview participants 
were hesitant about the amount of knowledge they gained. Taking also into account the 
claim that the techniques applied were simple, and that working routines like sawing, 
digging etc. were easy to learn in most cases, the question remains open. 
 
Since the sudden stop of the PLRIRB, the place of discourse has returned to the actors of 
‘conventional water management’, i.e. the Slovak Water Management Company, the Slovak 
Water Construction Company, the ministries (especially the Ministry of Environment) and 
the Water Research Institute. In discussions, these actors often point to their established 
expertise and their scientific knowledge. Their status – being state-owned institutions and the 
long-established scientific authority in Slovakia – obviously enhances their (felt) legitimacy 
and authority. 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 What is the role of cognitive frames in social innovations? How do they relate 
to institutions and social networks? 
WP 3 How can cognitive frames possibly be measured? What is the evaluative space 
here? 
WP 4 Which technological visions and scientific advances were used in the 
discourse? 
WP 5 Do changes in cognitive frames represent specific phases in social innovation 
lifecycles? 
WP 6 How are policies driven by cognitive frames? 
 
2.4 Rules, norms, and policies 
Were/are there any policies (in the thematic field or generally) that contribute(d) to the social 
problem addressed? Were/are there any legal / constitutional triggers or framework 
conditions that contributed to the social problem? Were/are there any other rules or norms 
that contribute(d) to the social problem? 
Are there any policies (within the relevant thematic field or elsewhere) that foster or inhibit 
the social innovation, e.g. by altering its capacity and function to tackle marginalisation? Are 
there any legal / constitutional triggers or framework conditions that fostered or inhibited the 
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social innovation? Are there any other rules or norms that fostered or inhibited the social 
innovation? 
To what extent do rules, norms and policies contribute towards systemic change through 
social innovation in this field of study? 
Is ‘tackling marginalisation’ (either via poverty reduction, social inclusion, etc.) a central, 
explicit objective or outcome of policies or other rules and norms? Why/Why not?  
Does the social innovation build on or recombine existing policies, norms and rules? 
Do relevant policies exist on a regional, national or international (EU) level? Can different 
influences of different policies be detected across different regions? 
At what stage of the development process did/do supporting policies become most relevant? 
Have existing policies been changed as a consequence of the social innovation? Did other 
rules and norms change as a consequence of the social innovation? How was/is this achieved, 
and by whom? Are those actors particularly powerful? 
How do policies or other rules and norms relate to social networks relevant for the social 
innovation? 
How do policies or other rules and norms represent or relate to public discourses and 
narratives? How is policy making influenced by them? Vice versa, how do policies and other 
rules and norms influence public discourses? 
 
In 2004 the Slovak Republic (SR) joined the EU – and with it the various policy and funding 
mechanisms of the EU. This notably includes the European Water Framework Directive 
(WFD), a policy instrument that is generally considered to be the EU’s approach to so-called 
integrated water resource management. The WFD is the key legal framework for 
environmental sustainability in the water sector. It promotes the adoption of river basin 
management plans with the goal to achieve good ecological and chemical status of European 
rivers and lakes by 2015 (Article 4). According to the WFD, “water is not a commercial 
product like any other, but, rather a heritage which must be protected and treated as such” 
(WFD, Preamble). Furthermore, the WFD is to be implemented with the active involvement 
of the public (Article 147). 
 
In the European context, the NWP’s focus on so-called green water and the role of the small 
water cycle for flood prevention has much to contribute to the WFD discussion. The WFD 
will not meet its targets by 2015 and so far has considered only to a very limited extent the 
role of water in catchments as a whole (as opposed to the narrow focus on so-called blue 
water in lakes and rivers). Considering the increase of floods and droughts in Europe, the 
kind of inclusive view the NWP promotes is an important topic. In their conceptual 
approach, Kravčík and PW take on and endorse such an integrated and participatory 
approach, pushing it in the direction of flood prevention not just in the rivers but also on the 
land; despite this, they have not received much attention from the WFD (Grüne Liga, 2004). 
 
Another important legal framework on the European level is the EU Floods Directive (FD). 
Among the requirements laid down by the FD for implementation, the information and 
                                                 
7
 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-framework/index_en.html 
 96 
participation of the public in several process steps of evaluation, and planning for flood 
protection are especially relevant here.  
 
A reassessment of the WFD and the FD, along with a discussion of landscape productivity 
and maintenance payments under the EU Common Agricultural Policy, could create a space 
for municipalities to create long-term work related to an investment in a public good – 
restoring and maintaining water as a fund for people and ecosystems). 
 
Another important issue is the question of property rights. The PLRIRB, following the ideas 
of the NWP, was carried out with a vast majority of measures that were constructed on land 
belonging to various entities. Juggling these differing responsibilities and the necessary 
communication between authorities proved to be complicated. The following quotes show 
exemplary opinions and examples:  
 
“Considering the administration and enterprises owned by the state (state forests, 
water management company), I think that the information between higher and lower 
parts of their organisation did not flow sufficiently, and either did not reach the lower 
parts at all or was communicated and understood wrongly. […] 
 
Maybe there is a hole in the law, but I would first solve this problem, that people who 
work this land should be creating or constructing such measures by law, and through 
this protect people and properties under their land.” (Jan Ziska, engineer involved in 
the PLRIRB, interview on 20.02.2012) 
 
“It would be good if those in the administration have an agreement. It cannot be that 
one administrative body allows something and the other one wants the fine to be paid. 
And in the second district the same administrative body is supporting it. There cannot 
be different explanations of law in the same state. It needs to be unified.” (Martin 
Benko, mayor of Hranovnica, interview on 20.02.2012) 
 
“[W]e need to negotiate with land and forest managers about the maintenance of their 
roads and pipes.” (Jan Podmanicky, mayor of Stara Bystrica, interview on 
28.02.2012) 
 
So far there is no evidence of change in the responsibilities of or communication between 
authorities. Moreover, an alignment of agricultural and forestry policies for landscape 
productivity and maintenance has not taken place. 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 What is the role of institutions in social innovations? How do they relate to 
cognitive frames and networks? 
WP 3 Which networks/links were shared by social innovators and policy makers? 
 Which policies are able to change distribution and accessibility to 
resources/inputs for the SI process? 
 Were there complementary policies that made a difference? On which basis did 
their complementarity rest (e.g., same beneficiaries, same social problem 
addressed, complementary social problem addressed, etc.)? 
WP 4 What is the role of research, technology and innovation policy during social 
innovation process? 
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 What is the role of education (and life-long learning) policy during social 
innovation process? 
 Do technological norms and standards play a role? 
WP 5 What is the role of policy makers during the social innovation process? 
WP 6 Which (social) innovation policies are currently successful / have been 
successful in the past? In which contexts? 
 Which role do policies play in ecosystems fostering social innovation? 
 
2.5 Resources 
What type of financial resources are used to finance relevant activities of the social 
innovation (e.g., own assets of target group, donations, membership fees, grants, social 
investments, regular loans, public funds, etc.), and for what purposes are these resources 
deployed (e.g., machinery, commodities, advisory, etc.)?  
 
What other types of resources (voluntary work, social networks, natural resources, etc.) 
were/are relevant for the social innovation? Please describe the role of the different resources. 
 
PW is a small NGO with a permanent staff of around six staff members and a larger network 
of volunteers (around 50). The permanent staff consists of project managers and an 
accountant. The organisation does not have an organigram and its members view themselves 
as entrepreneurial and self-determined (Hronsky, interview on 27.7.2010). The organisation 
finances itself via grants from public and private sources; it has not yet developed an earned 
income strategy. The financial situation of PW has been a subject of concern, especially since 
the end of the PLRIRB. 
 
Since the Soviet era, flood prevention is mainly the responsibility of the regional and central 
governments in Slovakia. Municipalities can apply for renting their streams in order to 
manage them, but flood prevention projects are normally expensive and the applications for 
government funding are difficult. Regarding the beneficiaries of the PLRIRB – the 
municipalities and the unemployed people – the distribution of resources was more direct 
than before. Money became available to the municipalities right away when they were 
approved to take part in the PLRIRB. Moreover, the municipalities had the possibility to 
distribute the money more freely than usual. One drawback was the provision of salaries for 
the workers – the municipalities were required to pay the salaries up front and the labour 
office would reimburse them after the work had been done – anyhow, advancing the money 
for the salaries proved to be difficult for some of the municipalities.  
 
“You know, you pay it, you write a claim (request) for refund, it was a two-month 
process and it still is. I am not sure how it will be with latest salary. And the people 
are relentless; they want their salary on the day the salary should be paid.” (Edita 
Orenicova, mayor of Keckovce, interview on 20.02.2012). 
 
Furthermore, the application process was simplified. Normally, a municipality has to do cost-
intensive planning before applying for government money. As Martin Benko, mayor of 
Hranovnica, puts it: “Usually the procedure is that you prepare the project documentation [i.e. 
project presentation], and wait if you will be successful; if it does not get through, we can 
throw the projects in the dustbin” (Benko, interview on 20.2.2012). In contrast, to apply to 
become part of the PLRIRB, there was no need for preliminary work – only an online 
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questionnaire needed to be filled in. Only when the municipality was chosen to participate in 
the PLRIRB project did documentation become necessary before the money was handed 
over. Thus, the municipality had almost no costs before a decision was taken.  
 
“We don’t have to take any credits. We have fulfilled pre-conditions and we got the 
money and hired a company; they did the job and we paid it. If we had to take a credit 
we would not have been able to because we are already paying one and it is a problem. 
And when the money came, it was partly free how the villages used it and that was also 
a big advantage.” (Vladislav Basista, mayor of Demjata, interview on 27.02.2012) 
 
According to Kravčík, the concept of landscape revitalisation and flood protection by way of 
many small measures is a much more cost-effective way than building large structures 
(especially large dams) – a reason, he states, why the measures of the revitalization program 
are disliked by the state companies. The ideas for water holdings and dams fostered by 
Kravčík and PW are based on simple techniques – the construction of small structures usually 
made out of wood, stone or earth. The municipalities participating in the PLRIRB had the 
possibility to adjust the constructions according to their ideas; they also could decide whether 
to contract a construction company or to build the measures on their own. 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 … 
WP 3 How is the distribution and accessibility to these resources? 
WP 4 Does the nationalization / privatization of relevant infrastructures impact on the 
access to social innovations? 
WP 5 What role do financial resources play for SI (invention, diffusion, etc.)? 
 Can the role of the type of capital (social, cultural, ecological, etc.) for social 
innovations be specified? 
WP 6 … 
 
2.6 Social and technological innovation 
Is the social innovation fostered by or related to technological innovations like 
- a new general purpose technology (e.g., information and communication 
technologies) and/or by scientific advances? 
- a new artefact (e.g. mobile phone)? 
Is the social innovation fostered by or related to a new infrastructure (e.g. Internet)? Is the 
social innovation fostered by the emergence of new techniques? 
How did/do technological innovation contribute to the social innovation, or vice versa? 
Did/does technological innovation help in the diffusion of the social innovation or even 
improve it? 
 
Already stated above, the concept of water management via the building of small barriers in 
order to dissolve the energy of water, to increase the amount of infiltration of water and to 
stop sediment loss etc. is – not only according to Kravčík – based on traditional knowledge 
that was nearly forgotten during the Soviet period. As presented to journalists, at conferences 
and in blogs, the NWP is seen as a rediscovery of tradition. Water as a heritage (see EWFD, 
section 2) receives a specific meaning here in relation to innovation: the innovation is not 
positioned as the new that takes away from the old ways, but as a return and revival of 
tradition. 
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In the communication of the projects and programmes like the PLRIRB the aspects ‘simple 
techniques approach’ (see above) and ‘traditional knowledge’ have been strongly indicated 
and agreed upon. Exemplary quotes on traditional knowledge: 
 
“First I had a feeling that it is something new, but later I found out it is something that 
our fathers did.” (Martin Benko, mayor of Hranovnica, interview on 20.02.2012) 
 
“We also get information from the old literature. […] We did not reinvent the wheel. 
It was done before but not for the last 20-30 years. And now it becomes alive. We are 
bringing back to life what our fathers and grandfathers did and worked on.” (Vladislav 
Basista, mayor of Demjata, interview on 27.02.2012) 
 
In the surveys conducted, in regards to the statement “Our forefathers have been building 
dams and water holdings of similar type”, ca. 52% agreed in the first round (ca. 17% 
disagreed; fall 2011) and ca. 62% agreed in the second (ca. 16% disagreed; fall 2012). 
 
Therefore the new approach does not involve new technologies – apart from sometimes using 
machinery for the construction of retention measures that have not been available some 
decades before and the use of the internet as a major channel for distribution of information 
and contacting people. 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 … 
WP 3 How is the distribution and accessibility to technology and its use? 
 Whose perception on the use of the technology matters / is being 
promoted/diffused? 
WP 4 To which step in the social innovation and diffusion process do technological 
innovations contribute? (idea generation, invention, innovation, diffusion 
process incl. adaptation, etc.) 
WP 5 Which patterns do emerge in the interplay of social and technological 
innovations? 
WP 6 … 
 
2.7 Social impact measurement  
Have there been any attempts to measure the impact of the social innovation (on the level of a 
specific intervention or organisation or a national level, etc.)? 
 
So far, the socio-ecological research group GETIDOS conducted the main independent study 
of Michal Kravčík and PW (Lodemann and Ziegler, 2014). The goals of the study were to 
assess ecological sustainability and capabilities (the latter as listed by Martha Nussbaum). 
This case study mainly draws on material collected for the study by GETIDOS. The material 
(interviews etc.) is available on request. Parts of it are used e.g. for the publications in 2010 
and 2014 (Lodemann and Ziegler, 2014; Lodemann et al., 2010). 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 … 
WP 3 What dimensions and approaches for impact measurement are currently used? 
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(How) do they contribute to the development of the SI? 
 What is the chosen evaluative space? 
WP 4 … 
WP 5 … 
WP 6 … 
 
2.8 Further drivers and obstacles for the diffusion of the SI 
What further contextual factors can be identified that fostere(d) or inhibite(d) the diffusion of 
the social innovation (e. g., legal framework conditions, economic/political situation or crisis, 
dominant welfare regime, ecological situation, power structures, cognitive frames, religious 
constellations, demographic developments, etc.)? 
What further factors can be identified on the level of the innovative agents that fostered or 
inhibited the diffusion (e.g., organisational capacity of the inventor, resources, resistance of 
employees, value set or skills of the leaders)?  
 
The main contextual factors have already been mentioned in the paragraphs above. Among 
the contextual factors that inhibit(ed) the diffusion of the social innovation are: 
 
• ‘Conventional water management’ has strong advocates who are working closely with 
the SR government or are part of it. Main players are the state-owned Slovak Water 
Management Company, the Slovak Water Construction Company as well as (at least 
partly) the Water Research Institute. Moreover, an alignment of agricultural and 
forestry policies for landscape productivity and maintenance has not taken place. 
• Following a period of major flood events in Slovakia and a change in the SR 
government in 2010, a window of opportunity opened up. The scaling of the NWP on 
the national level via the PLRIRB was (in the beginning) strongly connected to the 
endeavour of a small amount of people, particularly Michal Kravčík and then Prime 
Minister Iveta Radičova (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union, SDKU-DS). This 
collaborative strategy, however, did not prove to be resilient with respect to changes 
in government. The change in government in March 2012 led to the abrupt stop of the 
programme, the conventional players who had been in opposition of the programme 
reclaiming the water management sector. It is noteworthy that PW lacks a secure 
source of funding, let alone an organisational growth strategy, which could provide 
independence from the dynamics of party-politics. 
• In the case of the PLRIRB the cooperation amongst different authorities proved to be 
complicated; though a governmental programme, there were cases where permissions 
were denied by authorities on lower levels (see section 2.4). 
• Financial resources are a constant concern for Michal Kravčík and PW (see above). At 
the level of municipalities, the lack of resources plays a major role in the almost 
absence of activities for flood prevention beyond the PLRIRB. Applying for EU funds 
seems impossible for many municipalities because of a lack of resources necessary to 
fulfil the requirements of the application process. 
 
“The EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment, note of the author) is a big 
problem for us. Especially when we are applying for EU grants. We wanted to 
do a flood protection project and they required EIA, but the problem is that it 
is a process lasting a couple of months. If the call is in March and the deadline 
is in May, we cannot manage it in time. […] This is it with all the projects. We 
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have to prepare everything, land ownership, EIA, which costs for example 
17,000 €, and you don’t know if you will get the funding.” (Jaroslav Fekula, 
mayor of Radostka, 27.02.2012) 
 
• Moreover, municipalities are mostly not entitled to take decisions in water 
management as the streams are controlled by the water or forest authorities; the legal 
situation therefore is an obstacle as well. 
 
The most driving factors of the NWP are the personal efforts of Michal Kravčík, staff 
members of PW and supporting networks. Especially Kravčík has been the ‘figurehead’ of 
the NWP and been very active in the dissemination of the idea via publications and (online) 
discussions.  
Though important legal frameworks on the European level like the EU Water Framework 
Directive (WFD) and the EU Floods Directive (FD) might be links to further support the 
NWP approach – as besides requirements concerning ecology etc., the WFD and the FD both 
e.g. stress the participation of the public – these links have not played an important role so 
far. 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 … 
WP 3 How can actors be ‘nested’ into contexts? Do different networks overlap? If 
yes, how do they overlap? Which actors are taking part in more than one 
network? 
WP 4 … 
WP 5 How do different influential factors in the diffusion process of SI interrelate? 
 
What are different barriers for different kinds of SI (e.g. bottom-up vs. top-
down)? 
WP 6 … 
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ICS - PART 3) Social innovation: development and impact 
3.1 Development of the SI 
Can different phases and crucial events in the development of the SI be identified today? Are 
there perhaps different “streams” within the social innovation? 
 
The differentiation of phases in this case does not follow a theoretical scheme but rather a 
chronological order. There are nonetheless crucial events (already mentioned above, strongly 
repetitive) that have had strong influence on the scaling of the NWP. 
 
• Preparation phase, learning (pre-1993): 
Michael Kravčík studied water management in Bratislava (1975-1980) and worked 
for the Institute of Hydrology and the Institute of Land Ecology of the Slovak 
Academy of Science as well as the Soil Management Institute. He experienced several 
dismissals due to confronting the ‘conventional approach to water management’ led to 
connecting with the activist’s scene; he reports that he experienced the period of 
“glasnost” and the end of the cold war (sametová revoluce, Velvet Revolution) as 
very liberating. He belonged to a group of Slovaks that used the change in regime to 
found their own NGOs; in 1993 he became the co-founder of PW.  
 
• Initialising event: Tichy Potok (1990s): 
Tichy Potok has been a crucial event in the history of Michal Kravčík and PW. In the 
1990s there was a plan to construct a dam for flood prevention and drinking water 
provision at Tichy Potok, a village in the upper part of the Torysa River. Michal 
Kravčík and PW successfully supported villagers in their protest against the dam. In 
their anti-dam struggle they formulated of the Blue Alternative, a system of small 
dams and water holdings meant to offer the same level of security against floods as 
well as to increase the drinking water supply. However, Blue Alternative and the 
relative success of PW – Kravčík received the Goldman Environment Prize and EU 
award in 1999 – resulted in more problems than opportunities (Kravčík, conversation 
on 30.07.2010). In the early 2000s it became very difficult to obtain funding for water 
projects and the competition and critique from other NGOs was very intense.  
 
• Practical experience phase, further conceptualisation (1997-2007): 
In the time between the anti-dam struggle in Tichy Potok and the implementation of 
the PLRIRB, Michal Kravčík and PW initiated and/or were involved in many small 
projects on the local and regional levels (see list in paragraph 1.3 Problem 
Background). PW widened its spectrum of activities, including areas such as regional 
development and handicraft, as well as the inclusion of ethnic minorities. The 
cooperation with outside partners also became more important due to the limited 
possibilities of cooperation within Slovakia. 
 
During this period Kravčík and colleagues began formulating Blue Alternative in a 
more theoretical fashion – and translating the information into English – leading to 
the publication of the book ‘Water for the Recovery of the Climate – A New Water 
Paradigm’ in 2007. 
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• Window of opportunity – the PLRIRB (2010-2012): 
In fall 2010, following both a change in government and a period of major floods, an 
opportunity opened up to implement the PW approach on a much larger scale. The 
new prime minister was Iveta Radičová, who Kravčík knew from civil society work in 
the early days of the Velvet Revolution. Radičová’s government, the SDKU-DS 
(Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party), initiated the PLRIRB 
in close cooperation with Kravčík, creating a special office under the prime minister 
headed by Martin Kováč (co-author of the NWP and also an Ashoka fellow like 
Kravčík). However, this opportunity was not for long; following another change in the 
SR government the programme was abruptly stopped in March 2012. 
 
• Reorganizing phase (2012- ): 
Since the PLRIRB has been stopped, Michal Kravčík and PW are in a constant 
struggle for financial resources. Kravčík experienced the post-PLRIRB time as 
stressful, with strong refusal and exclusion from the main discourses in water 
management in Slovakia. Michal Kravčík became frustrated with the situation in 
Slovakia and began focusing his efforts to other countries (Kravčík, interview in 
February 2013). He became a candidate for the European Parliament in 2014, but was 
not elected. He is still fighting for an appreciation of the PLRIRB’s impact; he 
presents the results of the programme at many conferences and workshops abroad.  
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 How does the development of SI relate to changes in relevant cognitive frames, 
institutions and social networks? 
 
How can the innovation be located in Mann’s framework of power 
sources/fields of innovation? 
 To what extent has the social innovation been incremental (with a focus on 
products or services that address(ed) identified market failures effectively), 
institutional (reconfiguring existing market structures to create social value), or 
disruptive (with a focus on politics and social movements, changing the 
cognitive frames around markets and social systems/structures) across its 
diffusion process? 
WP 3 Do any new actors/relevant groups get involved? (especially marginalised 
groups with previously little voice) 
WP 4 … 
WP 5 Can specific recurring developmental stages be identified for SI? 
 What actor constellations were present during important developmental stages 
of the SI? 
WP 6 … 
 
3.2 Impact of the SI 
What kind of impact can be attached to the social innovation today (e.g. improved access to 
resources, learning options, self-confidence, etc.)? Does the social innovation also unfold its 
impact beyond the initial field of activity (e.g. effects on the labour market)? 
How can the positive impact of the social innovation be described? Are there also potentially 
negative impacts in the targeted field of activity and beyond? 
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With a view on the entrepreneurial journey so far, the following goals have been achieved: 
 
• the Tichy Potok Dam was prevented; 
• an alternative has been proposed (Blue Alternative, NWP); 
• with the PLRIRB, an opportunity arose for the first time to try out this paradigm on a 
large, national scale and Kravčík was able to do so through a collaborative strategy 
with government. Though stopped for the time being (and controversially discussed 
nowadays, note of the author), the PLRIRB resulted in the construction of about 
80,000 different water retention elements (Kravčík et al., 2012). 
 
In terms of scaling the impact, scaling out was achieved rather suddenly with the 
collaboration with government. This temporarily turned Kravčík into a social intrapreneur – 
working for the government – who drew on the contacts, publications and experiences he had 
made over the prior two decades to rapidly come up with a programme for municipalities 
that is lowtech and can be implemented by municipalities and small businesses. The 
implemented government programme is typical for the theory of change in the sense that 
municipalities and their mayors are key collaborators of the programme at the local level; the 
programme is very low-tech and so municipalities and local business are able to implement 
most of the programme themselves. This effort in scaling out was accompanied and prepared 
by scaling up efforts. Since PW’s foundation, Kravčík and colleagues have been engaged in 
political advocacy and the use and co-shaping of political space. The contacts established 
enabled the sudden possibility for scaling in the later years. This political advocacy has been 
accompanied by efforts in articulating and disseminating ideas via publications (journals and 
books). In this sense, PW contributes to the knowledge-space on water management and 
thereby also develops materials that are used to promote political advocacy. Finally, the blog 
and publications are used to present the approach not so much as something new but more so 
as the rediscovery of something old. Thus PW makes use of and co-shapes cultural space 
regarding water management. 
 
The collaborative strategy with the SR government in case of the PLRIRB, however, proved 
not to be resilient with respect to changes in government in March, 2012. PW has a stable 
network of partners in municipalities and the coordinating ZMOS (Slovak Association of 
Towns and Villages) but it lacks a strategy that is independent of short- term changes in 
party-politics. Its very limited organizational capacity also means that much depends on 
Michal Kravčík personally. 
 
From the perspective of the municipalities, it is difficult to assess the long-term impact of the 
PLRIRB. It remains open to further evaluation. However, the conducted interviews and 
surveys may hint at impact a) on the level of municipalities and b) on the level of the 
participating workers. 
 
a) Impact on the level of municipalities 
Mayors interviewed during the PLRIRB highlighted their increased space for decision 
making in the realm of water management. Though it sometimes proved difficult to 
find ten long-term unemployed people, mayors agreed to the inclusion in general and 
found it an important aspect for the development of the community.  
 
b) Impact on the level of the participating workers 
The programme did not create permanent jobs. Nevertheless, respondents to the 
surveys seemed to be somewhat optimistic with respect to the long-term effects. In 
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response to the proposition that skills gained during the programme will help them to 
find another job, 70% agreed and 11% disagreed (Lodemann and Ziegler, 2014). 
However, these results have to be handled with care; in conversations on location of 
the construction sites many workers stated that the lowtech approach did not enhance 
their working skills; living in rural areas these types of working routines are part of 
‘basic education’. 
 
Participants received 327 € per month plus health and social insurance as well as 
food tickets during the working time. The minimum wage in Slovakia is 317 € (as of 
January 2011); the average net monthly wage of forestry and related workers in 2012 
was 484 €. The payment is thus slightly above the minimum wage level, though still 
far from the average income for this field of work. In the first round of the survey 
many respondents commented on the low salary, often arguing that the jobs are hard 
physical labour and that payment should be according to skills. 
 
Recognition and responsibility for the work are strongly embedded in the respective 
villages owing to the local involvement. In both rounds of the survey, the majority of 
respondents agreed with the statement that the villagers agreed with what they were 
doing (86 per cent in the first round and 90 per cent in the second), that the 
respondents’ participation has been valued by the villagers (86 per cent in the first 
and 88 per cent in the second) and that there were other people who would like to join 
a programme like the PLRIRB (80 per cent in the first and 90 per cent in the second). 
Regarding the fact that the participating workers were (mostly) unemployed people, 
the recognition and valuation of their work done during the PLRIRB may have 
enhanced their position within the community. Along with economic reasons, it may 
have been of personal value for (at least some) workers: “Some relationships 
improved and became friendly [...] It is probably the first project for them [in the case 
of Hranovnica: the Roma people] that we did together with the municipality and yes, 
they were proud for sure.” (Vladimir Horvath, social worker in Hranovnica, 2012)  
 
The point about inclusion is subject to the qualification that the programme did not 
include any explicit requirements regarding gender or ethnicity. The PLRIRB did 
contribute to an improved community perception with regards to ethnicity in one 
sense: seven of the construction teams were mainly Roma groups (one of these teams 
was visited by a minister). The news image generated of Roma working for a societal 
task went against the expectation of non-working Roma dependent on unemployment 
benefits; it remains doubtful though if the perception of the Roma communities has 
undergone a major change (Kravčík, conservation on 9 January 2012). 
 
How far the PLRIRB has empowered municipalities and participating workers to enhance 
their situation in the future remains subject to further research. 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 … 
WP 3 What was/is the evaluative space for assessing that the impact of the SI process 
is positive or negative? 
WP 4 … 
WP 5 … 
WP 6 … 
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ICS - PART 4) Discussion and key lessons 
 
The idea of creating small water catchments to thereby strengthen the small water cycle is 
novel in the contemporary Slovakian context. The innovation aims at ecological sustainability 
and, secondarily, local empowerment. With the PLRIRB, Kravčík was able to not only aim 
for the national level with the idea but also to scale the idea on this level via a governmental 
programme for the first time. However, the programme was stopped due to a change in SR 
government. The following aspects are solely an attempt to extract key lessons and open to 
further discussion. 
Based on the findings throughout the template, we explore the key lessons of the following 
actors: 
• Social innovators 
 
Constantly developing concepts, widening activities: 
The focus on flood prevention is important in the Slovakian context. The story of 
Michal Kravčík and PW up to now has shown the risk of relying on a specific way of 
implementation – e.g. the PLRIRB has stopped due to political pressure. The close 
link to party politics in this case proved to be hazardous. Developing the ideas of the 
NWP further, e.g. expanding the ideas to arid regions or urban areas and developing 
concrete ideas for operationalization, together with connecting to new potential actors, 
seems to be an open opportunity. Moreover, the (diplomatic) search for further 
communication with the established players in ‘conventional water management’ 
seems to be a topic that would enhance the possibilities of the scaling of the NWP 
approach. Constantly playing a dissident role (i.e. positioning oneself as different-
minded in strong opposition to established ideas) might hinder reconciliation with 
established players and cooperation. 
 
Developing and standardizing educational approaches: 
In view of Kravčík’s long-standing concern with education, it may be useful to 
increase and standardize the PW’s approach to education. In view of the collaborative 
scaling strategy, this would call for a standardized description of the approach to 
water retention (increasing the possibility of replication or adaption by others) as well 
as possibly the establishment of a training centre with regular courses. 
 
Connecting to legal frameworks: 
Further linking of ideas as proposed by the NWP to existing (European) legal 
frameworks like the WFD or the FD might be helpful to increase visibility, to include 
the NWP into discourses and to gain better access to (financial) resources.  
 
Profound, independent evaluation: 
The abrupt stop of the PLRIRB and the post-PLRIRB discussions have shown the 
importance of profound evaluation; up to now both sides, advocates and opponents, 
rely mainly on anecdotal evidence. Most of the arguments seem fairly simple: “It 
works.” vs. “It does not work.” An independent study might be important for a better 
understanding and – in case the impact of PLRIRB or other projects proves to be 
positive – could serve as an important support of ideas as proposed by the NWP. 
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• Policy makers 
 
Creating ‘long-term temporal spaces’: 
The PLRIRB was stopped in a premature status. Many municipalities have pointed to 
the need of further constructing measures to enhance safety. Moreover, in regards to 
the risk of flooding, regular maintenance appears to be important for the long-term 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the programme. The case of the PLRIRB shows the 
impact of politics and its often short-term focus due to political interests. Crucial in 
these matters is the creation of safe ‘long-term temporal spaces’, in which new ideas 
could prove their fitness, i.e. if they offer a solution or at least interesting approaches 
that have to be developed further or not.  
 
Allocating resources for evaluation: 
In the case of the PLRIRB there was no budget for evaluation though a profound 
evidence of the impact of the programme would have helped in deciding its future. An 
impact assessment might have led to receiving recognition from the Ministry of 
Environment and the State Water Management Company for the PLRIRB as an anti-
flood programme and thereby lead to further funding (also from EU funds). It may 
thus be reasonable to include a budget for evaluation, especially for programmes that 
have been initiated by the government but also in cases of funding projects done by 
third parties.  
 
Harmonizing legal frameworks and responsibilities: 
The ideas of the NWP are connected to many sectors that are managed by different 
authorities and different legal frameworks, e.g. river basin management, agricultural 
and forestry policies. As the PLRIRB has shown, many of these policies, and the 
executing authorities involved, are only randomly linked to each other; 
communication between the authorities has proved to be difficult at least in a couple 
of cases. This has led to confusion and delays on the level of the participating 
municipalities, regarding permission or the allocation of resources. This is at least 
partly owed to the fast implementation of the programme. A close analysis of the 
existing structure of authorities, necessary harmonization of legal frameworks etc. 
seems crucial, especially in regard to new ideas that tackle problems in a (more) 
holistic way. Last but not least, the analysis should include the beneficiaries and their 
potential role. 
 
Calculating costs: 
Flood prevention via the techniques as implemented in the PLRIRB might prove to be 
difficult –there should be no flooding event that does damage if the techniques work 
as assumed. The visibility therefore is low and a profound evaluation is needed (see 
above). While a simple comparison between costs as a result of flood damage and 
costs for flood prevention cuts this short, the questions remains how to take into 
calculation the impact on people’s motivations and emotions? Moreover, conventional 
flood protection measures like dykes and channels8 hand on the flood wave to 
municipalities downstream, which then have to react. Cost calculation for the 
provision of adequate funding should therefore take into account many aspects; a 
thorough understanding of these aspects requires close cooperation with 
municipalities. 
                                                 
8
 For illustrative reasons: there are alternatives like the creation of flood plains etc. 
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• Investors and funders (resource structure) 
 
Balancing consideration and trust: 
The case study supports the truism that new ideas always bear risks (in their concept 
as well as in many stages of their implementation process); nevertheless, they also 
potentially offer chances for the solution of problems. Funding new ideas should 
therefore be done with consideration that includes monitoring and evaluation. In the 
case of the PLRIRB it was part of the innovation to change the conventional flow of 
resources9 by handing over responsibility to the municipalities. If the allocation of 
resources had been done with too much caution and hesitation, it would have 
undermined the goals of the PLRIRB. 
 
                                                 
9
 The costs that arise due to the preparation of proposals (e.g. environmental impact assessments) have proved to 
be difficult to handle for municipalities (see also paragraph 2.5 Resources). 
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Introduction 
This document is a deliverable of the work package 2 of the EU-funded FP7 project CRESSI. 
CRESSI explores the economic underpinnings of social innovation with a particular focus on 
how policy and practice can enhance the lives of the most marginalised and disempowered 
people in society. To date, case studies targeted social housing, micro finance, and drinking 
water supply. The present case study focuses on the field of health and attempts to give an 
overview on a social innovation called community-based health research; it looks at 
variations in four countries and is an introduction to this practice field rather than a detailed 
analysis of a single project or case, although examples are given. 
 
Problem area and targeted beneficiary groups 
Community-based health research (sometimes community-based participatory (health) 
research (CBPR), collaborative research, action research, interactive research, participatory 
health research (PHR)) means cooperation between research, health care, and engaged 
citizens to jointly achieve new insights in the improvement of public health. Particularly 
socially marginalised parts of our society benefit from this approach because it facilitates 
innovative practice that can contain the negative determinants of health. Research is not 
conducted on people as passive subjects just to provide data; it is rather conducted “with” 
them in order to provide relevant information for improving their lives (Israel et al., 1998; 
Minkler and Wallerstein, 2008; Macaulay et al., 1998; Macaulay et al., 1999; Green and 
Kreuter, 2005). 
CBPR ‘is regarded as an effective method for transferring evidence-based research from 
clinical settings to communities that can most benefit thereby improving health. CBPR’s 
community-partnered research processes offer the potential to generate better informed 
hypotheses, develop more effective interventions, and enhance the translation of the research 
results into practice. Thus, CBPR is an essential tool for action-oriented and community-
driven public health research.’ 
(https://obssr.od.nih.gov/scientific_areas/methodology/community_based_participatory_resea
rch/index.aspx) 
 
Problem background and solution approaches 
When considering social innovation for the benefit of marginalised people in our society, the 
health sector offers a vast field of study objects. Community-based health research, for 
example, has been recognised as a field of activity for both researchers and activist in the 
public health sector to engage in the quality assurance of health promotion and disease 
prevention in relation with socially disadvantaged groups. In most OECD countries life 
expectancy and at the same time compression of morbidity increase if a person belongs to the 
privileged group that can benefit from the progress in health research, health care, better 
education, and improved standard of living. However, one fifth of the population falls 
through the cracks. Those who have a low income and poor education or grew up in an 
underprivileged parental home are more inclined to suffer from poor health than others. This 
is partly due to the fact that chronic-degenerative diseases are the major cause of health 
problems and death in OECD countries; these diseases develop earlier in underprivileged 
people and lead to death more often and earlier (WHO World Health Organization et al., 
2011). Chronic-degenerative diseases, however, are to a large degree avoidable if primary 
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prevention measures are taken early enough. This is one major focus of community-based 
participatory health research. Other focuses are, for example, women’s health, migrants, and 
elderly people. 
In a scientific context community-based health research is part of participatory social 
research and emerged only recently in a significant way. It has some roots in the so-called 
action research and was originally developed by a Jewish doctor in Berlin, Kurt Lewin, who 
wanted to match action and research. Under the Nazi regime he fled to the US where he 
continued his work. It was only in the late 1960s and the following years during the student 
revolts and the emergence of Critical Theory (Frankfurt School) that this approach of 
participatory social research was taken up again in Germany. However, it was soon 
stigmatised as Marxian and unscientific (because of the supposed lack of neutrality when a 
researcher is personally involved in the field of study) and almost disappeared in Germany 
(and in the most of Europe), but it survived and was further developed in North America, 
Latin America, and to some degree in the Scandinavian countries (Wright, 2012b, p. 418). 
Accordingly, very different kinds of this research approach developed; apart from differences 
there are usually two common characteristics: 
1. New insights are directly connected with new forms of action to improve the living 
conditions of the marginalised. 
2. Researchers, practitioners, and citizen scientists work at the same level in order to 
conduct a research project and they work together during all of its phases; this is what 
is meant by the term ‘participatory’. 
Action research today takes very different paths and a common basis for consolidation still 
needs to be found. Action research is present in various fields and areas and there is no 
common definition or even title. As to action research, the health sector belongs to the most 
established ones; this has historically been accompanied by the emergence of Public Health 
and the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion1: 
‘Health promotion is the process of enabling people to increase control over, and to improve, their 
health. To reach a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, an individual or group must 
be able to identify and to realize aspirations, to satisfy needs, and to change or cope with the 
environment. Health is, therefore, seen as a resource for everyday life, not the objective of living. 
Health is a positive concept emphasizing social and personal resources, as well as physical capacities. 
Therefore, health promotion is not just the responsibility of the health sector, but goes beyond healthy 
life-styles to well-being.’ 
The Ottawa Charter notes that the following conditions are necessary to promote health: 
• peace, 
• shelter, 
• education, 
                                                          
1
 The Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion of 1986 
(http://www.who.int/healthpromotion/conferences/previous/ottawa/en/), often recognised as a foundational 
document of health promotion, continues to be relevant for public health – even after almost 30 years. ‘Inspired 
by the WHO Constitution, the Alma Ata Declaration, and the Lalonde Report, the Ottawa Charter endorses a 
positive definition of health, situates health as a product of daily life, proposes core values and principles for 
public health action, and outlines three strategies and five action areas reaching beyond the boundaries of the 
health care sector. The Charter established a radical agenda for public health, specifically to expressly convey 
the values public health pursues, thereby increasing the potential for the reflexivity of the field and opportunities 
to consider complementary values in actions that promote population health.’ Kumar and Preetha (2012) 
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• food, 
• income, 
• a stable eco-system, 
• sustainable resources, 
• social justice, and equity. 
 
These prerequisites can only be provided in collaboration with the local communities. Local 
communities are thus often involved in community-based health research and are essential for 
the funding of related projects. Some of the principles of this joint activity in the health sector 
are: 
• mutual learning and transfer of expertise, 
• divided decision making, 
• common ownership of all products and process achieved in the common work or 
project (Wright, 2012b, p. 419). 
Action research, not only related to the health sector, is characterised by a huge theoretical 
heterogeneity which makes it impossible to speak of a common school of thoughts or 
academic consistency. Some critics noted that action research is held together more by 
political objectives of social transformation than shared scientific criteria (Lukesch and 
Zecha, 1978, p. 41). 
A crucial feature of action research and thus also of community-based health research is, it its 
own rhetoric, the intended interaction between research, on the one hand, and action, on the 
other, i.e. a harmony between both. By definition, action research intends to cross the 
boundaries between science and ‘real life’ and not just collect empirical data or engage in 
analyses and theory building. Instead, researchers want to be involved and change things; on 
the other hand, citizens, i.e. the research objects, want to contribute and also to be actively 
involved in the research setup (Masters, 1995). Another characteristic of action research is 
that it acknowledges that communities create their own identities; in the field of health, action 
research also focuses on the relevance of communities or neighborhoods with reference to 
particular health problems and it is strongly committed to sharing knowledge and solution-
solving approaches within the respective community and beyond. Projects in community-
based health research usually take a long-term approach and intend to enhance and stabilise 
the social relationships among project partners. They often take ecological perspectives into 
account, since these are considered to be important health determinants, at least at the 
declarative level. 
However, these principles are not always implemented in practice. Especially the 
participatory aspect is often neglected. Instead of concentrating on the community, the studies 
often focus on the individual. Another practice is that studies are often not much concerned 
with communities as identity-creating entities but with collecting data in many communities, 
which leads to general interpretations at society level that are, in the end, aiming at policy 
interventions at that level. Many projects focus on prevention alone, without considering 
(other) causalities. An ideal solution would be a systemic perspective including a cyclical and 
iterative approach of empirical data collection, interpretation, and intervention (Wright, 
2012b, p. 421). 
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Actors and networks 
An obstacle for the scientific acknowledgement of community-based health research is also 
the fact that similarly to other areas of action research it has not yet achieved a definite 
academic profile that would serve as a solid basis for explaining and justifying its 
methodological and theoretical heterogeneity. Due to these deficits, community-based health 
research stands in stark contrast to randomised clinical studies, for instance, at least from an 
academic point of view. 
In order to overcome this deficit, some proponents of community-based health research 
established the International Collaboration for Participatory Health Research (ICPHR) in 
2009 (Wright, 2009; Wright et al., 2010). It intends to strengthen the role of PHR in 
intervention design and decision-making on health issues. The work of the ICPHR focuses on 
systematically bringing together the knowledge and experience of PHR gained in different 
countries in order to strengthen its role with reference to issues of quality, credibility, and 
impact on policy and practice. The ICPHR is an international organisation aiming at 
consolidating common principles on the international level and at encouraging this kind of 
research in countries which have only recently started to engage in PHR. The ICPHR central 
office is located at the Catholic University for Applied Sciences in Berlin, Germany. 
‘Activities of the ICPHR include: 
• developing guidelines for conducting and evaluating PHR; 
• describing the unique impact of PHR as compared to other research approaches; 
• describing which forms of theory and evidence are produced by this approach as 
compared to other forms of health research; 
• finding ways for conducting systematic reviews of the PHR literature in order to 
contribute to the body of international knowledge on improving community health; 
• creating a database of resources on the theory, practice, and outcomes of PHR’ 
(http://pram.mcgill.ca/resources.html; see also: http://www.icphr.org/). 
The creed of the ICPHR is very similar to the context and content of social innovation 
definitions because it acknowledges that: “Not all people have an equal chance to live a long 
and healthy life or to have their voice heard in society. People who have to struggle to live, 
for example, because they are poor or because they are discriminated against or because they 
have a disability, often have more health problems.” ICPHR wants to “promote PHR as a 
way to generate knowledge that is relevant to these people and can thus increase the 
likelihood of improving their living and working conditions so they, too, can have a chance to 
live healthier, happier lives. In the understanding of its members (mostly medical 
sociologists), PHR is a new way of doing health research.” (both quotes: International 
collaboration for Health Research, 2015, 
http://www.icphr.org/uploads/2/0/3/9/20399575/what_is_the_icphr_-_short_description_-
_version_2014_10_20.pdf) 
The forming of a first international PHR-related association can be interpreted as a first move 
towards institutionalisation. To distinguish PHR from other health-related research 
approaches, Springett et al. (2011) suggest some topics which coincide to a large degree with 
the features already mentioned above, whereby a strong normative focus, especially in the 
context of social innovation, is worth mentioning. In the end, PHR is supposed to support a 
kind of social transformation towards a better and most of all healthier life for marginalised 
people in accordance with democratic principles of empowerment and participation. 
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Participation is to be understood in the sense of the German term ‘Teilhabe’, which 
practically means that the people in focus, i.e. the marginalised, actively take part in the 
research process, not only as study objects but also as lay researchers or citizen scientists. 
These citizen scientists take part in the development and testing of instruments, in the 
collection and interpretation of data, etc. 
 
Narratives and discourses 
Since the 1960s several developments have contributed to a change of cognitive frames, i.e. 
changes in narratives and discourses. Amongst those developments there were several 
medical scandals which in the end resulted in demands for more patient involvement, better 
information on risks of the broader public, and a greater demand of the public for more 
accountability in public (health) services. From the 1960s on it can be observed that on the 
part of the patients there is an increased willingness to challenge so-called experts in medical 
and scientific research and a decreased trust in technocrats and scientists (Ismail, 2009; 
Collins and Evans, 2002). One of the crucial incidents, at the beginning of the 1960s, was the 
medical scandal related to Thalidomide, a medication for pregnant women that caused 
physical impairments in several thousands of newborns; approximately half of them died. It 
was never fully documented how many children were affected and the practice of admitting 
the drug to the market was very different across countries. It seems that the majority of 
Thalidomide victims could be found in West Germany, since here the drug was admitted first. 
Due to poor documentation standards, little knowledge on evidence-based medicine, and no 
patient involvement whatsoever, it took several years until the disastrous effects of 
Thalidomide were scientifically proven and revealed. Interestingly, the political and judicial 
reactions also varied across the different countries. While in Europe a lawsuit against the 
responsible company Grünenthal was settled via extra-judicial procedures, including 
compensation for the parents of the impaired and deceased children, in Canada parents of 
victims took a grass-root approach: They formed a group called The Thalidomide Victims 
Association of Canada, a group of 120 Canadian parents of children who survived. (Warren, 
2001). ‘Their goal was to prevent future usage of drugs that could be of potential harm to 
mothers and babies.’ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thalidomide) The members of this 
Thalidomide Victims Association were involved in the STEPS programme which aimed at 
preventing teratogenicity (Franks et al., 2004). The harmful effects of Thalidomide increased 
the fear regarding the safety of pharmaceutical drugs. After the effects of Thalidomide were 
made public, the Society of Toxicology of Canada was established to focus on toxicology as 
a discipline separate from pharmacology. After the Thalidomide scandal, ‘the need for the 
testing and approval of the toxins in certain pharmaceutical drugs became more important’ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thalidomide). The Society of Toxicology of Canada is 
responsible for the Conservation Environment Protection Act and focuses on researching the 
impact of chemical substances on human health (Racz et al., 2003). The Thalidomide scandal 
resulted in changes as to the way drugs are tested as well as to what type of drugs can be used 
during pregnancy, and it increased the awareness of potential side effects of drugs. 
In the United States, Thalidomide was distributed only during a test phase; it has never been 
on the market, since the FDA denied the approval; during the test phase some children with 
impairments were born, which raised suspicion; therefore, FDA officials demanded further 
research. The Thalidomide scandal prompted many countries to introduce stricter rules for 
the testing and licensing of drugs, e.g. the Kefauver Harris Amendment 
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(http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/NewsEvents/ucm320924.htm) (U.S.) and Directive 65/65/EEC1 
in the E.U.(http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31965L0065:EN:HTML).2 
Another shocking medical scandal happened for the main part in the UK but had widespread 
effects in other developed countries as well. It was the scandal related to the UK 
government’s handling of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy or Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
disease crisis in the mid to late 1990s, which contributed to the skepticism of the public as to 
the public authorities’ ability to successfully deal with critical health issues. More recently, in 
the United Kingdom the public concern about a purported connection between the MMR 
(measles, mumps, and rubella) vaccination and autism seems to have manifested itself in an 
opposition to the scientific research establishment, although there is overwhelming evidence 
that no such connection exists (Milewa et al., 2008). A series of organ retention scandals at 
major hospitals in the UK, including the Bristol Royal Infirmary and the Alder Hey 
Children’s Hospital, had arguably more damaging effects in terms of public trust in medical 
research; in the early to mid-2000s this issue led to public enquiries and important changes in 
the regulatory regime in this field (House of Commons, 2001; Ismail, 2009). These 
experiences were also discussed on the European continent with reference to further political 
action and challenged the so-called medical and scientific research experts; since the 1980s 
they have also led to a demand for public-sector reforms in the developed world, at least in 
terms of political correctness and wording with regard to public accountability. 
Another factor that enhances participatory health research is the changing perception of 
disease and illness, both within and outside the medical field. Today, key health challenges in 
developed countries do not arise from acute or transmissible diseases (i.e. tuberculosis or 
cholera) but from non-communicable diseases (NCDs), also known as chronic diseases (i.e. 
cancer, diabetes, or heart disease). Chronic diseases require a more nuanced approach to 
treatment; however, the most significant impacts on outcomes are likely to arise equally from 
behavioural changes and the administration of drugs and clinical interventions (Ismail, 2009; 
Rose, 2008). There is a growing awareness of the fact ‘that this demands a hitherto unusual 
degree of cooperation between health professionals and patients/service users in both health-
care provision and health research, especially given the increasing importance of patient 
experience in determining the way in which interventions for chronic conditions are 
designed’ (Ismail, 2009). 
‘Internationally, the growth of a well-funded and active AIDS movement has also had a 
significant impact on the amount of research that has been conducted in this area (Epstein, 
1996); combat veterans in the United Kingdom and United States have also been engaged in 
a similarly high-profile, although less successful, campaign to bring about changes in the 
research approach on the Gulf War syndrome (Ismail, 2009; Zavestoski et al., 2002).  
A key outcome of these changes was the emergence of the notion of a so-called lay expertise, 
mainly from the field of medical sociology. This concept is increasingly spreading in 
participatory and community-based research (Ismail, 2009; Prior, 2003). In the past years the 
concept of lay expertise seems to have received official approval through growing 
institutional support of participatory research. ‘Internationally, the United Nations Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights has provided an important underpinning for moves in this 
                                                          
2
 ‘In the United States, the new regulations strengthened the FDA, among other ways, by requiring applicants to 
prove efficacy and to disclose all side-effects encountered in testing. The FDA subsequently initiated the Drug 
Efficacy Study Implementation to reclassify drugs already on the market.’ 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thalidomide) 
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direction (Ismail, 2009; Kuruvilla and Shvama, 2005). In the United Kingdom the NHS 
INVOLVE programme was established in 1996 in order to help enhance the increased lay 
participation in research supported by the health service. (Ismail, 2009) 
An additional societal development contributing to a favourable climate for PHR was the 
increasing democratisation of science, promoting the involvement of the public at a strategic 
level. Of course, this is important not only for PHR and it reflects the premise that democratic 
systems of decision making at (almost) all levels give room for participation in an open 
debate, which is a crucial momentum for proponents of patient and user involvement in the 
decision making process (Viswanathan et al., 2004; Wilsdon and Willis, 2004). From a 
philosophical perspective one can argue, as Habermas does, that any expert culture is 
essentially anti-democratic (Habermas, 1987). Arguments contributing to this notion also 
include the broad concept of citizenship as an understanding of patients and users as 
stakeholders who have the right to shape their own lives and future, especially with regard to 
public funding supporting scientific research. In the long run this development may even 
considerably change the health research system by changing the power balance between 
patients or users, scientists, policy makers, and funding administrators. In the context of 
technology assessment, foresight, and patient empowerment the discussion also focuses on 
the ethical acceptability of health research and on social inclusion of patients. Especially 
against the background of physical, psychological, and psychiatric treatments for disabled 
persons there are attempts to minimise disruption to the community they live in and to avoid 
exploitation of the patients and other lay participants. At the same time the inclusion of lay 
participants in the research process, as promoted by PHR, is supposed to provide adequate 
information for this group, ‘while providing useful data on patient perceptions of treatments’ 
(Ismail, 2009) (see, for example, Resnik, 2001). 
Proponents of patient rights argue that health-related issues and health research usually 
concern human beings; therefore, people should be involved in decision making at as many 
levels as possible. Accordingly, patients should come first in the design of health research 
programmes, since these are conducted to their benefit. (Ismail, 2009) As Goodare and Smith 
(1995) have pointed out, patients should be directly involved in helping set the research 
agenda, in defining the topics to be studied, designing the research programmes, defining the 
level of consent required for individuals to participate, etc. (see also Ismail, 2009) 
From health research there is increasing evidence that health is not exclusively a matter for 
health professionals; over the last decades (at least in developed countries and increasingly in 
developing countries as well) this subject has also been influenced by patients, since non-
communicable diseases, which often result from life style, are on the rise. Amongst health 
professionals at all levels and in all medical areas the concept of cooperation (in the sense of 
co-production) between patients and the health system is prevailing if a better life and well-
being are to be achieved. Particularly with reference to diseases such as diabetes, obesity, 
chronic kidney disease, or cardio-vascular diseases patient involvement can make a real 
difference. As Andersson et al. (2006) have shown patients’ health may improve much better 
if patients are actively involved in the decision making regarding their treatment and if they 
assume the responsibility for it to a large degree. 
All these societal developments that occurred in the last 50 to 55 years are drivers which 
contributed to a changing understanding of public health and patient participation. The social 
innovation of PHR has benefited from these developments and from policy arrangements 
(institutions such as certain laws, as well as funding provisions), and the study of the action 
field of this social innovation has to consider the co-evolutions of these developments. The 
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emergence of PHR coincides – or depends on – a growing scientific and political interest in 
programme evaluation and best practice cases. 
The quality of the research process and its evaluation is an important issue for PHR activists 
who aim at lending more credibility to their work and at enhancing its comparability with 
other approaches in health research. In practice this means that researchers monitor and 
document a participatory research project in order that intersubjective validity is ensured and 
the developments can be monitored any time. Quality assurance especially concerns the 
process, the context, and the results, whereby process may refer to the role of the lay 
researchers or the communication between the involved actors; context may refer to the local 
knowledge, collective learning, etc.; and results refer to the competence building of the 
participants (see Wright, 2012b, p. 423). 
Another indication of a step towards an institutionalisation of PHR is the fact that an 
increasing number of scientific journals are willing to publish participatory research results. 
Quality criteria are, for example, defined in the journal Progress in Community Campus 
Partnerships for Health. This journal exclusively publishes results from participatory 
research. 
Several initiatives were created by proponents of community-based health research to 
establish a basis for quality development. This can also be interpreted as a contribution to the 
institutionalisation of the field. An approach called ‘participatory quality development’ is 
supposed to develop and test instruments of quality control with the goal to improve the 
quality in health improvement (http://www.partizipative-qualitaetsentwicklung.de/). 
The normative approach of PHR and its attempt to be acknowledged by other scientific 
disciplines has already been mentioned. One additional step towards this direction is a critical 
debate on PHR-related values and the reflexivity of the entire approach and the project in 
focus. Participatory health research assumptions have to be questioned in order to avoid the 
impression of a missionary attitude. 
Critical reflexivity is seen as a core element of participatory research. This approach is linked 
to the theory of transformative learning. This theory, proposed by Ledwith and Springett 
(2010) and inspired by the anthropological theories of the Brazilian educator Paolo Freire, 
provides a framework for understanding collaborative communication and engagement that 
can lead to social change. It is based on the assumption that communication is critical to 
individual and community well-being and that participatory practice is a way for a 
community to operate with mutual respect between its members and with a common purpose, 
and not to neglect the global connection. Ledwith and Springett apply a cyclical reflection 
approach for the building of theory on the basis of empirical data collection and every-day 
action. Action is critically reflected in order to lead to new or improved action, etc. All 
involved participants (researchers, practitioners, lay persons) are united in the attempt to 
improve living conditions. 
The role of (professional) researchers is unconventional in the sense that they are not the only 
experts to determine the steps of the research project, to design the approach, and to interpret 
the data. They are not the only ones who explore possible solutions to a social problem. The 
participative approach calls the so far uncontested expertise into question. This creed requires 
a high level of professionalism, including a high degree of reflexivity on the quality of the 
researchers’ work and also on the power relations in our society which are reflected in 
professional relations. These power relations, especially with regard to the health sector, 
show some degree of variation across different countries. For instance, a health-related 
 121 
profession which has an academic status in one country may be still in a stage of 
development in another. Another example is the status of health care, social work, and 
therapeutic occupations in the Anglo-Saxon countries: there are faculties and research 
infrastructure dedicated to these fields, whereas in countries such as Germany and Austria 
professional associations like the chambers of physicians try to keep other health occupations 
at a distance. Established power relations also exist between the physician and the patient. It 
is traditionally a top-down relation. Professionals engaging in participatory health research 
have to abandon this paternalistic habitus, at least to some degree; they have to communicate 
with the patients – who are rather their clients – on the same footing, and consider the 
implications. This is meant by reflexivity. Also some abstraction is required in order to assess 
the degree of participation that is actually available to the client or patient or to another lay 
person and to evaluate to which extent the researcher is responsible for this degree. Even 
though this degree cannot be quantified or standardised, it can be assessed according to a 
multi-stage model that was developed by proponents of participatory health research based on 
Arnstein’s ladder of participation (1969) (see figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Multi-stage model of participation 
In the literature on PHR the normative goal is that the participants do not just participate but 
have some ownership in the decision making process (partial decision-making authority) 
related to crucial decisions on their lives by identifying, for example, what their health 
problems are and what measures have to be taken to improve their health. The model can be 
understood as evolutionary. During a project the participants can proceed from one phase to 
the next one; the last phase, which goes beyond participation, comprises all forms of self-
organised measures. These can be measures induced bottom up from the group of lay persons 
who also take the responsibility for the process and results. One example would be diabetes 
patients setting up a self-help group to support their fellow citizens and occasionally invite 
experts from a clinic or health organisation. The multi-stage model is not to be understood as 
a scale for the evaluation of the projects. Rather, it is supposed to provide some guidance for 
reflexivity and the direction a certain project has taken or intends to take; thereby, this model 
contributes to the quality of participatory health research. 
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Institutionalisation 
In the following section the focus will be on institutionalisation and legislation in support of 
PHR, illustrated by examples from Germany, Austria, the US, and Canada. 
 
Institutionalisation in Germany 
Rosenbrock (1998) assumes that the reluctant implementation of the Ottawa Charter in 
(West) Germany is rooted in the disastrous role of German health policy and the euthanasia 
programme during the Nazi regime. After World War II, medicine focused on the individual 
patient and not on a general health policy for parts of society or society as a whole. 
Proponents of a society-centered approach (social hygiene) from the Weimar Republic had 
either been killed or had emigrated. Instead, more than in any other industrialised country, the 
conservative middle class policy supported medical doctors in their class consciousness and 
prestigious position and endowed local general practitioners with the necessary power to 
virtually become idols, a development that later on continued in a political climate of neo-
liberalism throughout the 1980s and 1990s. So far, the establishment and implementation of 
preventive healthcare-related laws have failed in Germany and public health care is limited to 
preventive measures such as vaccination, health and safety regulations at the work place, the 
WHO European Health Cities Network, and the psychiatry reform. Apart from an impressive 
increase in public health-related studies at several German universities, it is also worth 
mentioning that there is an increased cooperation between the health sector, patients, and 
society in HIV prevention, and that there is an alternative health movement which started in 
the 1980s. However, the hegemony of neo-liberal thinking arising during the 1980s had 
precarious consequences for public health, the implementation of the Ottawa Charter, and for 
PHR. Neo-liberal policy making does not favour any increase in health sector-related 
governmental efforts and transfers the responsibility for health to the individual level. 
Accordingly, attempts to change German health care-related laws and to create a financially 
viable basis for a nation-wide prevention programme have failed. Some critics even fear a 
drawback of the PHR and prevention programmes that could already find funding (Kuhn, 
2011). The discovery and decoding of the human genome may play into the hands of those 
advocating individual medicine alone. Environmental factors are disregarded, while the focus 
is on the genome. 
In Germany, major parts of public funding for PHR was provided under the prevention 
research programme of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium 
für Bildung und Forschung; BMBF). The programme was installed in 2003 as an 
interdisciplinary programme aiming at identifying why and to what extent health-preventive 
measures can help improve people’s health and quality of life. One of the goals of prevention 
and health promotion is to increase individual responsibility, to avoid the need for early 
retirement, and to maintain and strengthen the quality of life and performance levels well into 
old age (http://www.bmbf.de/en/1236.php) Based on a close collaboration between 
prevention providers and scientists, effective and practice-oriented prevention offers are to be 
created in this way. 
The programme ran in four funding phases until 2012, for which application-oriented 
research projects were selected by external experts. Each funding phase focused on a specific 
target group for which health promotion is of particular sociopolitical relevance. Target 
groups included children, adolescents, elderly people, and socially disadvantaged people. 
About 60 projects were funded with 20.05 million euros. 
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The health-related focuses of the individual projects varied from nutrition, exercise, and 
stress management to company-based health promotion or addiction prevention. In this 
context the projects attempted to develop and test new concepts, programmes, and access 
channels in order to evaluate the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of measures, and to 
promote quality assurance, networking, and the development of structures in the field 
(http://www.knp-
forschung.de/?uid=580c784d0bb6f24f28fcce660951db9a&id=Seite3190&lang=en). 
 
Cooperation for Sustainable Prevention 
Under the prevention research programme the BMBF funded the project Cooperation for 
Sustainable Prevention (Kooperation für nachhaltige Prävention; KNP) which was launched 
in June 2009. The overriding goal was to create structures that make the results of prevention 
research more widely known in practice and politics, and to promote their sustainable 
utilisation. The intention was to strengthen the foundation of prevention in health care and 
other areas of society. In this respect, the KNP aimed at  
• further expanding the inter-project cooperation and communication structure in order 
to promote the exchange between key players from science, practice, and steering 
bodies; 
• gathering findings relating to effective prevention and health promotion; 
• preparing the central statements and results of prevention research in an appropriate 
way for practitioners and decision-makers and at supporting their dissemination; 
• reviewing and further developing methods and tools. 
Amongst other measures subject-related working groups on methods, practice, policy 
transfer, social inequality, participatory health research, and prevention and rehabilitation 
were established. The cooperation project very much relied on the collaboration of the 
participating projects. 
Another concern of the cooperation project was the sustainability of the targeted development 
of structures for German prevention research. Consequently, no measures were restricted to 
the projects supported within the BMBF funding programme. External participants were also 
invited to join and to contribute their ideas. (http://www.knp-
forschung.de/?uid=580c784d0bb6f24f28fcce 660951db9a&id=Seite3194&lang=en) 
 
Organisational structure 
The organisation of the cooperation project was highly participatory, in order to ensure 
networking of German prevention research ‘from the inside out’. The structural elements of 
the cooperation project reflected this self-image. Project partners from science and practice 
were invited to the two-day meetings (strategy meetings), together with other interested 
parties. The meetings were held once per year. In addition to a scientific part for the purposes 
of content-related exchange there was a strategic part that offered an opportunity to discuss 
and agree on a common procedure for the further development of prevention research. The 
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project was supervised by an advisory committee that supported and critically commented on 
developments. It consisted of top-level representatives from science, politics, and the health 
sector. 
Working groups functioned as structural elements of the cooperation project, where the 
participants could make a contribution in accordance with their interests and situation. The 
working groups addressed concrete issues, presented their results at the strategy meetings and 
expert conferences, and made use of the other dissemination possibilities of the cooperation 
project.  
A steering group managed the cooperation project, meeting quarterly for this purpose. It 
consisted of members of the three implementing institutions: Hannover Medical School 
(Institute for Epidemiology, Social Medicine and Health Systems Research), the University 
Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf (Department of Medical Psychology), and the Federal 
Centre for Health Education (Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche Aufklärung; BZgA). The 
task of the steering group was to plan forthcoming steps, prepare working papers for the 
advisory committee, strategy meetings, and working groups, and to support and coordinate 
their initiatives (http://www.knp-
forschung.de/?uid=580c784d0bb6f24f28fcce660951db9a&id= Seite3192&lang=en). 
In 2010 all participants of the project Cooperation for Sustainable Prevention (KNP) agreed 
on a memorandum concerning the funding of prevention research and issued 
recommendations and guidelines for the governance of action research. This memorandum 
was passed by 15 research societies and published in the scientific journal ‘Das 
Gesundheitswesen’ (Walter et al., 2012). 
One of the working groups was committed to Participatory Health Research. This working 
group was dedicated to participatory research methods and specifically to the content of 
participatory health research; it determined activities and topics in the field and served as a 
network for projects funded under these research priorities. The working group intended to 
promote participatory health research as a means of enabling science and institutions in the 
practical field to jointly acquire new knowledge that contributes to improving health. The 
PHR working group cooperated with the International Collaboration on Participatory Health 
Research (http://www.knp-
forschung.de/?uid=580c784d0bb6f24f28fcce660951db9a&id=Seite3206&lang=en). 
Apart from related funding priorities of the German Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research, an important institutional basis for participatory health research has been provided 
by laws regulating prevention research. Rosenbrock criticised that instead of creating a legal 
foundation for this new direction in health policy for systematic prevention, health promotion 
and PHR policy makers delegated the issues in a minimalist way to the statutory health 
insurances which had no political power and were bound to adhere to the health insurance 
laws. It is thus typical that there is not one single law dedicated to the provisions of 
prevention, health promotion, and PHR; however, there are several laws reflecting the lack of 
commitment on the part of the legislative power. 
Several laws support for this approach: 
• the Social Security Code (Sozialgesetzbuch), 
• the statutory health insurance (Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung), 
• the statutory accident insurance (Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung), 
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• and the German Occupational Safety Act 
(Arbeitsschutzgesetz/Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz) 
regulate prevention and self-help, occupational help promotion, rehabilitation, participation 
of physically and mentally challenged persons, inclusion, the organisation of a safe work 
place, and the management of health authorities at the workplace. 
 
Supplementary regulations 
The prevention-related guideline (‘Prävention) issued by the German statutory health 
insurance defines the action fields and quality criteria that have to be fulfilled by the health 
insurances with regard to prevention. Fields of action comprise physical activities, nutrition, 
stress management, and drug abuse (§ 20 Abs. 1 SGB V). With regard to the promotion of 
occupational health the action fields are ‘counseling for occupational health and life and work 
style that help promote health’, and ‘networking of inter-company prevention activities’. (§ 
20a SGB V) 
 
Institutionalisation in Austria 
Austria’s health policy realised the importance of the Ottawa Charter in 1988, when 
‘committed health policymakers established what was called Forum Gesundes Österreich 
(Forum for a Healthy Austria), later renamed Fonds Gesundes Österreich’ (FGÖ; Fund for a 
Healthy Austria): This organisation was specifically dedicated to health promotion and began 
its work by means of information campaigns and coordination tasks. (http://www.fgoe.org/) 
Austria’s accession to the European Union has provided additional impetus to health 
promotion: The EU Member States have been establishing transnational networks since 1996. 
‘Through their cooperation and exchange of experiences on various health promotion 
initiatives’ (http://www.fgoe.org/) these networks helped improve quality in this area. Fonds 
Gesundes Österreich was the platform through which Austria could participate in these EU 
activities. 
‘The European dimension of health promotion was not the only one to gain significance in 
Austria. The national dimension also became increasingly important. A team of legislators 
and experts responded to this trend by drawing up a bill on health promotion. The outcome of 
the debates on this subject is the Health Promotion Act’ (http://www.fgoe.org/), passed by 
parliament in 1998. It is committed to a holistic approach to health adopted by the WHO. 
This Act ‘strengthened the ‘new’ version of Fonds Gesundes Österreich, not least by 
expanding its responsibilities and its budget’ (http://www.fgoe.org/). It made PHR projects 
possible. 
Since 1 August 2006 the FGÖ has been a subsidiary of the Gesundheit Österreich GmbH 
(Health Austria Ltd). 
It is the mission of the Fonds Gesundes Österreich to ‘help people in Austria enjoy healthier 
lifestyles and healthier environments in their day-to-day lives in all spheres of life. (The 
organization thus) addresses people wherever they live, and love, learn, work and play. The 
healthy decision should be the simple and obvious decision an individual makes in whatever 
environment he or she lives’ (http://www.fgoe.org/). The emphasis is that this ‘should be a 
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decision within everyone’s reach’: The organisation wants to support initiatives to overcome 
social inequalities that limit health opportunities and make it more difficult for people to 
benefit from activities and actions that promote health. As in other PHR strategies, the FGÖ 
aims at ‘promoting ways of thinking and acting as a part of people’s everyday live’s, at 
motivating individuals to do more for their health, and also at encouraging them to make 
healthy changes in the social structures in which they live’. (all quotes: http://www.fgoe.org/) 
This institutionalisation sets the frame – legally and financially – for participatory health 
research. However, this does not mean that all activities of the FGÖ comply with the norms 
of PHR. In principle, they are community-based but only some fulfil participatory criteria. 
‘With a variety of measures, activities, and cooperative projects, Fonds Gesundes Österreich 
seeks to identify and change the factors crucial for health and well-being for people and their 
environments’ (http://www.fgoe.org/). 
Priority setting in Austria 
The Fonds Gesundes Österreich currently has six priority areas in which it conducts activities 
to enhance health awareness in Austria: 
• physical exercise, 
• nutrition, 
• mental and emotional health, 
• children and young people in non-school settings, 
• employees in small and medium-sized enterprises, 
• older people in regional settings (urban vs. rural). 
‘These priority subjects permeate all regular activities such as project funding, networking, 
special events, and PR’. The major instrument is to ‘initiate and coordinate efforts to develop 
exemplary model projects especially in these priority areas. These projects cover behaviors 
and conditions relevant to health which occur particularly in connection with specific 
characteristics such as age, gender, social status, or nationality’(all quotes: 
http://www.fgoe.org/). 
One additional goal of the FGÖ’s activities is ‘to raise public awareness about health and to 
support and create healthy living conditions and lifestyles’. Major instruments in this area 
include the ‘development of appropriate structures and networks, in continuing education and 
in support for the self-help movement as well as in information and education relevant to 
health’ (all quotes: http://www.fgoe.org/). 
In addition, the FGÖ hosts many events, amongst which the annual health promotion 
conferences and meetings are the most important ones.  
In 2014, 7.25 million euros were invested in supporting 92 projects (FGÖ Fond Gesundes 
Österreich, 2014, p. 12). Financial support is only granted to projects involving total funding 
of more than 10,000 euros. There are possibilities of co-funding of practical projects; in these 
cases the FGÖ generally provides one-third to at most two-thirds of the verified total costs.  
The FGÖ is part of a management structure headed by the Gesundheit Österreich GmbH 
(Health Austria Ltd.). 
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Gesundheit Österreich GmbH (GÖG) 
“GÖG was established on 1 August 2006 on the basis of a federal statute, as a national research and 
planning institute for health care and a competence and funding centre of health promotion. 
ÖBIG (Österreichisches Bundesinstitut für Gesundheitswesen) and FGÖ (Fonds Gesundes Österreich), 
institutions established in 1973 and 1998, respectively, have become business units integrated in the 
GÖG structure, with GÖG as their universal legal successor. On 1 July 2007, the third business unit 
was founded: BIQG (Bundesinstitut für Qualität im Gesundheitswesen [i.e. Federal Institute for Quality 
in Health Research, note of the author]). 
This set-up is to provide for a coordination of structural planning, health promotion and quality 
assurance. The structure of a holding company was designed to create synergy from which all 
stakeholders in Austria’s health care system, and thus all citizens of Austria, may benefit. 
GÖG has one shareholder: the Austrian Federal Government, represented by the Federal Minister of 
Health. In the context of its research activities, GÖG is not bound by instructions from its shareholder. 
GÖG has two subsidiaries: Gesundheit Österreich Forschungs- und Planungs GmbH provides services 
for public institutions, while Gesundheit Österreich Beratungs GmbH works for clients in the private 
business sector.” (http://www.goeg.at/en/GOEG-Aufgaben.html) 
 
Laws in Austria 
Health Promotion Act 
The Fonds Gesundes Österreich was established ‘to help people in Austria enjoy healthier 
lifestyles and healthier environments in their day-to-day lives in all spheres of life’. It was 
legally made possible through the Health Promotion Act of 1998 
(http://www.fgoe.org/health-promotion/infos). 
The Federal Act on Measures and Initiatives on Health Promotion, Education and 
Information (Health Promotion Act; HPA) pertains to measures and initiatives which help to: 
1. ‘maintain, promote, and improve the public’s health in a holistic sense and at all stages of 
life; 
2. provide education and information on avoidable diseases and on the emotional, mental, 
and social factors influencing health’ (http://www.fgoe.org/hidden/englische-
version/fgoe05dez-gfg_98-eng1.pdf). 
Strategies for achieving the objectives comprise (http://www.fgoe.org/hidden/englische-
version/fgoe05dez-gfg_98-eng1.pdf): 
1. The establishing of ‘structures for health promotion and disease prevention’ which 
incorporate and take existing institutions and structures into account. 
2. The developing and commissioning of contextual programmes and offers directly 
connected to the people in communities, cities, schools, enterprises, and in the public 
health care system. 
3. The developing of programmes ‘for specific target groups in order to inform and advise 
them about healthy lifestyles, disease prevention, and strategies for coping with chronic 
diseases and crises’. 
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4. The conducting of scientific programmes ‘for further developing health promotion and 
disease prevention as well as epidemiology, evaluation, and quality assurance in this 
field’. 
5. The supporting of ‘continuing education of people working in health promotion and 
disease prevention’. 
6. The coordinating of ‘the measures and initiatives outlined in (the) Federal Act with 
existing activities in health promotion’. 
The legal framework for the execution of the tasks is provided to the non-profit making 
Fonds Gesundes Österreich, a fund in the meaning of the Federal Foundation and Fund Act 
(Bundes-Stiftungs- und Fondsgesetz), which is responsible for the implementation of the 
measures and initiatives outlined in the Federal Act. Federal funds available under the 
currently valid Federal Finance Act (Bundesfinanzgesetz) can be requested from the Federal 
Government for activities of the Fonds Gesundes Österreich. 
(http://www.fgoe.org/hidden/englische-version/fgoe05dez-gfg_98-eng1.pdf) 
The Federal Finance Act responded to the problem of rising health care costs which require 
that in addition to the structural changes already initiated more steps be taken to promote 
health. It thus became ‘a health policy goal to expand the public’s knowledge of health risks 
and health-promoting measures, to convey information about a healthy lifestyle, and to 
support the development of positive behaviors and of health-promoting conditions for this 
purpose’ (http://www.fgoe.org/hidden/englische-version/fgoe05dez-gfg_98-eng1.pdf).  
The abovementioned Act from 1998 defines the goal and the strategies for the use of 
earmarked funds made available by means of value-added tax revenues and budgeted at the 
Federal Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs. The funds to be made available 
annually as of the entry into force of this Federal Act allow coherent, long-term planning and 
implementation in the field of health promotion, education, and information.  
This additional funding was intended as a supplement to preventive measures already 
established for promoting and conducting practical activities and for supporting scientific 
studies on health promotion. It also serves as a means of creating a lasting support structure 
for measures and initiatives of this kind. A total of 100 million Austrian schillings (approx. 
7.7 million euros) annually was allocated to the Health Promotion Initiative when the 
respective law was enacted in 1998. 
 
Institutionalisation in the US 
In the United States, the National Institutes of Health (NIH; a component of the US 
Department of Health and Human Services) as a governmental institution with a significant 
budget for funding health-related research plays a key role in Participatory Health Research. 
In the US the term generally used is Community-Based Participatory Research (CBPR). The 
NIH portfolio of CBPR annually increases in quantity of funded projects and in participating 
institutes or centres, with support from the following NIH institutes and offices: 
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 NCI National Cancer Institute 
NIAAA  National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 
NICHD  National Institute of Child Health and Human Development 
NIDA National Institute on Drug Abuse 
NIDCR National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research 
NIEHS National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences 
NIMH The National Institute of Mental Health 
NIMHD National Institute on Minority Health and Health Disparities 
NINR National Institute of Nursing Research 
OBSSR Office of Behavioral and Social Sciences Research 
ORWH Office of Research on Women’s Health 
 
 
‘Additionally, a CBPR Scientific Interest Group (SIG) has been established at the NIH with 
the purpose of strengthening the communication among federal agencies with an interest in 
supporting CBPR methodologies in the conduct of biomedical and behavioral research, 
education, health care delivery, or policy. The NIH CBPR SIG’s priority objectives are as 
follows: 
1. Serve as a focal point to identify and develop new coordinated activities in order to 
increase awareness, understanding, and use of CBPR; 
2. Critically evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of CBPR; 
3. Identify challenges and opportunities for supporting CBPR; encourage research training 
and career development opportunities for CBPR researchers and practitioners; and 
4. Serve as a network through which information can be shared regarding community-based 
participatory research activities’ 
(https://obssr.od.nih.gov/scientific_areas/methodology/community_based_participatory_r
esearch/index.aspx). 
Especially the NIH Office of Behavioral and Social Sciences Research (OBSSR) recognised 
that in order to maximise the relevance, dissemination, and implementation of research for 
the public, communities need to be actively engaged in research undertakings, including 
active participation in research, in the translation and application of research findings to 
community-based practice and public health initiatives, and in using research-generated 
evidence in support of public health policy decisions. Accordingly, the OBSSR is committed 
to promoting community-partnered research and the advantages it offers in advancing the 
public’s health. Towards this end, the OBSSR has developed numerous activities and 
resources in recent years. These initiatives are supposed to encourage and support 
community-partnered research with the aim of accelerating public health research and the 
impact of research findings. The OBSSR also offers a great variety of training activities for 
PHR. 
(https://obssr.od.nih.gov/scientific_areas/methodology/community_based_participatory_resea
rch/) 
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US government and private interest in supporting PHR 
In the United States, public as well as private money is crucial for the support of participatory 
health research. On the private side ‘both large and small philanthropic organizations, 
including the W. K. Kellogg Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation, the California Endowment, and the Aspen Institute have begun providing 
substantial support for action oriented participatory research’ in health and related fields.’ 
(Minkler et al., 2003) Through its Community Health Scholars Program the Kellogg 
Foundation also has supported postdoctoral level training for a new cadre of researchers with 
experience in participatory health research and a commitment to the use of this approach in 
their future academic careers.  
Furthermore, some foundations have played a leading role in advocating and funding a form 
of participatory health research, i.e. the participatory evaluation or ‘empowerment evaluation’ 
as a means of increasing community capacity; these foundations also actively engaged those 
affected by particular programme interventions in ongoing efforts to assess and improve these 
interventions’ outcomes and effectiveness (Fetterman et al., 1996; Whitmore, 1998).3 Similar 
to many cases of technological innovation (Mazzucato, 2013), government funding is 
considered to play the most important role in the social innovation of participatory health 
research. (Cf. Minkler et al., 2003) 
Over the last decade a significant increase in federal and private funding of participatory 
health research could be observed, with an annual support estimated at 45 million US dollars 
(in 2002 alone) even prior to the new substantial capital injection by the CDC (Center for 
Disease Control) and the National Institute of Health which was dedicated to the support of 
such research. ‘However, notwithstanding this important trend, such funding still represents a 
tiny fraction of the billions of dollars in support available for more traditional research 
efforts. Furthermore, studies conducted in both the United States and Canada have 
documented that researchers continue to have substantially greater difficulty in obtaining 
funding for CBPR than in obtaining funding for other research.’ (Minkler et al., 2003. See 
also Israel et al., 1998; Chopyak and Levesque; Green et al., 1995; Maurana et al., 2000). 
In the US, the problems of health care disparities in population groups that are economically 
marginalised (including racial and ethnic minorities; low-income, rural, and inner-city 
population; women; and children) have been designated as a priority by the Department of 
Health and Human Services. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) is a 
subdivision of the US Health Department and aims at providing research findings in order to 
make health care safer, increase its quality, and make it more accessible, equitable, and 
affordable; the agency also aims at working within the US Department of Health and Human 
Services and with other partners in order to make sure that the research findings are 
understood and used. (http://www.ahrq.gov/). 
 
Institutionalisation in Canada 
In Canada, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), a subdivision of Health 
Canada (the department of the government of Canada with responsibility for national public 
health), is an agency dedicated to health research and to the managing of health-related 
                                                          
3
 ‘Participatory evaluation figures prominently in The California Endowment, The Public Health Institute’s 
$137 million Partnership for the Public’s Health program, as well as in The Rockefeller Foundation/The 
California Endowment’s Work and Health Initiative.’ (Minkler et al. 2003) 
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issues. The objectives of the CIHR are both to gain new knowledge from research and to 
ensure that new knowledge is translated into practical results. The CIHR was created on 7 
June 2000 under the Bill C-31 and its mandate is: ‘To excel, according to internationally 
accepted standards of scientific excellence, in the creation of new knowledge and its 
translation into improved health for Canadians, more effective health services and products 
and a strengthened Canadian health care system’ (Parry et al., 
http://www.irsc.gc.ca/e/44954.html). The CIHR is committed to what is defined as 
‘integrated knowledge translation’ (IKT) which ‘relies on a partnered approach to research 
founded on an ever-growing body of experience encapsulated within the literature of 
participatory research’ (Parry et al.). Participatory research has been defined by the Royal 
Society of Canada as the systematic enquiry with those affected by the issue under study in 
order to induce action or social change; it is increasingly recognised ‘as a highly effective 
method of enhancing relevance of and adding value to health research. The equally important 
goals of participatory research are to undertake quality research with a high level of scientific 
rigour; provide benefit to the knowledge users working in partnership with the researchers; 
and develop knowledge that is applicable to other settings’ (Parry et al.; http://www.cihr-
irsc.gc.ca/e/43626.html). 
The Canadian Institutes of Health Research has two funding schemes for this kind of 
research: the Project Scheme and Foundation Scheme (http://www.cihr-
irsc.gc.ca/e/44954.html#s10). Some of the Canadian provinces have research funding 
organisations and funding schemes of their own. 
 
Obstacles 
In practice there are many obstacles to action research and particularly to participatory health 
research. It is often difficult for professionals to leave their expert role behind and 
acknowledge that fellow participants may have the same level of expertise. Conversely, this 
also applies to lay persons and patients – they often feel inferior to experts and shy away 
from giving their cases and beliefs more prominence within a project; they possibly lack the 
necessary skills or self-confidence to formulate what they want or think that it is less 
important. In other cases great expectations are raised on both sides in terms of participation 
and the progress a project can make. If these expectations are not met, the whole project and 
the approach may be negatively affected as well. 
There are also some institutional barriers. Funding for those projects is very limited and 
funding organisations do not always understand the principles of participation in this context 
but rely on objective indicators because these are easier to assess. From the point of view of 
institutions participation is often not desired because this concept does not fit into their 
operational structures. Project outcomes are usually only considered if they do not imply 
significant changes of the existing set up (see also Wright, 2012a, p. 99). 
 
Examples of social innovations 
The field of PHR is not only very broad but also very heterogeneous and shows a lot of 
variations across time and countries. For illustration a few examples from Germany, Austria, 
Canada, and the US have been chosen.  
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Germany 
Immigrant peer researchers and HIV prevention in Germany: The PaKoMi project and video. 
The PaKoMi Project in Germany was a 3-year participatory research project (2010-2013) 
including immigrant communities in Germany who were not considered in HIV community 
work for a long time, even though some immigrant groups were more severely affected than 
Germans or other immigrant groups. The project aimed at improving the involvement of 
immigrant communities in HIV research and prevention services and was conducted by the 
national association of community-based AIDS service organisations (Deutsche AIDS-Hilfe 
e.V.) in the cities of Berlin, Hamburg, Osnabruck, and Dortmund in collaboration with 
partners from different immigrant communities, AIDS service providers, and researchers 
from the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB). Community members were trained 
as peer researchers and supported to conduct PHR projects in the four cities. The project also 
included case studies. (http://communitybasedresearch.ca/cuexpo-
2011//res/pub/docs/Gimmigrant_128.pdf) 
The video on this project ‘documents some of the activities and gives voice to the 
perspectives of the different partners involved. Community members and peer researchers 
from African, Central and Eastern European immigrant communities reflect on their 
experiences, their motivation to get involved and the lessons learned. Community voices 
form the core of the video, while being juxtaposed, intertwined, and contrasted with the 
perspectives of the service providers and researchers.’ The benefits and challenges are 
explored from the different points of views. (http://communitybasedresearch.ca/cuexpo-
2011//res/pub/docs/Gimmigrant_128.pdf) 
BIG: Movement as Investment for Health  
BIG (2005-2007) is a health-related project in Germany; it is run by the Institute of Sport 
Science and Sport at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg and stands for Movement as 
Investment for Health (Bewegung als Investition in Gesundheit); it aims at ‘improving health 
outcomes by investing in preventative physical activity interventions’ (http://www.big-
projekt.de/en/the-big-approach/). In the recent years, the pertinence of this approach in 
modern public health has become visible through the increase in scientific evidence proving 
the benefits of physical activity – or movement. There is an increasing scientific evidence of 
the positive effects of physical activity which, for instance, may help: to prevent chronic 
diseases such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes, cancer, hypertension, and obesity; to reduce 
conditions such as back pain; to improve physical and mental well-being; and to increase 
people’s self-confidence and enhance social support. (Cf. http://www.big-projekt.de/en/the-
big-approach/) 
‘There are, however, social disparities in accessing the benefits of physical activity: 
individuals with a higher socio-economic status in society have better health outcomes and 
are also more physically active than those with more restricted access to education, a lower 
income, and more challenging life conditions’ (http://www.big-projekt.de/en/the-big-
approach/). 
There is also a gender-related inequality. ‘Given these facts, the goal of the BIG project is to 
create more opportunities for women in difficult life situations to partake in physical 
activities and to benefit from the positive effects of movement’. (http://www.big-
projekt.de/en/the-big-approach/) Existing studies demonstrate that this aim is rather difficult 
to achieve, since to date only few physical activity interventions focusing on socially 
disadvantaged groups could achieve sustainable, improved health outcomes. The practical 
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challenge of the BIG project is to reach those people who need physical activity most, but 
who have the least opportunity to access it and profit from the related health benefits. The 
scientific challenges of BIG are twofold: firstly, to develop and implement innovative 
interventions for the ‘realization of sustainable promotion of movement for women in 
difficult life situations’, and secondly, ‘to develop adequate instruments for the evaluation of 
the health outcomes of these interventions’. (http://www.big-projekt.de/en/the-big-approach/) 
In order to surmount these practical and scientific challenges, the BIG project has developed 
several approaches, see http://www.big-projekt.de/en/the-big-approach/. 
 
Austria 
The project Dementia-friendly Community Pharmacy (2013-2015) is carried out by the 
Institute for Palliative Care & Organisational Ethics of the Faculty for Interdisciplinary 
Research and Training at the IFF University of Klagenfurt. The project aims at promoting 
health and wellbeing of families, informal caregivers, and people living with dementia by 
means of fostering the implementation of needs-based, person-centered care in community 
pharmacies, thereby developing a health-promoting community pharmacy environment. 
Community pharmacies have been chosen because people suffering from dementia and their 
caregivers are regular users of community pharmacy services. Pharmacies are an easily 
accessible health care setting within the wider community setting; therefore, they offer 
specific opportunities for health promoting interventions. Conceptually, the project is based 
on principles of health promotion and palliative care: it acknowledges the specific living 
situation of the patient and aims at fine-tuning of all services and responsible people who deal 
with the patient instead of applying a general solution. The ultimate goal is to foster dignity 
and quality of life and reduce stigmatisation. 
In this project, participatory research is used as an approach to ensure participation of all 
partners involved in the development of health promoting interventions, for example equal 
collaboration between research and practice, iterative loops for reflection and evaluation, etc. 
Caregivers and people living with dementia are involved as community partners, community 
pharmacies, counseling services and other community based services. Health promotion 
organisations and palliative care experts as practice partners and the project team as research 
partners take part as well. (http://www.uni-
klu.ac.at/pallorg/downloads/EAPC_2013_20130527_PP.pdf) 
‘The project “Dementia-friendly Community Pharmacy” is funded by “Fonds Gesundes 
Österreich / Gesundheit Österreich GmbH”, “Wiener Gesundheitsförderung WIG” and 
financially supported by “Österreichische Apothekerkammer ÖAK“’ (http://www.uni-
klu.ac.at/pallorg/inhalt/2109.htm). 
 
Canada 
Primary health care: Applying the principles within a community-based participatory health 
research project which began in a Canadian women’s prison in 2005. 
The purpose of this research which received a research grant from the Canadian Institutes of 
Health Research was to determine the feasibility of engaging imprisoned women in 
community-based participatory research and to identify, with the help of and in cooperation 
with the women, which health concerns had to be addressed. The set-up of this project 
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comprised the integration of primary health care and community-based participatory 
research. It also included a settings-based approach to health promotion and the 
transformative action research determined the overall design of that study. Imprisoned 
women, correctional centre staff, and academic researchers participated in a collaborative 
way. The study was conducted during the main short sentence (two years or less) in a 
minimum or medium security women’s correctional centre in a Canadian province. In-depth 
interviews were conducted with 16 imprisoned women; in-depth group interviews were 
facilitated with 16 members of the correctional centre staff. 21 themes, which emerged from 
participatory, inductive, and content analysis of the data, were presented at a face-to-face 
meeting attended by 120 imprisoned women, 10 members of the correctional centre staff, and 
5 academic researchers. ‘Underlying values and principles for the project were identified 
prior to a discussion of the results.’ (Martin et al., 2009) In the course of this meeting the 
themes were grouped into five major categories: addictions and mental health; HIV, hepatitis, 
and infections; health care in prison; life skills and re-entry into society (including 
homelessness and housing); children, family, and relationships. Numerous suggestions for 
health interventions and participatory projects were generated, each relating to one of the five 
major categories (Cf. Martin et al., 2009). 
 
USA 
In an effort to improve the health of American Indian and Alaska Native (AI/AN) tribal 
communities, the project Research for Improved Health: A National Study of Community - 
Academic Partnerships (2009-2013) aimed at understanding in which ways communities 
engage as partners in their own (the communities’) health research and intervention projects. 
By including also other communities of color and communities that face health disparities in 
the study design the project also aimed at making beneficial findings within the AI/AN 
communities available to a broader audience. 
The project lasted four years. Quantitative and qualitative methods were applied and 
partnering with community and academic health research as well as intervention partnerships 
across the country were promoted to better understand the factors that contribute to and 
detract from meaningful and effective community-academic partnerships. ‘AI/AN tribal 
communities have taken a strong lead in this area of work because they face some of the most 
significant health disparities in (Canada) and have similarly suffered some of the greatest 
documented research abuses.’ (http://narch.ncaiprc.org/index.cfm) 
The study was conducted by the National Congress of American Indians Policy Research 
Center, the University of New Mexico Center for Participatory Research, and the University 
of Washington Indigenous Wellness Research Institute. It received funds from the Native 
American Research Centers for Health (NARCH) through the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (http://narch.ncaiprc.org/index.cfm). 
 
Development and impact 
Summarising the abovementioned features, it can be said that participatory health research is 
developing towards a health science approach especially designed to analyse and promote 
participatory processes. The beneficiaries are mainly marginalised people who have been 
deprived of social, economic, political, or other participation in issues in which society is 
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usually involved. Activities of PHR are set up to promote such participation in a networked 
and communicative way. PHR is an international phenomenon and at the moment in a phase 
of consolidation, in which the scientific criteria as well as the advantages and disadvantages 
with regard to other health science approaches are assessed. The formation of an international 
organisation and the establishment of several national and international networks (e.g. in 
Germany the Netzwerk für Partizipative Gesundheitsforschung) are working towards a 
scientific acknowledgment of PHR as a discipline of its own. The commitment of several 
national health and research ministries to install research programmes and funding tools is 
enhancing this development. Proponents of PHR are optimistic that in the near future this 
approach will be established on a solid scientific basis and advance towards helping 
marginalised people more efficiently and more effectively. 
 
Conclusions 
PHR holds considerable relevance, since it aims at studying the complex health problems of 
the 21st century and at taking action to address them in an adequate way. A number of 
foundations and government agencies have played a leading role in promoting and funding 
PHR; however, reluctance to fund PHR remains common. PHR presents a number of 
challenges for practitioners as well as for health funders. ‘The longer time frame required for 
partnering with communities and the related need for sustained financial commitment may be 
problematic for those seeking clear funding goals and short-term outcomes. Evaluating the 
effects of CBPR also may prove challenging, although new approaches, including tools for 
examining shorter term system-level effects, appear to hold promise. Funders can lay 
important groundwork for CBPR by supporting the community building and organizational 
capacity development, that is a critical precursor to and first step in such partnership 
approaches’ (Minkler et al., 2003). 
Participatory Health Research proves to be a rich and worthwhile practice field for the study 
of social innovations. This overview reveals that networks, institutions, and cognitive frames 
have to be the products of co-evolutionary developments in order to make PHR work. All 
these elements vary across countries – and yet we have analysed and understand PHR as a 
global phenomenon, since actors are connecting across borders and learning from each other. 
The question as to how important technologies are for this action field still requires a more 
in-depth research. To date, there is evidence that technologies such as the internet, which 
make social networks possible, play a role, though not a dominant one. Human genome 
research, on the other hand, has to be evaluated more carefully. Although this technology 
supports the argument of individual medicine, the conclusion cannot be that personal health is 
a matter of individual responsibility alone. On the contrary, as the arguments in this case 
study have shown so far, concerted efforts on the part of policy makers (not only from the 
health sector), health care professionals, research, and from society are needed to support 
marginalised people in their efforts to participate in our health system. This also means that 
joint efforts have to be undertaken in order to transform certain parts of the present health 
system and to make it more compliant to the needs of marginalised people. It remains to be 
seen whether the necessary actions will be taken within our health systems or whether – as 
the case studies on social housing and Participatory Health Research have shown – external 
shocks such as wars, medical scandals, and epidemics must serve as an impetus for 
sustainable transformation.  
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METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS AND INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Purpose of case studies: Empirical data provision for analysis and theory 
building 
WP2 serves as a case collection and database for the other WPs in the project, especially 
work packages 3 (measurement), 4 (social vs. technological analysis), 5 (life cycles) and 6 
(policy analysis). It also allows for the testing of the theoretical framework developed in WP 
1. Accordingly, the purpose of the case studies is to collect empirical data that can be 
analysed through the different theory lenses of the project in the different work packages. 
Therefore the basic versions of the case studies (particularly comprehensive cases) will be 
rather descriptive and “analytically neutral” and provide the ground for pluralistic theoretical 
analysis within the different work packages. 
 
Units of analysis  
The idea of the comprehensive case study is to take a long term perspective on “basic” social 
innovations such as social housing or fresh water supply that have become mainstream in 
most parts of Europe over time. It follows the logic of an embedded single case study, which 
means that it focuses on a single phenomenon, yet attention is also given to different subunits 
(Yin, 2003:39ff). This means it does not examine, for example, social housing in a certain 
town, nor the activities of one specific organisation or social movement. It rather aims to 
understand the neuralgic points and crucial components in the diffusion process of the social 
innovation, at least since the 19th century, including the variety in adaptations across different 
contexts and backgrounds such as different welfare regimes or economic and political crises. 
Nevertheless, the most important and illustrative implementations of the social innovation 
will be analysed in more detail as subunits of analysis according to the categories of the 
template. This logic is illustrated in a simplified way in Fig.1. 
 
Figure 1: Scope of analysis in comprehensive case studies 
 
Accordingly, the comprehensive cases will describe the historical development of the social 
innovation and focus specifically not only on the invention, but also largely on the diffusion 
process (Fagerberg, 2003; Westley et al., 2007). For illustration, we added a case study on the 
social context of bicycles as a technological innovation from the long-established research 
field of sociological technology studies (Bijker, 1995). Although it follows a slightly different 
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template and contains some theoretical perspectives, its scope is comparable to a 
comprehensive case study as aspirated for in our context. Moreover, it shows that 
technological and social innovation have been jointly analysed before. The other example we 
included is a conference paper on the life cycle of the intelligence test (McGowan/Westley, 
2013). It illustrates what a life cycle analysis in WP 5 could look like. 
The individual case studies on the other hand will focus on one specific organisation, 
movement or initiative, such as, a micro credit initiative for Roma population in Hungary 
(“Way out” programme). It takes the approach of a holistic single case study that largely 
builds on a single unit of analysis (Yin 2003: 40). Moreover, they mostly focus on the present 
and examine innovations that are beyond invention, yet still in a diffusion process. Different 
aspects of this one specific case are examined, while the macro perspective plays a 
subordinate role here. 
There are little differences in the template designs to account for these different approaches 
in the units of analysis. Both templates depart from the social problem that is addressed by 
the social innovation. Since the template for the comprehensive cases puts a strong emphasis 
on the development process, different streams, and changes over time (CCS – Part 2), this 
part comes next here. This perspective is less prominent in the individual case studies (ICS – 
Part 3), since the scope and observation period is substantially narrower. Influences and 
context factors are important in both case types and contain more or less the same questions. 
Both templates close with discussions and key lessons. 
 
Table 1: Structures of comprehensive and individual case studies 
Comprehensive Case Study Individual Case Study 
I. Social problem I. Social problem 
II. Solution, development, and impact II. Solution, influences, and context factors 
III. Influences and context factors III. Development and impact 
VI. Discussion and key lessons VI. Discussion and key lessons 
 
Data collection 
WP 2 tells the story of different social innovations. Its task is to collect sources, data and 
other material as a basis for the future WPs. Both case studies should build on different types 
of sources for data triangulation. 
The comprehensive case studies provide a historical perspective of a certain social 
innovation from a macro level. The results will especially be of interest for the life cycle 
analysis in WP 5. The partners should do desktop research, if necessary also archival 
research, looking for historical, political, economic, legal, etc. secondary sources or data and 
figures (also quantitative) which help to clear the history of the social innovation. If actors 
involved in the development or distribution of the social innovation can be accessed (housing 
companies, cooperatives, etc.) an interview could be considered with a representative to get 
his/her interpretation of the development. 
 Country perspectives in comprehensive cases: The partners who are not directly 
responsible for the cases will be asked to add their national perspective later in the process. 
More specific instructions will follow here. 
 145 
 
The individual case studies concentrate more on the organisational level. They offer more 
possibilities for primary data collection, particularly interviews, but also for other data 
sources for triangulation. The historical perspective is not as important here as for the 
comprehensive case studies. But if partners run into evidence, which seems to be relevant for 
the life cycle analysis in WP 5, it would be a nice bonus. 
 
 
Suggestion for length 
• Comprehensive case studies: about 80 – 100 pages (including country perspectives) 
• Individual case studies: about 30 – 40 pages 
Given the comprehensiveness of the template and the fact that data might not be available to 
the same amount for all different parts, it is obvious that some sections of the template can be 
filled in in less detail than others. However, regardless of whether the case is comprehensive 
or individual, the collected data may be of interest for the partners in other WPs during the 
research process, so information for all questions in the template should be provided if 
possible.  
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I. TEMPLATE Comprehensive case studies 
 
CCS - PART 1) Social problem addressed 
1.1 Field(s) of problem  
In which field(s) of activity did the targeted social problem originally arise (e.g., health, care, 
economic development, work integration)? Are there also any interrelated effects in other 
fields? 
1.2 Targeted beneficiary group(s) 
Who were/are the targeted beneficiaries? What specific characteristics did/do they have that 
might be relevant for or a symptom of their marginalisation (e.g., economic vulnerability, 
physical handicaps, migration status, lack of access to the education system, etc.)?  
1.3 Problem background 
Please describe the context conditions that were/are relevant for the emergence of the social 
problem or the marginalisation of the target group. This could be the general economic 
situation, political situation, welfare policy, a poor education system, religious constellations, 
demographical or technological development, etc. and/or more specific problems such as 
market power abuse, discrimination, corruption, etc. 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages)1 
WP 1 Which individual (or collective) capabilities of marginalised people were 
deprived? Which functioning could not be achieved? 
 How were conversion rates affected by the context conditions and how did 
they contribute to marginalisation? 
 Can specific networks (actor constellations), cognitive frames or institutions be 
identified that were relevant for the problem situation? 
 Can power structures, according to Mann’s adapted framework, be identified 
that were relevant for the problem situation? 
 Is there a specific field (Fligstein) where the social innovation occurs? 
WP 3 Is there a clear beneficiary that is being targeted? 
 Was the social problem addressed individual-specific or group-specific or 
context-specific? 
 How did contextual conditions that were/are relevant relate to each other? (e.g. 
complementarities, co-evolution, etc..) 
WP 4 Did technological innovation cause marginalisation or make existing 
marginalisation worse? 
 Did technological innovation pave the way for social innovation? 
WP 5 Did social problems addressed by social innovation emerge in certain context 
conditions? 
WP 6 Which policies/political constellations did contribute to the social problem? 
 
 
                                                          
1
 All questions in the boxes do not have to be explicitly addressed within the case study, but the collected data 
should allow the analysis of these questions within the work packages. 
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CCS - PART 2) Social innovation solution, development and impact 
2.1 Antecedents and invention of the SI solution approach 
When can the first activities of the social innovation be detected? How did they address the 
social problem, and how did these activities relate to previous solution approaches (if any) for 
the problems constellation? 
How did they provide novelty in terms of goods, services or processes (including new forms 
of organisations, resources, or communication)? 
2.2 Phases of development of the SI 
How did the social innovation develop over time and across different contexts? Can different 
phases or crucial incidents be identified in the development of the social innovation towards a 
broadly adapted standard? What were the relevant societal levels of action? 
2.3 Streams of development of the SI 
Were there also different “streams” of the social innovation, i.e., different forms and 
adaptions in the implementation of the basic idea? Did these streams converge or diverge 
over time? 
2.4 Status quo of the SI 
How is/was the social innovation established today? Please describe who (e.g., public 
authorities, private companies, associations and cooperatives, public-private-partnership, etc.) 
provides which services, products, activities, etc. to whom and under which conditions? 
2.5 Impact of the SI  
In a long-term perspective, how did the social innovation unfold its impact in its initial field 
of activity and beyond (e.g., did the improved sanitation and health situation also improve the 
situation of the target group on the labour market)?  
How can the positive impact of the social innovation be described (e.g., improved access to 
resources, learning options, self-confidence, etc.)? At which structural levels of society did 
the social innovation achieve impact? 
Have there also been any negative impacts in the targeted field of activity and beyond? 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 To what extent has the social innovation been incremental (adaptive change in 
practice, e.g. with a focus on products or services that addressed identified 
market failures effectively), institutional (changes in the Social Grid practice, 
e.g. reconfiguring existing market structures to create social value), or 
disruptive (radical change in practice, e.g. with a focus on politics and social 
movements, changing the cognitive frames around markets and social 
systems/structures) across its diffusion process? 
WP 3 Evaluative Space: which was/is the initial goal of the SI process? Did it change 
over time? 
 Who has been/is being empowered by the SI process? 
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WP 4 Which kind of technological artefacts and infrastructures were required for the 
development of the SI? Which kind of novel technological artefacts (TA)2 and 
/ or new infrastructures were involved in the development of the SI? 
 Which kind of key techniques (TC)3 are required for the SI? 
Was it necessary to acquire new techniques (TC) in order to implement the SI? 
WP 5 Can specific reoccurring developmental stages be identified for SI? 
 Can their development be described as linear, cyclical, etc.? Are there path 
dependencies in SI? 
 What drivers or obstacles fostered and hindered the social innovation? 
 Which cognitive frames, networks and institutions did change along the 
lifecycle of the SI? How did the dynamics between these elements change? 
 Did the reduction of one form of marginalisation cause another? 
WP 6 … 
 
 
CCS - PART 3) Influences and relevant context factors 
3.1 Social problem 
Have there been any changes, extensions, etc. in the addressed social problems or 
marginalised target groups, from a long-term perspective? Can different reasons be identified 
over time that were responsible for the rise and persistence of the social problem? Are there 
reoccurring patterns that repeatedly caused a need/fostered the adaptation and distribution of 
the social innovation? 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 Did reasons for marginalisation change over time? 
WP 3 How did empowerment in one dimension cross-fertilize empowerment in other 
dimensions? 
 Which complementarities among context- and actor-characteristics were 
crucial? 
WP 4 Did the lack of access to new technological artefacts (TA) and infrastructures 
(TI) have an impact on the marginalisation? 
 Did the lack of access to training to acquire relevant techniques (TC) have an 
impact on the marginalisation? 
WP 5 Did the social innovation solve or mitigate social problems? 
 Did the social innovation (usually) meet the needs of different target groups? 
WP 6 … 
 
                                                          
2
 Technological artefacts (TA) including “hardware” (TAh), i.e. any kind of material artefacts, and 
“software/Apps” (TAa), i.e. any kind of software apps, protocols, services, blueprints…. 
3
 This can include: TCs – Somatic techniques (e.g. swimming, singing …), TCe – Exosomatic techniques (e.g. 
making fire, writing, haircutting, riding a bike or car, …), TCp – Primary production techniques (meaning 
human appropriation of net primary production in agriculture and exploitation of the lithosphere), TCi – 
Industrial techniques, TCc – Communication techniques, etc. 
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3.2 Solution approach  
Did the concrete activities of how the social innovation approached the social problem 
change and renew over time (including new forms of organisations, resources, or 
communication)? Describe the most relevant activities to prevent, mitigate or solve the 
marginalisation (e.g., service provision, lobbying, advocacy, etc.)?  
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 Which cognitive frames, networks and institutions did change during the 
course of the lifecycle of the SI? 
 To what extent has the social innovation been incremental (with a focus on 
products or services that addressed identified market failures effectively), 
institutional (reconfiguring existing market structures to create social value), or 
disruptive (with a focus on politics and social movements, changing the 
cognitive frames around markets and social systems/structures) across its 
diffusion process? 
WP 3 How stable were the social innovation solution approaches? How dependent 
were the solution approaches to contingencies (individual characteristics of 
promoter/inventor, contextual circumstances)? 
WP 4 How did education/training contribute to the diffusion of the social innovation? 
 Did the solution involve support in acquiring the relevant technological 
artefacts (TA)? 
Did the solution involve support in access to the relevant infrastructure (TI)? 
WP 5 Can the development of cognitive frames, networks and institutions be 
described as linear, cyclical, etc.? Are there path dependencies in SI? 
WP 6 … 
 
3.3 Actors and networks  
Can specific networks or individual actors be identified as key players in the idea generation, 
invention phase, the innovation phase and the diffusion phase of the social innovation? 
Are there also typical “adapters” that did not necessarily develop the social innovation 
(incremental innovation), but adapted it to their context and accordingly contributed to the 
diffusion of the social innovation? Can they be located in a specific societal sector (civil 
society, market, public)? Did networks play a role in the adaptation process? 
Were relevant actors or members of networks personally affected by the social problem 
addressed? Was or is the target group involved in the value creation process? Did the target 
group members take any collective action? 
Which networks or other actors were important as catalysers, multipliers, or adapters? (e.g., 
sponsors, public authorities, politicians pushing for beneficial changes in legal frameworks, 
celebrities that increased public attention, etc.)? Where those actors particularly powerful? 
Why? 
Did those actors and networks influence legislation, education curricula, or other institutions? 
Which influence did these actors and networks exert on narratives and public discourses 
regarding the social problem/social innovation? 
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Please indicate if typical networks or other actors were present when a social innovation was 
invented or adapted. If so, did these different network and actor constellations change across 
different phases of the social innovation? Were these constellations influenced by the general 
framework conditions (e.g., the political welfare regime)? 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 How did networks contribute to the social innovation over time? 
 How did networks relate to institutions and cognitive frames? Which dynamics 
of change did occur? 
WP 3 Distributive aspect: which actors had access to the SI process? Which barriers 
can be identified at different levels (e.g. geographical distance, knowledge 
gaps, etc.)? 
WP 4 Which scientific networks (e.g. disciplines) contributed to the success of the 
SI? 
 Which industrial actors contributed to the success of the SI? 
WP 5 What actor constellations were present during important developmental stages 
of the SI? 
 Did different societal spheres (e.g., civil society incl. philanthropy, private 
markets, and public authorities) contribute at different points of dissemination 
to the SI? 
WP 6 How were policies driven by actors and network constellations? 
 
3.4 Narratives and discourses  
Please, indicate which narratives or discourses accompanied / were relevant for the addressed 
social problem and the social innovation. How did these change over time? Did they inhibit 
or foster social innovations? 
In which social domains can these discourses and narratives be located (media, 
parliament/city council, civil society/community)? What were the instruments of the 
discourse (reports, petitions, opinion leaders, media campaigns, letters to the editor etc.)? 
Who was involved in these discourses (e.g., the beneficiaries)? Can any parties be identified 
that dominated these discourses or narratives? Why could they do so (e.g., power, 
knowledge)? 
Did those narratives influence the perception and acceptance of legislation, education 
curricula, or other institutions? 
Did they affect the perception and acceptance of any social networks? 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 What was the role of cognitive frames in social innovations? How did they 
relate to institutions and social networks? 
WP 3 How can cognitive frames possibly be measured? What is the evaluative space 
here? 
WP 4 Which technological visions and scientific advances were used in the 
discourse? 
 151 
WP 5 Did changes in cognitive frames represent specific phases in social innovation 
lifecycles? 
WP 6 How were policies driven by cognitive frames? 
 
3.5 Rules, norms, and policies 
Were there any policies (in the thematic field or generally) that contributed to the social 
problem? Were there any legal / constitutional triggers or framework conditions that 
contributed to the social problem? Were there any other rules or norms that contributed to the 
social problem? 
Were there any policies (within the relevant thematic field or elsewhere) that fostered or 
inhibited the social innovation, e.g. by altering its capacity and function to tackle 
marginalisation? Were there any legal / constitutional triggers or framework conditions that 
fostered or inhibited the social innovation? Were there any other rules or norms that fostered 
or inhibited the social innovation? 
To what extent have rules, norms and policies contributed towards systemic change through 
social innovation in this field of study? 
Is ‘tackling marginalisation’ (either via poverty reduction, social inclusion, etc.) a central, 
explicit objective or outcome of policies or other rules and norms? Why/Why not? 
Did the social innovation build on or recombine existing policies, norms and rules? 
Were relevant policies located on a regional, national or international (EU) level? Can 
different influences of different policies be detected across different regions? 
At what stage of the development process did supporting policies become most relevant? 
What are the diffuse and unintended effects of policies and/or other rules and norms in this 
field of study? 
Did existing policies change as a consequence of the social innovation? Did other rules and 
norms change as a consequence of the social innovation? How was this achieved, and by 
whom? Were those particularly powerful? 
How did policies or other rules and norms relate to social networks relevant for the social 
innovation? 
How did policies or other rules and norms represent or relate to public discourses and 
narratives? How was policy making influenced by them? Vice versa, how did policies and 
other rules and norms influence public discourse? 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 What was the role of institutions in social innovations? How did they relate to 
cognitive frames and networks? 
WP 3 Which networks/links were shared by social innovators and policy makers? 
 Were there complementary policies that made a difference? On which basis did 
their complementarity rest (e.g., same beneficiaries, same social problem 
addressed, complementary social problem addressed, etc.)? 
WP 4 What was the role of research, technology and innovation policy during social 
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innovation process? 
 What was the role of education (and life-long learning) policy during social 
innovation process? 
 Did technological norms and standards play a role? 
WP 5 What was the role of policy makers during the social innovation process? 
WP 6 Which (social) innovation policies have been successful in the past? In which 
contexts? 
 Which role did policies play in ecosystems fostering social innovation in the 
past? 
 How do policies relate to cognitive frames and social networks? 
 
3.6 Resources 
Please describe and compare different forms of funding that were used to finance the social 
innovation (e.g., own assets of target group, donations, membership fees, grants, social 
investments, regular loans, public funds, etc.)? For what purposes were these resources 
deployed (e.g., machinery, commodities, advisory, etc.)? 
Were other forms of resources (voluntary work, social networks, natural resources, etc.) 
relevant for the social innovation? Please describe their role. 
Did those resources change during different phases of the diffusion process or different 
background conditions? 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 How did power structures affect the resource endowments of the marginalised 
over time?  
WP 3 How relevant was the combination of different resources (complementarities 
vs. substitutes)? 
 How did eventual complementarities come about? 
 Who had/has access to the crucial resources and on what did/does accessibility 
depend upon? 
WP 4 Did the nationalization / privatization of relevant infrastructures impact on the 
access to social innovations? 
WP 5 Are there recurring dynamic patterns during the course of the diffusion of a SI? 
 Do different forms of financing contribute to the same diffusion results? 
 Can the role of capital forms (social, cultural, ecological, etc.) for social 
innovations be specified? 
WP 6 … 
 
3.7 Social and technological innovation 
Was the social innovation fostered by or related to technological innovations like 
- a new general purpose technology (e.g., information and communication 
technologies) and/or by scientific advances? 
- a new artefact (e.g. mobile phone)? 
Was the social innovation fostered by or related to a new infrastructure (e.g. Internet)? Was 
the social innovation fostered by the emergence of new techniques? 
 153 
How did technological innovation contribute to the social innovation, or vice versa? Did 
technological innovation help to distribute the social innovation or even improve it? 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 … 
WP 3 Can patterns of sequencing be observed? 
WP 4 Can recurring patterns on the interplay of social and technological innovation 
be specified? 
 To which step in the social innovation and diffusion process do technological 
innovations contribute? (idea generation, invention, innovation, diffusion 
process incl. adaptation, etc.) 
WP 5 … 
WP 6 … 
 
3.8 Social impact measurement  
Have there been any attempts to measure the impact of the social innovation (on the level of a 
specific intervention, a national level by public authorities, etc.)? Did these measurements 
influence the development of the social innovation? 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 … 
WP 3 What dimensions and approaches for impact measurement have previously 
been used? How did they contribute to the development of the SI? 
 Were there any discussions about the impact of the SI, its measurement or the 
meaning of measured results? 
 Which actors/groups/beneficiaries were considered in previous impact 
measurement attempts? 
WP 4 … 
WP 5 … 
WP 6 Where there any evidence-based policies during the SI lifecycle? 
 
3.9 Further obstacles and drivers of the diffusion of the SI 
What further contextual factors can be identified that fostered or inhibited the diffusion of the 
SI over time (e. g., legal framework conditions, economic/political situation or crisis, 
dominant welfare regime, ecological situation, power structures, cognitive frames, religious 
constellations, demographic developments, etc.) 
What further factors can be identified on the level of the innovative agents that fostered or 
inhibited the diffusion (e.g., organisational capacity of the inventor, resources, resistance of 
employees, value set or skills of the leaders)? 
Can different patterns of drivers and obstacles be identified, like for bottom-up vs. top-down 
adaptions of the innovations or related to different context conditions? 
If the innovations were adapted across different regions or national borders, were there 
specific obstacles? 
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WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 … 
WP 3 Which contexts did matter? In particular, which definition/level of context did 
matter? (e.g., geographical surrounding, political/economic situation at the 
macro or global level, belonging to professional groups, etc.) 
WP 4 … 
WP 5 How do different influential factors in the diffusion process of SI interrelate? 
 What are the different obstacles for different kinds of SI (e.g., bottom-up vs. 
top-down)? 
WP 6 … 
 
 
CCS - PART 4) Discussion and key lessons 
Based on the findings throughout the template, what are the key lessons for … 
- Policy makers? 
- Investors (resource structure)? 
- Inventors / investees? 
 
 
CCS – ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES [subunits of analysis] 
The descriptions in the comprehensive case studies, particularly in parts 2 and 3, should be 
illustrated with a small range of examples, i.e., subunits of analysis. In addition to the 
information relevant for illustrating a specific argument, please also provide the following 
data specifically for these examples (cf. also ICS part 2): 
 
• Solution approach: main activities and novelty in context 
• Actor constellations: inventors, adaptors, other relevant actors, involvement of target 
group 
• Resources: financial and others  
• Social vs. technological innovation: interrelations 
• Social (innovation) policy: support through a certain policy, impact of SI on legislation 
• Social impact measurement: application and relevance  
• Further drivers and barriers for the diffusion of the SI: economic/political situation or 
crisis, dominant welfare regime, ecological situation, religious constellations, 
demographic developments, etc.) 
• Impact: positive and potentially negative 
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II. TEMPLATE Individual case studies 
 
ICS - PART 1) Social problem addressed 
1.1 Problem area 
In which field(s) of activity does the targeted social problem arise (e.g., health, care, 
economic development, work integration)? Are there also any interrelated effects in other 
fields? 
1.2 Targeted beneficiary group(s)  
Who are the targeted beneficiaries? What specific characteristics do they have that might be 
relevant for or a symptom of their marginalisation (e.g., economic vulnerability, physical 
handicaps, migration status, lack of access to the education system, etc.)?  
1.3 Problem background 
Please describe the context conditions that are relevant for the emergence of the social 
problem or the marginalisation of the target group. This could be the general economic 
situation, political situation, welfare policy, a poor education system, religious constellations, 
demographical development, technological development, etc. and/or more specific problems 
such as market power abuse, discrimination, corruption, etc. 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 Which individual (or collective) capabilities of marginalised people are 
deprived? Which functioning could not be achieved? 
 How are conversion rates affected by the context conditions and how do they 
contribute to marginalisation? 
 Can power structures be identified according to Mann’s adapted framework 
that are relevant for the problem situation? 
WP 3 Is there a clear beneficiary that is being targeted? 
 Is the social problem addressed individual-specific or group-specific or 
context-specific? 
 How do contextual conditions that were/are relevant relate to each other? (e.g., 
complementarities, co-evolution, etc.) 
WP 4 Did technological innovation cause marginalisation or make existing 
marginalisation worse? 
 Did technological innovation pave the way for social innovation? 
WP 5 Can specific networks (actor constellations), cognitive frames or institutions be 
identified that are relevant for the problem situation? 
 Do social problems addressed by SI emerge in certain context conditions? 
WP 6 Which policies/political constellations did/do contribute to the social problem? 
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ICS - PART 2) Solution, influences and relevant context factors 
2.1 Solution approach  
How does the social innovation approach address the social problem? Describe the most 
relevant activities to prevent, mitigate or solve marginalisation (e.g., services provision, 
lobbying, advocacy, etc.)? 
What is the novelty in terms of goods, services or processes (including new forms of 
organisations, resources, or communication)?  
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 Which cognitive frames, networks and institutions are addressed by the SI? 
 To what extent has the social innovation been incremental (adaptive change in 
practice, e.g. with a focus on products or services that address(ed) identified 
market failures effectively), institutional (changes in the Social Grid practice, 
e.g. reconfiguring existing market structures to create social value), or 
disruptive (radical change in practice, e.g. with a focus on politics and social 
movements, changing the cognitive frames around markets and social 
systems/structures) across its diffusion process? 
WP 3 How stable are social innovation solution approaches? How dependent are 
solution approaches to contingencies (individual characteristics of 
promoter/inventor, contextual circumstances)? 
WP 4 Which kind of technological artefacts and infrastructures are required for the 
development of the SI? Which kind of novel technological artefacts (TA)4 and 
/ or new infrastructures are involved in the development of the SI? 
 Which kind of key techniques (TC)5 are required for the SI? 
Is it necessary to acquire new techniques (TC) in order to implement the SI? 
 How does education/training contribute to diffusion of the social innovation? 
Does the solution involve support in acquiring the relevant technological 
artefacts (TA)? 
Does the solution involve support in access to the relevant infrastructure (TI)? 
WP 5 … 
WP 6 … 
 
2.2 Actors and networks  
Can specific networks or individual actors be identified as key players in the idea generation, 
invention phase, the innovation phase and the diffusion phase of the social innovation? Are 
relevant actors or members of networks personally affected by the social problem addressed? 
Is the target group involved in the value creation process? Do members of the target group 
take any collective action? 
                                                          
4
 Technological artefacts (TA) including “hardware” (TAh), i.e. any kind of material artefacts, and 
“software/Apps” (TAa), i.e. any kind of software apps, protocols, services, blueprints …. 
5
 This can include: TCs – Somatic techniques (e.g. swimming, singing …), TCe – Exosomatic techniques (e.g. 
making fire, writing, haircutting, riding a bike or car …), TCp – Primary production techniques (meaning human 
appropriation of net primary production in agriculture and exploitation of the lithosphere), TCi – Industrial 
techniques, TCc – Communication techniques, etc. 
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Which networks or other actors were/are important as catalysers, multipliers, or adapters 
(e.g., sponsors, public authorities, politicians pushing for beneficial changes in legal 
frameworks, celebrities that increased public attention, etc.)? Where those actors particularly 
powerful? Why? 
Did/do those actors and networks influence legislation, education curricula, or other 
institutions? 
Which influence did/do these actors and networks exert on narratives and public discourses 
regarding the social problem/social innovation? 
Are there also typical “adapters” that did not necessarily develop the social innovation 
(incremental innovation), but adapted it to their context and accordingly contribute(d) to the 
diffusion of the social innovation? Can they be located in a specific societal sector (civil 
society, market, public)? Did/do networks play a role in the adaptation process? 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 How did/do networks relate to institutions and cognitive frames? Which 
dynamics of change did/do occur? 
WP 3 Which complementary actors needed to be involved contemporarily? 
 Distributive aspect: which actors have access to the SI process? Which barriers 
can be identified at different levels (e.g., geographical distance, knowledge 
gaps, etc.)? 
WP 4 Which scientific networks (e.g. disciplines) contribute(d) to the success of the 
SI? 
 Which industrial actors contribute(d) to the success of the SI? 
WP 5 How do different societal spheres (e.g., civil society incl. philanthropy, private 
markets, public authorities, etc.) contribute at different points of dissemination 
of the SI? How do they interact? 
 How do marginalised groups contribute to different forms of social innovation? 
WP 6 … 
 
2.3 Narratives and discourses 
Please, indicate which narratives or discourses accompany / are relevant for the addressed 
social problem and the social innovation. Do they inhibit or foster social innovations? Can 
already any changes be detected?  
In which social domains can these discourses and narratives be located (media, 
parliament/city council, civil society/community)? What are the instruments of the discourse 
(reports, petitions, opinion leaders, media campaigns, letters to the editor etc.)? 
Who is involved in these discourses (e.g. the beneficiaries)? Can any parties be identified that 
dominate these discourses or narratives? Why can they do so (e.g., power, knowledge)? 
Do those narratives influence the perception and acceptance of legislation, education 
curricula, or other institutions? 
Do they affect the perception and acceptance of any networks? 
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WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 What is the role of cognitive frames in social innovations? How do they relate 
to institutions and social networks? 
WP 3 How can cognitive frames possibly be measured? What is the evaluative space 
here? 
WP 4 Which technological visions and scientific advances were used in the 
discourse? 
WP 5 Do changes in cognitive frames represent specific phases in social innovation 
lifecycles? 
WP 6 How are policies driven by cognitive frames? 
 
2.4 Rules, norms, and policies 
Were/are there any policies (in the thematic field or generally) that contribute(d) to the social 
problem addressed? Were/are there any legal / constitutional triggers or framework 
conditions that contributed to the social problem? Were/are there any other rules or norms 
that contribute(d) to the social problem? 
Are there any policies (within the relevant thematic field or elsewhere) that foster or inhibit 
the social innovation, e.g. by altering its capacity and function to tackle marginalisation? Are 
there any legal / constitutional triggers or framework conditions that fostered or inhibited the 
social innovation? Are there any other rules or norms that fostered or inhibited the social 
innovation? 
To what extent do rules, norms and policies contribute towards systemic change through 
social innovation in this field of study? 
Is ‘tackling marginalisation’ (either via poverty reduction, social inclusion, etc.) a central, 
explicit objective or outcome of policies or other rules and norms? Why/Why not?  
Does the social innovation build on or recombine existing policies, norms and rules? 
Do relevant policies exist on a regional, national or international (EU) level? Can different 
influences of different policies be detected across different regions? 
At what stage of the development process did/do supporting policies become most relevant? 
Have existing policies been changed as a consequence of the social innovation? Did other 
rules and norms change as a consequence of the social innovation? How was/is this achieved, 
and by whom? Are those actors particularly powerful? 
How do policies or other rules and norms relate to social networks relevant for the social 
innovation? 
How do policies or other rules and norms represent or relate to public discourses and 
narratives? How is policy making influenced by them? Vice versa, how do policies and other 
rules and norms influence public discourses? 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 What is the role of institutions in social innovations? How do they relate to 
cognitive frames and networks? 
WP 3 Which networks/links were shared by social innovators and policy makers? 
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 Which policies are able to change distribution and accessibility to 
resources/inputs for the SI process? 
 Were there complementary policies that made a difference? On which basis did 
their complementarity rest (e.g., same beneficiaries, same social problem 
addressed, complementary social problem addressed, etc.)? 
WP 4 What is the role of research, technology and innovation policy during social 
innovation process? 
 What is the role of education (and life-long learning) policy during social 
innovation process? 
 Do technological norms and standards play a role? 
WP 5 What is the role of policy makers during the social innovation process? 
WP 6 Which (social) innovation policies are currently successful / have been 
successful in the past? In which contexts? 
 Which role do policies play in ecosystems fostering social innovation? 
 
2.5 Resources 
What type of financial resources are used to finance relevant activities of the social 
innovation (e.g., own assets of target group, donations, membership fees, grants, social 
investments, regular loans, public funds, etc.), and for what purposes are these resources 
deployed (e.g., machinery, commodities, advisory, etc.)? 
What other types of resources (voluntary work, social networks, natural resources, etc.) 
were/are relevant for the social innovation? Please describe the role of the different resources. 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 … 
WP 3 How is the distribution and accessibility to these resources? 
WP 4 Does the nationalization / privatization of relevant infrastructures impact on the 
access to social innovations? 
WP 5 What role do financial resources play for SI (invention, diffusion, etc.)? 
 Can the role of the type of capital (social, cultural, ecological, etc.) for social 
innovations be specified? 
WP 6 … 
 
2.6 Social and technological innovation 
Is the social innovation fostered by or related to technological innovations like 
- a new general purpose technology (e.g., information and communication 
technologies) and/or by scientific advances? 
- a new artefact (e.g. mobile phone)? 
Is the social innovation fostered by or related to a new infrastructure (e.g. Internet)? Is the 
social innovation fostered by the emergence of new techniques? 
How did/do technological innovation contribute to the social innovation, or vice versa? 
Did/does technological innovation help in the diffusion of the social innovation or even 
improve it? 
 
  
 160 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 … 
WP 3 How is the distribution and accessibility to technology and its use? 
 Whose perception on the use of the technology matters / is being 
promoted/diffused? 
WP 4 To which step in the social innovation and diffusion process do technological 
innovations contribute? (idea generation, invention, innovation, diffusion 
process incl. adaptation, etc.) 
WP 5 Which patterns do emerge in the interplay of social and technological 
innovations? 
WP 6 … 
 
2.7 Social impact measurement  
Have there been any attempts to measure the impact of the social innovation (on the level of a 
specific intervention or organisation or a national level, etc.)? 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 … 
WP 3 What dimensions and approaches for impact measurement are currently used? 
 
(How) do they contribute to the development of the SI? 
 What is the chosen evaluative space? 
WP 4 … 
WP 5 … 
WP 6 … 
 
2.8 Further drivers and obstacles for the diffusion of the SI 
What further contextual factors can be identified that fostere(d) or inhibite(d) the diffusion of 
the social innovation (e. g., legal framework conditions, economic/political situation or crisis, 
dominant welfare regime, ecological situation, power structures, cognitive frames, religious 
constellations, demographic developments, etc.)? 
What further factors can be identified on the level of the innovative agents that fostered or 
inhibited the diffusion (e.g., organisational capacity of the inventor, resources, resistance of 
employees, value set or skills of the leaders)?  
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 … 
WP 3 How can actors be ‘nested’ into contexts? Do different networks overlap? If 
yes, how do they overlap? Which actors are taking part in more than one 
network? 
WP 4 … 
WP 5 How do different influential factors in the diffusion process of SI interrelate? 
 
What are different barriers for different kinds of SI (e.g. bottom-up vs. top-
down)? 
WP 6 … 
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ICS - PART 3) Social innovation development and impact 
3.1 Development of the SI 
Can different phases and crucial events in the development of the SI be identified today? Are 
there perhaps different “streams” within the social innovation? 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 How does the development of SI relate to changes in relevant cognitive frames, 
institutions and social networks? 
 
How can the innovation be located in Mann’s framework of power 
sources/fields of innovation? 
 To what extent has the social innovation been incremental (with a focus on 
products or services that address(ed) identified market failures effectively), 
institutional (reconfiguring existing market structures to create social value), or 
disruptive (with a focus on politics and social movements, changing the 
cognitive frames around markets and social systems/structures) across its 
diffusion process? 
WP 3 Do any new actors/relevant groups get involved? (especially marginalised 
groups with previously little voice) 
WP 4 … 
WP 5 Can specific recurring developmental stages be identified for SI? 
 What actor constellations were present during important developmental stages 
of the SI? 
WP 6 … 
 
3.2 Impact of the SI 
What kind of impact can be attached to the social innovation today (e.g., improved access to 
resources, learning options, self-confidence, etc.)? Does the social innovation also unfold its 
impact beyond the initial field of activity (e.g. effects on the labour market)? 
How can the positive impact of the social innovation be described? Are there also potentially 
negative impacts in the targeted field of activity and beyond? 
 
WP Possible questions of analysis (addressed within work packages) 
WP 1 … 
WP 3 What was/is the evaluative space for assessing that the impact of the SI process 
is positive or negative? 
WP 4 … 
WP 5 … 
WP 6 … 
 
 
ICS - PART 4) Discussion and key lessons 
Based on the findings throughout the template, what are the key lessons for … 
- Social innovators? 
- Policy makers? 
- Investors and funders (resource structure)? 
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